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The significance of the many property problem
Title / Series / Name
Phenomenology and Mind
Publication Volume
22
Publication Issue
Pages
Authors
Editors
Keywords
Perception
Intentionality
Adverbialism
Intentionalism
Propositional attitudes
Content
Naïve realism
Physicalism
Intentionality
Adverbialism
Intentionalism
Propositional attitudes
Content
Naïve realism
Physicalism
URI
http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14018/14016
Abstract
One of the most influential traditional objections to Adverbialism about perceptual experience is that posed by Frank Jackson’s ‘many property problem’. Perhaps largely because of this objection, few philosophers now defend Adverbialism. We argue, however, that the essence of the many property problem arises for all of the leading metaphysical theories of experience: all leading theories must simply take for granted certain facts about experience, and no theory looks well positioned to explain the facts in a straightforward way. Because of this, the many property problem isn’t on its own a good reason for rejecting Adverbialism; and nor is it a puzzle that will decide amongst the other leading theories.
Topic
Publisher
Place of Publication
Type
Journal article
Date
2022
Language
ISBN
Identifiers
https://doi.org/10.17454/pam-2214