Constructing a world for the senses

dc.contributor.author	Farkas, Katalin
dc.contributor.editor	Kriegel, Uriah
dc.contributor.unit	Department of Philosophy
dc.date.available	2022-03-29T08:41:18Z
dc.date.issued	2013
dc.description.abstract	It is an integral part of the phenomenology of mature perceptual experience that it seems to present to us an experience-independent world. I shall call this feature 'perceptual intentionality'. In this paper, I argue that perceptual intentionality is constructed by the structure of more basic sensory features, features that are not intentional themselves. This theory can explain why the same sensory feature can figure both in presentational and non-presentational experiences. There is a fundamental difference between the intentionality of sensory experiences and the intentionality of thoughts: unlike the former, the latter is not constructed.
dc.description.uri	http://ukcatalogue.oup.com/product/9780199764297.do#.UPb26K5iaNA
dc.identifier.uri	https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14018/9287
dc.identifier.url	http://ukcatalogue.oup.com/product/9780199764297.do#.UPb26K5iaNA
dc.language.iso	eng
dc.publisher	Oxford University Press
dc.publisher.place	New York, Oxford
dc.relation.ispartof	Phenomenal intentionality
dc.source.epage	115
dc.source.spage	99
dc.title	Constructing a world for the senses
dc.type	Book chapter
dspace.entity.type	Publication
refterms.dateFOA	2022-03-29T08:41:18Z

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