Farkas, Katalin2025-04-162025-04-1620230309-70131467-834910.1093/arisup/akad009https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14018/27353On a Cartesian conception of the mind, I could be a solitary being and still have the same mental states as I currently have. This paper asks how the lives of other people fit into this conception. I investigate the second-person perspective—thinking of others as ‘you’ while engaging in reciprocal communicative interactions with them—and argue that it is neither epistemically nor metaphysically distinctive. I also argue that the Cartesian picture explains why other people are special: because they matter not just for the effect that they have on us.engcc-byhttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/https://m2.mtmt.hu/api/publication/34774571Farkas, K 2023, 'The Lives of Others', Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume, vol. 97, no. 1, pp. 104-121. https://doi.org/10.1093/arisup/akad009