Huoranszki, Ferenc2023-06-162023-06-1620210048-3893, 1574-927410.1007/s11406-020-00307-1http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14018/13896Agents have no control over the formation of their own zygote. Others may do. According to a well-known argument, the so-called Zygote Argument for incompatibilism, these facts, together with a prima facie plausible further assumption, are sufficient to prove that human agents cannot be responsible for their actions if they live in a deterministic universe. This paper argues that the lack of agents’ control over the constitution of their own zygote can undermine their responsibility only in exceptional conditions and that the occurrence or non-occurrence of those conditions has nothing to do with the truth or falsity of determinism. What undermines agents’ responsibility in the situations described by the Zygote Argument is the occurrence of some specific initial conditions which may render the manipulation of agents’ behaviour possible, and not the truth of determinism.engCC BY 4.0https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/Journal articlehttps://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11406-020-00307-1