Farkas, Katalin2023-06-162023-06-1620230309-7013, 1467-834910.1093/arisup/akad009http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14018/13872On a Cartesian conception of the mind, I could be a solitary being and still have the same mental states as I currently have. This paper asks how the lives of other people fit into this conception. I investigate the second-person perspective—thinking of others as ‘you’ while engaging in reciprocal communicative interactions with them—and argue that it is neither epistemically nor metaphysically distinctive. I also argue that the Cartesian picture explains why other people are special: because they matter not just for the effect that they have on us.engCC BY 4.0https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/Journal articlehttps://academic.oup.com/aristoteliansupp/article/97/1/104/7190180