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Social Network Analysis of Regional Policy Making in South Transdanubia, Hungary

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SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS OF REGIONAL POLICY MAKING IN SOUTH TRANSDANUBIA, HUNGARY

Katalin Kovacs, Endre Sik and Andrew Cartwright¹

ABSTRACT

This report provides a social network analysis of regional policy making in South Transdanubia. The region is a pioneer in the formulation of regional institutional systems in Hungary whilst facing some of the hardest development challenges. As elsewhere in the EU, there have been a range of efforts to support regional policy making and development, including the establishment of regional development councils and agencies. This report focuses on the regional development processes, relevant policy structures, and presents key findings from social network analysis. First, the report examines the network relations between key partners from public and private spheres. Next, to determine the structural equivalence between members in regional policy making, a CONCOR analysis of strategic ties is discussed and findings are presented. This research is supported by qualitative data, including interviews with a range of actors involved in regional planning. The report identifies several problematic issues in regional policy making, including tensions among different agencies, and offers some suggestions for addressing these issues.

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1. Introduction

According to the last micro-census carried out in the year 2005, the Southern Transdanubian Region has the smallest population of the seven NUTS II regions in Hungary (i.e. planning or statistical regions within the European Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics). Made of the three counties, Baranya, Somogy and Tolna, the population was 975,815 persons or approximately 10 % of the national total. As with other parts of the country, South Transdanubia has experienced a decline in population. The 2005 micro-census showed 16,553 fewer people than in 2001, which places the region second in terms of population decline. With an area of 1,416,856 hectares (around 15 % of the total country surface), in terms of physical size, South Transdanubia is the third largest NUTS II unit of Hungary. The region is the most rural region in Hungary, with a population density of 68.9 persons/km². The character of its geographical surface can explain the low population density index: the typical landscape is hilly with numerous small settlements in its valleys.

Beyond the regional “capital” of Pécs (population 150,000), middle-sized towns are relatively scarce in this region. Pécs is the county seat of Baranya county, while Kaposvár, the seat of Somogy county, is the second largest settlement in the region with some 65,000 inhabitants. The third county seat, Szekszárd, is the smallest urban center in the region (with 35,000 dwellers) but the largest in Tolna county. Paks, which is home to Hungary’s only nuclear power station, has 21,000 dwellers and is also located in Tolna county. It is worth mentioning that the town of Paks consistently ranks among the top few town in terms of GDP per capita. This has the effect of increasing the indices of the county considerably, which highlights how low achievements are across the rest of the county. From among the 654 settlements of South Transdanubia, 488 villages have less than 1,000 inhabitants, while the number of villages with less than 500 dwellers is 346—the highest number amongst all seven Hungarian regions. Thus, South Transdanubia is not only the most rural region in the country, but also, in terms of settlement structure, the most fragmented NUTS II unit.

The post-socialist production capacities of the region have been influenced by several factors. The combination of its fragmented settlement structure, shared border with the former Yugoslavia, and its a relatively under-developed road network means that South Transdanubia is rather remote. The economic structure inherited from the socialist period has also strongly impacted on the nature of recent regional development. Under socialism, the main employers in the region were mining, large-scale agriculture, and food production industries. Recovery from the collapse of these sectors has been slow, and the rate of investment in the region has also been low. GDP per capita figures have been declining since the middle of the 1990s. In 1995, the GDP per capita stood at the 81.4 % of the national average, whilst in 2004, it was only 71.3 %—making it the fourth least-developed region in Hungary. All of the eastern regions in the country ranked lower on the scale. If we compare South Transdanubian to all regions in the EU-25, then its GDP per capita stands at the very low figure of 43 % of the average.

Several studies have identified a strong North-South divide in Hungary, and this can be seen in almost all of the statistical figures.² For example, the employment figures for South Transdanubia show a 51.6 % labor market participation rate in 2005. This figure is exactly the same as in the Southern Great Plain Region, significantly less than in the northern Transdanubian regions and in central Hungary, and higher than those of northern and northeastern regions, representing another east-west regional fault line. The rate of unemployment was as high as 8.8 % in 2005, which was the highest in the Transdanubian region. By comparison, the corresponding unemployment rate was 6.3 % in Central Transdanubia and 5.9 % in Western Transdanubia, close to the Austrian border area. The highest unemployment rate in all the NUTS II regions was in Northern Hungary at 10.6 %.³

However, the latest per capita investment figures are not promising. With 218,146 Hungarian Forint (HUF) for every inhabitant, investment levels were half what they were in Central Transdanubia and the second lowest in Hungary. For most of the actors responsible for regional development, the principal reason for the low level of competitiveness is the weak road infrastructure. Indeed, Southern Transdanubia has as few as 70 km of motorways and motor-roads. Road density figures are low as well, though not the lowest in the country.

With regard to the development potential of Southern Transdanubia, the development projects that aim at enhancing the road network appear to be vital for halting further decline and for increasing the capital-attraction capacity of the region. According to many participants in development planning, the most important future projects are expected to be covered in the Transport Development Operational Program. However, the fragmented settlement structure and the pronounced “ghettoization” processes unfolding in peripheral border areas are formidable obstacles to development in the near future. As with physical characteristics, human resource capacities play an important role and, looking at the latest micro-census figures, there are clear weaknesses here. There are relatively few professional, highly qualified experts in engineering and the natural sciences, on the one hand, and in economic sciences, law, and social sciences, on the other hand (6.6 % and 6.7 % of the employees work these fields throughout the country, respectively), despite the Pécs University of Law and Economics. There are relatively large numbers of teachers working in South Transdanubia: 10 % of all Hungarian teachers work in this region, a rate proportionate with its population share, but only 5 % of employees work in cultural, art, and religious “industries.” Forestry, hunting, and fishing sectors are highly over-represented in South Transdanubia: 16 % of forest workers and professional hunters and 31 % of Hungarian fishermen work here. The employment capacities of agriculture, both cropping and animal husbandry, as well as various industrial branches are around the average. The percentage of those working in mining—7.3 %—fell below average, whilst participation in the food industry and construction remained slightly higher than in other parts of the country, with 11.3 % and 10.4 % shares respectively.

2 For example, Kiss 2001, Fazekas 2003, Kovács–Koós 2003, Nemes Nagy 2003.

3 The public road index (km) per 100 km² area was 31,1 in 2006. The value of the index was 28.1 and 27.7 for the two Great Plain regions.


The administrative structure reflects the fragmentation of the settlement structure—a counter-effect of the forced centralization of public services during the 1970s and 1980s. After the political changes, each village reestablished its local autonomy, meaning that they came to bear the right to elect their own local government body. However, decentralization was not so radically implemented—neither in public administration nor in public services. The fragmented settlement structure encouraged relatively more cooperation between neighboring villages than elsewhere in the country. This probably explains why the ratio of cooperative actions between civic associations and local authorities for the purpose of carrying out educational, cultural, health care, and social tasks exceeds the national average. The creation of district notary offices, for example, is also a feature of this region. Almost one-third of all district notary offices in the country can be found in South Transdanubia, although there are significant differences in scale between the three counties concerned. By the time of the introduction of the regional development legislation in 1996, 22 statistical micro-regions and 39 micro-regional development associations were initiated voluntarily from below (Somlyódiné, Pfeil 2003). In response to the latest public administration reform initiated in 2004, the administrative framework for joint public service provision via the creation of micro-regional associations at a district level was fully established in 2005. This put South Transdanubia in a leading position amongst the regions in Hungary.

South Transdanubia was also a pioneer in regional-level cooperation. The first regional council has operated as a foundation since 1993, three years before the law for regional development councils (RDCs) came into force (in 1996). This regional council was made up of county councils and various NGOs, including economic chambers in Baranya, Somogy, Tolna, and Zala counties. Though it was not obligatory, the South Transdanubian Regional Development Council was founded after 1996 and it set up its own managing agency, the South Transdanubian Regional Development Agency as a public non-profit company. As it was part of the EU PHARE Pilot Region Program, the composition of the RDC followed the partnership model required by the European Union. Members of the council included the presidents of the four general county assemblies, mayors delegated by the various micro-regional associations, representatives of the commercial chambers, delegates from the county councils of labor, and representatives of the central ministries (Pálné, Kovács 2003). After a series of acrimonious debates during the planning of the NUTS II, Zala county shifted to the West Transdanubian Region and South Transdanubia was restricted to the three southern counties. Since then, the composition of the Regional Council has followed the frequently amended rules of the Regional Development Act of 1996.

2. Social network analysis of the Regional Operational Program

Making the regional operational programs was the responsibility of regional development councils (RDCs). Because RDCs are decision-taking bodies, the operational task of organizing the work of planning was the task of the regional development agencies (RDAs), as the working units of the RDCs. This is what happened in the South Transdanubia region as well, where the RDA developed a rather extended horizontal and vertical network of actors as a kind of consulting background for the planning exercise. This exercise was done by six different consulting agencies, which continuously consulted with the members of the background network during various workshops and regular meetings. The only consulting agency from the region was Hozam Ltd.; the rest were from outside the region. The micro-regional associations were also part of this network and were able to place their input into the Regional Operational Program (ROP). Their most significant contribution was to collect and prioritize the potential projects of their own micro-regions. Until September 2006, more than 3,000 projects were mediated from the micro-regional level via these units towards the RDA. The RDA selected so-called “big projects, which are subject to different forms of tendering. These projects were especially important because they were more likely to be funded through schemes of restricted tendering, which meant that the lobbying activities to get projects listed as “big” was intense.

The following figure represents the structure of South Transdanubian Regional Planning Network:



This section outlines the social network analysis of the cooperation between the various public, private, and civic institutions participating in the preparation of the Regional Operative Program for South Transdanubia. The aim is to examine the nature of relations between the different partners and to highlight various qualities of the network—for instance, the degree to which it can be characterized as centralized or decentralized, whether ties between the actors can be seen as dense, and assessments of influence and grouping of actors according to their structural equivalence within the network. To the extent that it is possible, certain comparisons are made between this social network analysis the earlier study of policy networks in South Transdanubia by Pálné, Paraskevopoulos, and Horváth (2002).

In the end, 38 questionnaires were collected for this survey. Participants were identified by their official position in the ROP process, such as the main actors such as the Regional Development Council, mayors from larger urban centers, members of the micro-regional associations, and representatives from


smaller settlements. Representatives from both the vertical and the horizontal networks were included, and especially those amongst the latter group that were reported as being the most active participants. Additional institutions and actors were added to the list via a snowball method. If several respondents identified additional policy actors, then these were added to the list and invited to take part in the questionnaire. A full list of the participants consulted can be found in the Annex.

The ROP was started at the very end of 2005 and ended in December 2006, when the national Parliament approved all the OPs and ROPs. The development body attached to the Prime Minister’s office then submitted all these plans for the approval of the EU.

2.1. Characteristics of network ties

Pálné, Paraskevopoulos, and Horváth (2002) found that the South-Transdanubian Regional Development Council (DDRF), the South-Transdanubian Regional Development Agency (DDRFÜ), the Assembly of Somogy County (SMK), and the Assembly of Baranya County (BMK) were all in central positions in the policy-making network. In this section, we discuss the current nature of the institutional ties in order of the strength of relationship between their actors. The first three figures describe those network ties identified by participants as being “permanent and strategic,” more “occasional,” or of a more “ad hoc” nature. A second question in the questionnaire sought to identify network density through determining the frequency of contacts between different members. Participants were asked to grade their contact via a three-grade ordinal scale, i.e. whether they were occasionally, frequently, or usually in contact. A third set of questions aimed to discover the structural characteristics of the network in terms of which actors were in central positions, whether there were identifiable cliques in the network, which institutions seemed to act as bridges between such different groupings, and finally, the degree of symmetry among participants


Figure 1: Strategic ties in the network



In terms of strategic ties within the network, at the center are the Regional and the National Development offices, the micro-regional organizations and their strategic partners, including: the National Development Agency (Nemzeti Fejlesztési Ügynökség, NFÜ); the Southern Transdanubian Development Agency (DDRFÜ), a private consulting company (Hozam Ltd) and an academic research institute (Centre for Regional Studies of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences). The most prestigious partners within the network—those partners with the highest number of in-degree relations and the fewest number of out-degree ones—are most centrally located: NFÜ, DDRFÜ, Economic Chamber of Somogy County (Somogy Megyei Kereskedelmi Kamara, SMK), Chamber of Industry and Trade of Baranya Country (Baranya Megyei Kereskedelmi Kamara, BMMK), and Economic Chamber of Tolna County (Tolna Megyei Kereskedelmi Kamara, TMK). This measure is used to determine which institutions are considered to be at the center of the network according to the opinion of the other network members. One other finding of this analysis was that the central position of the private consulting company Hozam Ltd is not verified. Its prestige measure is relatively low (-20), meaning that whilst it would stress its own central position in terms of strategic ties in the network, other network members did not feel this to be the case.


The representation also appeared to show that there were no apparent cliques within this network and that there were no specific cut-points that would leave one or members in a relatively isolated position. This shows that the network is a relatively stable one and that even with the absence of one or more participants, the ties within the network would allow for the remaining members to cooperate.

Figure 2: Repeated relations



Within this network representation, many of the same actors are centrally located as they were as in the case of strategic links. On the whole, this network of repeat ties is less dense, implying that the majority of participants declared that their relations with others can be considered strategic.

Figure 3: Occasional relations between network members



In the central position within the net of ties characterized as occasional are the planning consultants and “second level” institutions within the region, i.e. county and the micro-regional institutions. Within these two groups, the most central position in the network is occupied by the consultant company that helped prepared the ROP, ExAnte Ltd; at the second most central position is the Center for Regional Studies of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. The hypothesis—the stronger the ties between participants, the rarer these ties would be—was not confirmed. Looking at the three figures above, it is obvious that the network of ad hoc links is the most dense of the there. At the same time, it is not so apparent that the network of strategic relations is significantly less dense. This assumption is confirmed by the values of density of the three networks, which is 19 % in the case of ad hoc links, 12 % in the case of repeated links, and 15 % in the network of strategic relations.


2.2. CONCOR analysis of strategic ties

In social network analysis, there are several ways for determining the structural equivalence between different members of the same network. (Hanneman and Riddle 2006.) The aim is to identify groups of nodes that are similar in their patterns of ties to all other nodes. These methods employ the idea of similarity/distance between the actors as their starting point. Two actors in a network may be said to be in a structurally equivalent relation if they have the same patterns of ties with other actors—in other words, if two actors that are structurally equivalent have the same ties to all other actors. In this manner, they can be said to be perfectly substitutable or exchangeable in the network. In terms of real data, discovering exact equivalence may be quite rare, and it may be more meaningful to measure approximate equivalence. There are several approaches for examining the pattern of similarities in the tie-profiles of actors, and for then forming structural equivalence classes. One very useful approach is to

apply cluster analysis to attempt to discern how many structural equivalence sets there are, and then to identify which actors fall within each set.

CONCOR analysis begins by correlating each pair of actors. Each row of this actor-by-actor correlation matrix is then extracted, and correlated with each other row. In a sense, the approach asks “How similar is the vector of similarities of actor X to the vector of similarities of actor Y?” This process is repeated over and over and eventually, the elements in this “iterated correlation matrix” converge on a value of either +1 or -1. CONCOR then divides the data into two sets on the basis of these correlations. Next, within each set (if it has more than two actors), the process is repeated. The process continues until all actors are separated. The result is a binary branching tree that gives rise to a final partition. In the case of all the institutions involved in the ROP process, we obtained the following dendrogram:

Figure 4: Dendrogram of CONCOR concerning strategic links



From this representation, we can see the appearance of eight structurally equivalent groups, from top to down. The National Development Agency and the regional office of the National Development Bank are placed in the same group as the University of Pecs. Ministries at the national level are placed in the same group as the Center for Regional Studies of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. The largest and most developed group was clustered around the regional “capital” of Pécs. It included a wide array of both state and non-state actors, including county representatives, a regional marketing office, micro-regional associations from the county, two private sector consultancies, two civil society groups, the Chamber of Commerce and Industry from Pecs, and the state-owned Innovation and Technology Development center. A fourth group can be identified amongst the labor institutions in Baranya county; a fifth is established between the Regional Agency and the related private sector consultancy companies. Labor institutions in Tolna county and development institutions around Somogy county form two further distinct clusters, whilst there is a structurally equivalent combination of labor institutions from Somogy county and the recently created local university in that county.

After discussing the networks by their strength, we turn to the network containing all the links between the actors examined.

Figure 5: All network links





Figure 5 highlights all the links between the actors in this network. Its density is high with a value of 0.4545. This means that that almost half of all possible links exist within this network. Compared to the earlier figures concerning the centrality of actors, there are new organizations among the central position, the private companies ExAnte 2001 Ltd., and the Dél-Dunántúli Regionális Marketing Igazgatóság. Using the same measure of in-degrees and out-degrees, the organizations with the highest prestige are the academic-level institutions, notably the Institute of Geography and the Department of Tourism from the University of Pécs (prestige = 20) and the Hungarian Academy of Science Regional Research Center (prestige = 14). The National Development Agency is also rated highly (prestige = 15). At the other end of the scale, the actors rated with the lowest prestige counts are county-level institutions from Somogy county such as Somogy Megyei Területfejlesztési Tanács (prestige = -16) and Somogy Megyei Vállalkozói Központ Közalapítvány (prestige = -11). Finally, although it might occupy a central position in its own perception, the private sector consultancy, ExAnte 2001 Ltd. with a prestige count of -14, received low ratings by other members of the network.

Despite the value of density (45 %), it is difficult to conclude whether this policy network can be characterized as dense or not. However, in comparison to the density of the network identified in the earlier study of Pálné, Paraskevopoulos, and Horváth (2002, 449.) we can say that the density of this network has increased since 2002.

Figure 6: Regional policy-making network in Hungary (Pálné, Paraskevopoulos and Horváth 2002)



One additional method of investigating the characteristics of the ROP network is to compare the graph of the official hierarchy of regional development organizations and actors, and the factual, empirical network based on the answers of the interviewed organizations. Figures 7 and 8 show the official network in 2002 and the network of the relevant actors in 2006.

Figure 7: Key organizations of ROP planning in 2002





Figure 8: Key organizations of ROP planning in 2006

There are a number of differences between these two figures. For instance, there are now fewer ministries (11) and more micro-regional associations (168 from 150). The National Office for Regional Development, which was attached to the office of the Prime Minister, was closed.

Subsequently, a new, broader, and more significant decision-making body was established. Still led by the Prime Minister, this body aims to provide strategic oversight and control towards the Second National Development Plan. It is the body which accepts the Regional Operation Program and has responsibility for submitting all ROPs and OPs to the European Commission. At the time of writing, this body is not yet under any Parliamentary control, a fact which has attracted some harsh criticism but the plan is to incorporate this body into the ordinary state administration in the near future.

It might be possible to suggest that the empirical network is significantly more dense than the official one. This higher density might be explained by the fact that the new members of the network such as the county councils, the towns and the various market institutions are all well embedded within the regional policy network. This result is in line with our centrality and the ego-network density measures when private institutions, as Ex-Ante or Hozam Ltd. had a central position in the local network, that was even bigger than the county councils or the larger regional towns.

2.3. Network cooperation

In terms of the quality of cooperation between the members of this regional policy-making network, then the vast majority of relations were defined as either "regular" or "excellent." All of the prestigious organizations were linked to one another via links that were self-described as excellent.

Figure 9a: Frequent and/or elemental conflicts

Density (matrix average) = 0.0092




Figure 9b: Normal cooperation

Density (matrix average) = 0.2297





Figure 9c: Excellent relations

Density (matrix average) = 0.1508



3. The Efficiency and effectiveness of institutional adaptation

Participants in the questionnaire were asked to give an assessment of the positive and negative aspects of the ROP process. As Table 1 shows, the most frequently mentioned problems were that the ROP process was too bureaucratic and that the financial side of the process was poorly organized.

Table 1: Some Criticisms of the Experiences of Former EU Co-financed Projects

Critical remarks	Respondents Agreeing (%)
Excessive administration	68
Funds available only in part or after a delay	53
General approach unfamiliar	32
Existence of Conflict of Interests	26
Slow pace of program implementation	26
Not enough local/civil participation	18
In appropriate political influence	18
Lack of institutions necessary for implementation	13
Insufficient fully qualified or trained staff	11
Mandatory financial reserves set at too high a rate	11
Poor selection of partners	8

As regards the degree to which the ROP process might lead to some longer-term enhancements of bureaucratic capacity or of more effective and efficient partnerships, the majority of respondents considered that community-building among the stakeholders and EU-learning were the two key results of the program implementation. A senior member of the regional Development Council, for example, stressed that:

“The good results from Tolna are not only thanks to our coordination work; we regularly met with the supervisors of the micro-regional work organizations, the leaders of associations, and, in our case, that bore fruit.”⁴

On the other hand, there was a sense amongst some that the principle of partnership was not always appreciated.

“Real partnership is still lacking from the European principles, but it is also true that there are only few actors, and hence, civil control is also weak in such a situation. Additional support is certainly needed. Concentration, for the time being, doesn't work, but it has to be forced by reforms from above.”⁵

4 Ferenc Kékes, President of the South Transdanubian Regional Development Council. Interviewed by Katalin Kovacs, Pecs, August, 2006.

5 Lóránd Szabó, Mayor of Dombóvár, Member of the Regional Development Council of South Transdanubia. Interviewed by Katalin Kovacs, Pecs, August, 2006

Table 2: The influence of EU co-financed projects implemented within pre-accession and post-accession programs

Fields of Progress		Respondents Agreeing (%)
1	Strengthened partnerships	76
2	Assisted the introduction of new norms of spending public funds	68
3	Assisted access to resources	58
4	Strengthened civil participation	34
5	Increased the standards of administration	29
6	Stimulated legal adaptation	16
7	Strengthened competition in the spending of public funds	13
8	Decreased (moderated) political influence	8
9	Accelerated implementation, increased efficiency	3
10	Increased the standards of administration	0

Despite the serious development problems in South Transdanubia, the majority of network members placed the strengthening of ties as a significant influence beyond securing of development funds: in terms of ranking, in fourth place was the strengthening of local civil society; below that, the view that EU projects stimulated and enhanced institutional adaptation and reform.

When self-criticism was formulated among the network members, then the weak lobbying ability of the South Transdanubian politicians was mentioned. This explains why the most important investment of a motorway between Budapest and Pécs was always ranked low on the priority list of centrally financed projects. Some inner conflicts between the players from these three counties of the region can also be identified. This is well illustrated by council members' contributions to a September 2006 general assembly of the Regional Development Council. At this meeting, the Commissioner in charge of the Second National Development Plan accompanied by the Minister of Regional Affairs, the chair person of the Parliament and two Secretaries of States visited South Transdanubia for a so-called consultation. This was a technical part of the overall consultation (egyeztetési) process, which has become one of the essential points of the planning process and a strong demonstration of the new approach towards regional planning—an approach that favors participation and the inclusion of interested parties into the planning process, and dialog between the planning agencies at different levels (central, regional and below). In this case, the object of the dialog was to exchange information about the content of centrally planned operational programs and the regionally planned ROP. There was particular references to the so-called “big projects” which—whether or not they are on a national or regional level—are not expected to be within the normal open tendering process. During the meeting, the Commissioner gave presentation about the latest structure of the overall plan with illustrations, and then listened to the politicians of the region, most of whom were MPs. Two of the three county representatives agreed that the first priority should be the motorway, whereas the third county representative did not mention this at all. These confronting attitudes of certain members of the Regional Development Council were also apparent in some of the interviews conducted for this research. The representation of narrow interests suggests that respondents' own urban/rural problems were voiced and, moreover, a speaker did not tend to represent his or her role in the Regional Development Council, but rather as mayor of a particular town or settlement.

In the interviews with members of the coordinating agencies, very uneven capacities and interests in complying with all the requirements of the new regional development planning could be discerned. Despite the frequency of ties and the strategic nature that many ascribed to their relations, there were still some strong disconnections in terms of role perception, the sequencing of actions, and the coordination of interventions. Perhaps unsurprisingly, those with central coordinating roles found that the attitudes and behaviors of the different partners could be a source of frustration. A quote from the Regional Development Council can be used to illustrate:

“The regions could plan with the appropriate autonomy, there is no problem with that. As regards the actual design, the problem is not with the mechanisms, but with the heads. There is a problem with the designers; their professional ideas usually don't let social viewpoints prevail, they don't take into account that development does not come true in a sterile laboratory. However, there is not enough ability for abstraction, for empathy, and readiness for compromise, on the other side. Politicians, who participate in regional decision-makings, want to build their own houses. Let's say, for example, if the Home Secretary is represented by a mayor of X city, that mayor won't talk on behalf of the Home Secretary, but according to the interests of his/her city. There were continuous conflicts in Somogy: ‘Why isn't the development of Tihamer utca of Csurgo in the Regional Operative Program? Just because...’ Politicians don't participate in the discussions, and then, at Council meetings, at the moment of decision these questions come up. It blows, rightfully, even the chief designer's mind, why now, why not earlier, when the designers are already paid etc. So, things go slowly.”⁶

If the majority thought that the ROP would eventually lead to better future relations amongst the different partners, there was no expectation that the ROP process would transform the significance of politics within regional development, both in regards to the local actors, and in between the central state and the regional bodies. Almost none of the participants believed that the ROP and all the attendant institutional reforms would seriously diminish the importance of politics in the distribution of funds and influence. A mayor from one of the larger towns in the region declared that:

“Regarding the re-politicization of this Regional Development Council, there is a fear of corruption. Those times, enterprises had much more opportunities, I know it personally, that the second proposal was denied due to political reasons. However, it would be better if decisions were made on a professional basis. This division of resources doesn't work, although, dividing the resources justly is virtually impossible.”⁷

The quoted Council member favored a centrally operating managing authority of the forthcoming ROP rather than making the Transdanubian Development Agency, their own operational unit, the appropriate body for such a task. Other regional actors expressed their fears and frustrations in relation to the influence of the central state over regional matters.

“Regional concentration is developing, on the other hand, but so is a remarkable decentralization. To my mind, we are in an important moment, regions will be developed in terms of legal rights, as well. However, this makes sense if regions are given responsibilities and sources... It's a nightmare for me—due to my motorcycle

6 Ferenc Kékes, President of the South Transdanubian Regional Development Council. Interviewed by Katalin Kovacs, Pecs, August, 2006.

7 Szabó *ibid.*

craze, knowing all roads, with and without potholes—to imagine that the decision about the reparation of roads would be made in Budapest. This is a typical regional issue.”⁸

Perhaps in reflection of the developmental importance of improving the road network in this region, the same respondent decried the impact of this centralizing tendency:

“I think that the kind of centralization is an absolute insanity which happened to the concentration of public road maintenance last year, what degraded county transport corporations into works units, and all substantive decisions and preparations were concentrated at the Ministry of Economy and Transport.”⁹

In terms of the influence of different parties, amongst network members, there seemed to be relatively equal weight given to the power of the region and the power of the central state in terms of planning the ROP. According to the respondents, regional actors were ranked as having the highest influence in regional development (more than 60 % of the respondents gave a score of 8 or higher on a scale of 10), followed by the central government and finally, the European Union. With 1 being weak and 10 being strong, the average level of influence of the region and the government was 7.73 and 7.16 respectively, whereas the EU was assessed as at 5.71. Relations and influence are seen in a bifurcated way. While there is no correlation between the estimated level of influence of the region and the other two actors, there is a strong positive correlation (0.73) between the level of estimated influence of the government and that of the EU. In sum, in the stakeholders’ view, the region is always influential, with the government and the EU much less so. At the same time, if either the government or the EU are regarded as influential, the other one is as well, and vice versa.,.

If we widen the discussion of relative influence to non-state actors, then it appears that the various business actors in the region are considered more important than the EC. At the same time, in most participants’ eyes, the Commission ranks above local civil society organizations

Table 3: Estimated level of influence in regional development

Government	7.97
South Transdanubian Regional Development Council	7.18
South Transdanubian Regional Development Agency	7.18
Business actors in the region	6.50
European Commission	5.45
Civil organizations	5.06

An analysis of the correlation between the estimated influence of the various stakeholders showed a positive inter-correlation (between 0.40 and 0.52) among the two regional development organizations, business, and NGO actors.

The respondents were asked how they would rate the overall ROP process. With 1 point meaning “very unsatisfied” and “10” representing being “very satisfied,” the level of success of the ROP planning

8 Kékes *ibid.*

9 *ibid.*

and the implementation was rather high (6.81 and 6.44 respectively).¹⁰ An analysis of the correlation between the levels of estimated influence and the satisfaction with the final ROP is rather telling. Those who tended to identify the state as the most influential partner in the ROP were more satisfied than the average, whilst those who viewed the EU, or the two non-state sectors, as being the most influential tend to be less satisfied with the final outcome than the average.

Table 4: Correlation between the level of influence and satisfaction (correlation coefficient)

	Planning	Implementation
EU Commission	- 0.20	-
Government	0.20	0.19
South Transdanubian Regional Development Council	-	0.18
South Transdanubian Regional Development Agency	-	-
business actors of the region	- 0.18	- 0.24
civil organizations	- 0.28	- 0.31

Note: - denotes that the correlation coefficient is less than 0.15

¹⁰ Points between 1 (very unsatisfied) and 10 (very satisfied) – see questions 9 and 10.

4. Conclusion: Europeanization and domestic structures

In 2006, the Europeanization of regional policy was determined, to a large extent, by the development of the region's legal status as the trustee of European regional policy, and by the results of the national and local governments elections. In the mid-1990s, Hungary and the South Transdanubian Region was a pioneer in the development of regional institutional systems. However, it is usually considered that the country lost this leading role when it succeeded in strengthening only those regions that worked as developing units, and only in terms of statistics. It remained a laggard in terms of the development of a regional institutional system with considerable autonomy (possessing the income and having the authority to dispose of it) and local governmental rights.

Both professional considerations and political statements have conceded the importance of reforming the regional institutional system. The main obstacle is the sharp conflict between the two major parties, which has meant that, since 1998, it has been virtually impossible to amend laws that require two-thirds majority. For instance, the establishment of regions would be possible only by amending the Act on Local Governments, which needs a two-thirds majority. Without this, Hungarian regions are subject to national development policy, the cohesion policy serving territorial equalization, in theory, and sectoral development policy, in practice.

In such a context, future institutional developments seem to be at the sub-regional level where public administration reform and policy conceptions over the nature of regional development meet. The so called Multi-Purpose Micro-Regional Association Act of 2004, for example, encouraged local governments belonging to under the umbrella of the same statistical micro-region (NUTS IV unit) to provide public services in close cooperation with one another. This had the consequence of reducing public services at the settlement level and further diminishing the role of the counties (which were already weak). Thus, the micro-regional organizations assumed responsibility for certain educational services, for instance, in preference to the counties. Again, as mentioned, the South Transdanubian region has been an eminent pioneer within the country: in 2005, it became the first region in Hungary to be covered by these new, partly European inspired multi-purpose micro-regional associations.

In recent years, what has become real in terms of the development of the regional institutional system has been the establishment of regional development councils—compulsorily, because of the amendment of the Act of Regional Development (1996) in 1999—and their working units, the regional development agencies. The division determined by the Act, based on the aggregation of the counties into threes proved to stay stable, even if it has been contested. In the development of operation in accordance with the European norms, the pre-accession programs had a great role, especially the PHARE support. This is particularly true in the selected region where the first Regional Development Council and working unit were established with PHARE support in 1997. This council was based on a wider conception of partnership than that envisaged with the Act's amendment in 1999. This change is usually considered as a reduction in the scant autonomy of the regional development councils due to a lack of resources. The right-wing coalition governing in those years strengthened the presence of the central government in the regional councils, vis-à-vis the local civil representatives. This move was criticized from the left, though, approved after its coming into power. The composition of the regional councils—with their high numbers of central government representatives on the one hand and their limited resources for development on the other hand—obstructs the construction of an efficient and compelling regional expansion in Hungary. It must be added that the price of the decentralization of resources into a regional level had to be borne in practice by the counties (NUTS III level). This administrative level, already weakened after the transition, became even weaker, and its functions have become reduced to the operation of the county-level institutions.

A further difficulty of strengthening the regions was that whether or not expert politicians considered Hungary ready to comply with all the changing requirements of regional management, the actual execution of the pre-accession programs and the programs for member states were coordinated centrally. The best that could be achieved at the level of the regions was the processing of submitted

proposals, but this led to an autonomous regional institutional system only in case of the EU Special Accession Program for Agriculture and Rural Development (SAPARD). The SAPARD Agency has a network of seven regional offices, which is still a basis for the Agricultural and Rural Development Office operating as the intermediate organization and finance agency of the of the Agriculture and Rural Development Operational Programme (ARDOP), spending European Agriculture Guarantee and Guidance Fund money after the accession. (Interestingly enough, the selection of beneficiaries has shifted to the central level.)

In contrast, the ROP implementation in 2004-2006 was so centralized that even regional quotas assuring a proportionate disposition of regional resources did not exist. The sole organization divided up by regions was the ROP Managing Agency (Váti Lp.), which maintained offices in regional centers. The other three OPs were implemented wholly by central “ideas” and central control.

It is interesting to note that whilst the center of the South Transdanubian Region is Pécs and Váti is located there, one of the offices dealing with the local ARDOP proposals (formerly the SAPARD Office and its direct descendant) operates in Kaposvár, in Somogy county. This reflects the endeavor on the part of local actors in regional politics to ensure that the three county centers take part in institutional developments relatively proportionately. Another example is that the sub-regional offices of the Regional Development Agency operate at the two other county centers. However, the leading politicians in the partner counties were not satisfied with such a distribution of tasks and resources: the chair of the Tolna County Development Council, for example, called the three-member office in Szekszárd “nothing,” and the endeavors to decentralize the Agency sub-regionally as a “waste of resources.”

As for the operation of existing institutions, according to many actors, their operation do not correspond to European norms yet. Those taking part in the council meetings confirmed that there is tension related to the selection of projects for subsidy and the monitoring of these projects. One interviewee talked about an open intention to get power, whilst another claimed that:

“There are two old lobby persons in the council who cannot imagine not receiving a grant. Once it happens, they make a hassle here in the council, but also in high quarters. But we, younger ones have our own links, we don't let ourselves go.”

Such an intensity of political patronage is possible only if transparency and the commitment to follow-up and control public expenses do not prevail in the systems of support. Weaknesses of this type in the operation of the regional institutional system influence both local and non-local actors who imagined that the management of EU funds would be by central institutions rather than through the mediation of regional agencies.

The development of the second National Development Plan was established on a different footing than the first. In the second version, regions gained an opportunity to conceptualize their own regional programs, even if within certain limitations. This is a great step forward, especially when their agencies manage to become the organization that actually mediates the resources. In light of recent developments, they have quite a good chance for achieving this goal.

In Hungary, six out of the seven NUTS II regions are classified as “convergence regions.” Because of its high GDP per capita figures, the Central Hungarian region is an exception subsumed under the second aim of regional competitiveness and employment; it is governed by different rules of planning and execution. The development resources are allocated to the convergence regions through the seven OPs originating from the central ministries under the control of the National Development Agency, and through the regional operative programs, which are formulated locally. This division of labor was determined by the order of magnitude and the nature of the developments. As far as ROP is concerned, the themes of development have been quite strongly defined by EU financial principles. Given that 90 % of EU money comes from the European Regional Development Fund and 10 % from the European Social Fund, infrastructural projects and those enhancing the quality of the physical environment and equipment of various public institutions and business entities will inevitably overwhelm the ROP-financed developments. This is one of the constrains. The other is the scope of investments ROPs are restricted to, and that is “the region” with relatively low budget potential projects. The larger, national

scope infrastructural and environment protection policies and development tools serving the execution of these will be financed under the Transport Development OP and the Environment and Energy OP, also using the Cohesion Fund, whereas the smaller-scale, regional level projects will be realized from the budget of the ROPs for relatively small-scale economic and infrastructural developments, the development of tourism, and the infrastructural development of the local institutions of public services. This framing means that the different ROPs have a marked resemblance to one another.

As regards the focus of the second National Development Plan and the ROPs: they are twofold: to develop competitiveness and to ensure advanced regional cohesion. This is true for the South Transdanubian ROP, too, the main target of which is to halt the relative depression that began in the mid-1990s, through an overall economic and town development policy targeting the spread of innovative ventures, a vertically and horizontally inter-linked tourism industry. Business services, such as incubation houses, industrial parks, and related support services serve the same goals, whilst the emphasis on developing roads of local importance are meant to provide better connections and accessibility of services and employment possibilities concentrated in rural centers. In this case, the division of labor should prevail between the various OPs based on the EU funds.

Considering the priorities and targeted localities/spatial units of ROPs further restriction of scope can be identified. Namely, they directly target urban and semi-urban rural centers and spatially coordinated service provision directly and indirectly when they construct roads and develop services, in other words, their policies are based on sub-regional but still spatial considerations. The smaller settlements and SMEs are seemed to be neglected by most ROPs and left for other financial schemes such as the new agricultural and rural development program and/or Economic Development OP that is going to cover larger economic projects.

The Social Renewal OP and the Social Infrastructure OP will be spent on larger and nation-scale human resource and human infrastructure developing projects. In this respect, the South Transdanubian region with its many micro-regions that lag behind could be targeted to a great extent. From these centrally planned OPs these peripheral rural spaces, where ghettoization has been taking place in the last two-three decades, can hope more than from their own regional development programs. According to the manager of the agency controlling the process of planning, the experts of the European Committee did agree with this conception of convergence, moreover, they encouraged the planners to concentrate to an even larger extent.

Finally, as regards the planning procedure of ROPs (such as the autonomy of the regions and the strengthening of the regional identity) and policy institutions interviewed, most network members were satisfied with the process. What is important to emphasize is the intensity and frequency of consultations, discussions with stakeholders within the region and between the different levels, lower (micro-regional) and above (national and EU-scale) equally. On the one hand, this is the result of a conscious decision and a normative instruction regulated by the second National Development Plan; on the other hand, it is generated by the structure itself. Cooperation amongst the agencies is necessary to reconcile the regional and the national level interests, and to correspond to the EU regulations, such as “one priority one program”; and “one fund, one program.” This led to a network-type National Development Plan II, the flexibility of which can reduce risk (from a certain point of view), but the complication of which incurs vast organizational and administrative burden, which generates risk from another point of view.

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Annex: Questionnaire

The South Transdanubian Operative Programme

SOCOCH

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Hungarian Coordinator: Central European University

The following questions inquire into the networks among partners who participated in one way or another in the development of the South Transdanubian Regional Operative Program (STROP). The aim of this international research project is to see whether regional operative programs are developed by a similar set of institutions in the various countries of the European Union.

The name of the institution:

List number:

Code of interviewer:

1. The following list indicates the institutions which (according to our information) took part in the development of the STROP. We ask first of all that you please take a look at this list and add any further institution that you had contact with in the course of developing the STROP.

1. Magyarországi Régiók Brüsszeli képviselője (Baranyi Magdolna kirendeltségvezető, Pálmai Zsolt munkatárs, Brüsszel)
2. Dél-dunántúli Regionális Fejlesztési Ügynökség Kht. (Márton György fejlesztési igazgató, Pécs)
3. Nemzeti Fejlesztési Ügynökség (Kovács István Vilmos, a TOB elnöke, Budapest)
4. Önkormányzati és Területfejlesztési Minisztérium (Szendrényi Péter, főosztályvezető, Budapest)
5. Megyei Területfejlesztési Tanács (Baranya) (dr. Kékes Ferenc elnök, Pécs)
6. Megyei Területfejlesztési Tanács (Somogy) (dr. Gyenesi István, Kaposvár)
7. Megyei Területfejlesztési Tanács (Tolna) (Frankné, dr. Kovács Szilvia elnök, Szekszárd)
8. Baranya megyei kistérségek (Páva Zoltán, polgármester, Komló)
9. Somogy megyei kistérségek (Ormai István, polgármester, Nagyatád)
10. Tolna megyei kistérségek (Szabó Lóránd, polgármester, Dombóvár)
11. Pécs Megyei Jogú Város Önkormányzata (Gonda Tibor, alpolgármester, Pécs)
12. Kaposvár Megyei Jogú Város Önkormányzata (Sári László fejlesztési igazgató, Kaposvár)
13. Szekszárd Megyei Jogú Város Önkormányzata (Halmai Gáborné alpolgármester, Szekszárd)
14. Pécs 2010 Menedzsment Központ (Tarróssy István, Pécs)
15. ExAnte Kft. – Üzleti szolgáltatások SFP (Haász Zoltán, Pécs)
16. Hozam 2001 Kft. (Hőnyi Pál, Szekszárd)
17. Dél-dunántúli Regionális Fejlesztési Rt. (Frey Tamás, Pécs)
18. Balaton Fejlesztési Tanács (dr. Molnár Gábor, Siófok)
19. Villány–Siklósi Borút Egyesület (Zentai Judit, Villány)
20. Duna–Dráva Nemzeti Park (Závodszy Szabolcs, Pécs)
21. Balatoni Regionális Turisztikai Projekt Iroda (dr. Kovács Miklós, Balatonfüred)
22. Dél-dunántúli Regionális Marketing Igazgatóság (Hegyi Zsuzsanna, Pécs)

23. Dél-dunántúli Regionális Forrásközpont (Gyurok Ernőné dr. Bódi Csilla szakmai vezető, Pécs)
24. Pécsi Regionális Munkaerő-fejlesztő és Képző Központ (Fodor Imréné igazgató, Pécs)
25. Pécs–Baranyai Kereskedelmi és Iparkamara (dr. Síkfői Tamás, Pécs)
26. Somogy Megyei Kereskedelmi és Iparkamara (Varga József elnök, Kaposvár)
27. Tolna Megyei Kereskedelmi és Iparkamara (dr. Beréti Zsolt, Szekszárd)
28. Baranya Megyei Vállalkozói Központ (Sigora Irma, Pécs)
29. Somogy Megyei Vállalkozói Központ Közalapítvány (Kocsis Tamás elnök, Kaposvár)
30. Tolna Megyei Vállalkozói Központ (Tóth Ferenc, Szekszárd)
31. Innovációs és Technológia-fejlesztési Központ Kht. (dr. Sárkány Béla, Pécs)
32. Baranya Megyei Munkaügyi Központ (Vonyó János, Pécs)
33. Somogy Megyei Munkaügyi Központ (dr. Tarrné dr. Törzsök Piroska, Kaposvár)
34. Tolna Megyei Munkaügyi Központ (dr. Brebán Valéria, Szekszárd)
35. Magyar Fejlesztési Bank megyei képviselői (Gyarmati György, a Baranya megyei képviselő vezetője, Pécs)
36. MTA Regionális Kutatások Központja (Hrubi László, tervezésben részt vevő munkatárs, Pécs)
37. Pécsi Tudományegyetem (Aubert Antal, PTE – TTK Földrajzi Intézet Turizmus Tanszék, Pécs)
38. Kaposvári Egyetem (Sarudi Csaba intézetigazgató, Kaposvár)
39.
40.
41.
42.

2. Please answer the following questions relating to the institutions / organizations included in the list.

List of institutions / organizations	How would you characterize the:				Is there an institutional or personal overlap in the management of your institutions?
	frequency of your contacts?		the nature of your relationship?		
	X	1	2	3	
	X – not significant	1 – occasional	2 – regular or frequent	X – not significant 1 – occasional business - or work-related 2 – frequent, only individual projects 3 – strategic, permanent	X – no significant contact 1 – no overlap 2 – there is an overlap
1. Magyarországi Régiók Brüsszeli képviselője	X	1	2	X 1 2 3	X 1 2
2. Dél-dunántúli Regionális Fejlesztési Ügynökség Kht.	X	1	2	X 1 2 3	X 1 2
3. Nemzeti Fejlesztési Ügynökség	X	1	2	X 1 2 3	X 1 2
4. Önkormányzati és Területfejlesztési Minisztérium	X	1	2	X 1 2 3	X 1 2

5. Megyei Területfejlesztési Tanács (Baranya)	X 1 2	X 1 2 3	X 1 2
6. Megyei Területfejlesztési Tanács (Somogy)	X 1 2	X 1 2 3	X 1 2
7. Megyei Területfejlesztési Tanács (Tolna)	X 1 2	X 1 2 3	X 1 2
8. Baranya megyei kistérségek	X 1 2	X 1 2 3	X 1 2
9. Somogy megyei kistérségek	X 1 2	X 1 2 3	X 1 2
10. Tolna megyei kistérségek	X 1 2	X 1 2 3	X 1 2
11. Pécs Megyei Jogú Város Önkormányzata	X 1 2	X 1 2 3	X 1 2
12. Kaposvár Megyei Jogú Város Önkormányzata	X 1 2	X 1 2 3	X 1 2
13. Szekszárd Megyei Jogú Város Önkormányzata	X 1 2	X 1 2 3	X 1 2
14. Pécs 2010 Menedzsment Központ	X 1 2	X 1 2 3	X 1 2
15. ExAnte Kft – Üzleti szolgáltatások SFP	X 1 2	X 1 2 3	X 1 2
16. Hozam 2001 Kft.	X 1 2	X 1 2 3	X 1 2
17. Dél-Dunántúli Regionális Fejlesztési Rt.	X 1 2	X 1 2 3	X 1 2
18. Balaton Fejlesztési Tanács	X 1 2	X 1 2 3	X 1 2
19. Villány–Siklói Borút Egyesület	X 1 2	X 1 2 3	X 1 2
20. Duna–Dráva Nemzeti Park	X 1 2	X 1 2 3	X 1 2
21. Balatoni Regionális Turisztikai Projekt Iroda	X 1 2	X 1 2 3	X 1 2
22. Dél-dunántúli Regionális Marketing Igazgatóság	X 1 2	X 1 2 3	X 1 2
23. Dél-dunántúli Regionális Forrásközpont	X 1 2	X 1 2 3	X 1 2
24. Pécsi Regionális Munkaerő-fejlesztő és Képző Központ	X 1 2	X 1 2 3	X 1 2
25. Pécs–Baranyai Kereskedelmi és Iparkamara	X 1 2	X 1 2 3	X 1 2
26. Somogy Megyei Kereskedelmi és Iparkamara	X 1 2	X 1 2 3	X 1 2
27. Tolna Megyei Kereskedelmi és Iparkamara	X 1 2	X 1 2 3	X 1 2
28. Baranya Megyei Vállalkozói Központ	X 1 2	X 1 2 3	X 1 2
29. Somogy Megyei Vállalkozói Központ Közalapítvány	X 1 2	X 1 2 3	X 1 2

30. Tolna Megyei Vállalkozói Központ	X 1 2	X 1 2 3	X 1 2
31. Innovációs és Technológia-fejlesztési Központ Kht.	X 1 2	X 1 2 3	X 1 2
32. Baranya Megyei Munkaügyi Központ	X 1 2	X 1 2 3	X 1 2
33. Somogy Megyei Munkaügyi Központ	X 1 2	X 1 2 3	X 1 2
34. Tolna Megyei Munkaügyi Központ	X 1 2	X 1 2 3	X 1 2
35. Magyar Fejlesztési Bank megyei képviselői	X 1 2	X 1 2 3	X 1 2
36. MTA Regionális Kutatások Központja	X 1 2	X 1 2 3	X 1 2
37. PTE –TTK Földrajzi Intézet Turizmus Tanszék	X 1 2	X 1 2 3	X 1 2
38. Kaposvári Egyetem	X 1 2	X 1 2 3	X 1 2
39.	X 1 2	X 1 2 3	X 1 2
40.	X 1 2	X 1 2 3	X 1 2
41.	X 1 2	X 1 2 3	X 1 2
42.	X 1 2	X 1 2 3	X 1 2

List of institutions / organizations	How would you characterize the nature of your cooperation?	Please indicate the five most and five least influential actors.
	X – no significant cooperation 1 – frequent and serious conflicts 2 – average, not strained relations 3 – excellent, only minor debates	0 – least influential actors 1 – most influential actors
1. Magyarországi Régiók Brüsszeli képviselője	X 1 2 3	0 1
2. Dél-dunántúli Regionális Fejlesztési Ügynökség Kht.	X 1 2 3	0 1
3. Nemzeti Fejlesztési Ügynökség	X 1 2 3	0 1
4. Önkormányzati és Területfejlesztési Minisztérium	X 1 2 3	0 1
5. Megyei Területfejlesztési Tanács (Baranya)	X 1 2 3	0 1
6. Megyei Területfejlesztési Tanács (Somogy)	X 1 2 3	0 1
7. Megyei Területfejlesztési Tanács (Tolna)	X 1 2 3	0 1
8. Baranya megyei kistérségek	X 1 2 3	0 1
9. Somogy megyei kistérségek	X 1 2 3	0 1

10. Tolna megyei kistérségek	X	1	2	3	0	1
11. Pécs Megyei Jogú Város Önkormányzata	X	1	2	3	0	1
12. Kaposvár Megyei Jogú Város Önkormányzata	X	1	2	3	0	1
13. Szekszárd Megyei Jogú Város Önkormányzata	X	1	2	3	0	1
14. Pécs 2010 Menedzsment Központ	X	1	2	3	0	1
15. ExAnte Kft – Üzleti szolgáltatások SFP	X	1	2	3	0	1
16. Hozam 2001 Kft.	X	1	2	3	0	1
17. Dél-Dunántúli Regionális Fejlesztési Rt.	X	1	2	3	0	1
18. Balaton Fejlesztési Tanács	X	1	2	3	0	1
19. Villány–Siklói Borút Egyesület	X	1	2	3	0	1
20. Duna–Dráva Nemzeti Park	X	1	2	3	0	1
21. Balatoni Regionális Turisztikai Projekt Iroda	X	1	2	3	0	1
22. Dél-dunántúli Regionális Marketing Igazgatóság	X	1	2	3	0	1
23. Dél-Dunántúli Regionális Forrásközpont	X	1	2	3	0	1
24. Pécsi Regionális Munkaerő-fejlesztő és Képző Központ	X	1	2	3	0	1
25. Pécs–Baranyai Kereskedelmi és Iparkamara	X	1	2	3	0	1
26. Somogy Megyei Kereskedelmi és Iparkamara	X	1	2	3	0	1
27. Tolna Megyei Kereskedelmi és Iparkamara	X	1	2	3	0	1
28. Baranya Megyei Vállalkozói Központ	X	1	2	3	0	1
29. Somogy Megyei Vállalkozói Központ Közalapítvány	X	1	2	3	0	1
30. Tolna Megyei Vállalkozói Központ	X	1	2	3	0	1
31. Innovációs és Technológia-fejlesztési Központ Kht.	X	1	2	3	0	1
32. Baranya Megyei Munkaügyi Központ	X	1	2	3	0	1
33. Somogy Megyei Munkaügyi Központ	X	1	2	3	0	1
34. Tolna Megyei Munkaügyi Központ	X	1	2	3	0	1
35. Magyar Fejlesztési Bank megyei képviseletei	X	1	2	3	0	1
36. MTA Regionális Kutatások Központja	X	1	2	3	0	1
37. PTE –TTK Földrajzi Intézet Turizmus Tanszék	X	1	2	3	0	1
38. Kaposvári Egyetem	X	1	2	3	0	1
39.	X	1	2	3	0	1

40.	X	1	2	3	0	1
41.	X	1	2	3	0	1
42.	X	1	2	3	0	1

3. By filling out the following table, please provide us with information on which EU programs/projects your institution/organization participated and / or participates in (e.g. pre-accession programs: Sapard, Phare, ISPA, Equal; post-accession programs: AVOP, KIOP, HEFOP, GVOP).

The name of the EU program/ project / lobby group	Role		Period		Level				
	1 – lead partner 2 – partner		1 – pre-accession 2 – post accession		1 – local 2 – micro-regional 3 – regional 4 – national 5 – EU, inter-regional				
	1	2	1	2	1	2	3	4	5
	1	2	1	2	1	2	3	4	5
	1	2	1	2	1	2	3	4	5
	1	2	1	2	1	2	3	4	5
	1	2	1	2	1	2	3	4	5
	1	2	1	2	1	2	3	4	5
	1	2	1	2	1	2	3	4	5
	1	2	1	2	1	2	3	4	5

4. Please indicate the problems that you had encountered in the course of program / project implementation. More than one answer is possible.

- a – lack of institutions necessary for implementation
- b – lack of staff with necessary training
- c – not enough residential / civil participation
- d – conflict of interests
- e – approach required by the program / project unfamiliar to partners
- f – poor selection of partners
- g – political influence
- h – funds available only in part or in delay
- i – excessive deposit / security and obligatory reserves
- j – excessive administration
- k – slow program implementation
- l – other problems, namely:

5. Did your participation in EU funded project / programs bring along any changes in the follow-

ing areas? More than one answer is possible.

- a – stimulated legal adaptation
- b – stimulated institutional adaptation (structural reforms)
- c – strengthened civil participation
- d – strengthened partnerships
- e – assisted the introduction of norms of spending public monies (bids, monitoring, evaluation)
- f – strengthened (fair) competition and professional considerations in the spending of public monies
- g – decreased (moderated) political influence
- h – accelerated implementation, increased efficiency in the distribution of public monies
- i – increased the standards of administration
- j – assisted access to resources
- k – other, namely:

6. How would you judge the local impact of the pervious changes?

- 1 – not significant
- 2 – significant
- 3 – very significant

7. In the planning of the STROP, how much influence did the following have...

	insignificant										strong	
a) ... the region?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10		
b) ... the central government?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10		
c) ... the European Committee?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10		

8. The STROP is only one of the development funds coming to this region. If you were to weight other EU or national development funds and objectives, what role would you say the following actors play in shaping the development chances of the region...

	insignificant					strong				
a) ...the European Commission (EU policies, fund allocation, etc.)?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
b) ...central government (national policies, fund allocation, etc.)?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
c) ...South Transdanubian Regional Development Council?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
d) ...South Transdanubian Regional Development Agency?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
e) ...business actors of the region?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
f) ...civil organizations (e.g. chambers)?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
g) ...another organization, namely:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
h) ...another organization, namely:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
i) ...another organization, namely:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

9. How successful in your opinion were the planners of the STROP in involving concerned partners into the planning process?

unsuccessful					very successful				
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

10. How satisfied are you with the current version of the STROP?

very unsatisfied					satisfied				
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

Thank you for your answers!