Development Policy Review, 2017, 35 (4): 441–453

European Union Development Policy: Collective Action in Times of Global Transformation and Domestic Crisis

Thilo Bodenstein, Jörg Faust and Mark Furness*

This special issue of Development Policy Review reflects on European Union (EU) efforts to build a more effective global development policy amid a rapidly changing international context. As 2030 Agenda and the Sustainable Development Goals have made clear, global development challenges require collective action if they are to be resolved. Contributions to the special issue explore the ways in which the EU approaches collective action challenges in different development cooperation frameworks and policy settings. Themes explored include strategies for overcoming collective action problems, the impacts of these interactions on EU and member state aid policies, coherence between development and other policy fields, relations between European and other development actors, and the reception of the EU's efforts in developing countries.

Key words: global development, collective action, EU development policy, global public goods, coherence, incentives

1 Introduction to the special issue

Patterns of global poverty and global power have shifted substantially since 2000. The total number of people living in absolute poverty has more than halved, fundamentally altering the paradigm in which development policy functions (Ramalingam, 2013). At the same time, global challenges such as economic and social exclusion, state fragility and environmental degradation – in particular climate change – have become more salient on the global development agenda. These can no longer be treated by policy actors as separate issues. As the global development agenda has become vastly more difficult in terms of overlapping issues, it has also increased in complexity; namely in terms of the expanding number of actors that can potentially act as veto players in decision-making processes (Tsebelis, 2002). The rising influence of emerging powers – especially China, India and Brazil – in global affairs has reduced the relative importance of European aid as an instrument for supporting development, and as a lever of influence (ODI et al., 2013). These global

*Thilo Bodenstein: Central European University, Budapest, Hungary; Jörg Faust: German Institute for Development Evaluation (DEval), Bonn, Germany; Mark Furness: German Development Institute/ Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE), Bonn, Germany. The authors would like to thank Bernhard Reinsberg, Katja Michaelowa, Achim Kemmerling, Simon Maxwell and Deborah Eade for helpful comments on earlier versions of this introduction article.

trends are aptly illustrated by 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. The international debates that resulted in the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) started from a traditional development aid perspective and quickly expanded into environmental sustainability, climate change, domestic and international security, migration, political governance, trade and investment and many subsets of these global public goods. As a result, the global development agenda has itself expanded from discussions centred on economic development and humanitarian aid into an all-encompassing global cooperation arena (UN, 2014).

This special issue is motivated by the fact that the EU is a very important player in global development, both as an actor and as a system of collective norms and procedural rules (Gänzle et al., 2012). In addition to being a major source of aid and other forms of development finance, the EU is the world's largest single market, especially for the raw materials and agricultural products that make up a large proportion of developing countries' exports (Holland and Doidge, 2012). Historical ties between several member states and their former colonies remain important levers of influence and European-inspired systems of political and legal organization have spread, slowly and unevenly but surely, throughout Asia, Latin America and Africa (Diamond, 2008). In terms of development cooperation, recent research shows that the impact of the EU on reform agenda-setting in developing countries is far stronger than that of any single bilateral donor (Custer et al., 2015). Thus, despite its obvious shortcomings, Europe remains a magnet for people from developing countries, both physically as a migration destination as well as socially though the influence of European culture, sport and consumer products.

Several policy statements outline the EU's global development ambitions and the ways in which European actors propose to work together to achieve them. The 2005 European Consensus on Development set out a common vision for development to guide member states' bilateral policies and EU-level aid. It also reaffirmed the EU's commitment to 'poverty eradication, ownership, partnership, delivering more and better aid and promoting policy coherence for development' (European Council, 2006: 2). The 2009 Lisbon Treaty reaffirmed the EU's commitment to ending global poverty, prioritized development policy in EU external affairs and stressed the need for EU-level and member state actors to work together. The institutional reforms and policy statements that followed the treaty attempted to address long-standing weaknesses in the collective action of European development policy-making. The 2011 Agenda for Change proposed to focus on good governance, human rights and sustainable growth. It also introduced differentiated development partnerships, implying that wealthier developing countries would no longer receive aid (EC, 2011). The EU's position on the post-2015 global development agenda defined development as a set of collective challenges and expressed the EU's commitment to translate vision into collective action (EC, 2014).

Against the background of the Lisbon Treaty, one might expect that changing global power structures would have created functional and normative pressures to improve the coherence and coordination of European development policies and embed them more deeply in the broader foreign policy agenda. And yet, internal challenges to collective policy-making have grown as a result of the economic crisis that has impacted on the EU and its member states since the 2008 global financial meltdown. These challenges have been aggravated further by existential crisis about the future course of the European project as a whole, perhaps illustrated best by the intra-European negotiations over Greece's Euro membership in 2014 and 2015, and the June 2016 decision of the United Kingdom to leave the European Union. Unsurprisingly, the debt crisis and recessions in several member countries turned European attention inwards to its own problems, in spite of the advancing global development agenda and the alarming conflicts in the EU's neighbourhood. Indeed, Europe's weaknesses in dealing with external crises were starkly revealed during the summer of 2015, when the EU experienced a collective action failure in reaching a common and compassionate position on refugees fleeing the Syrian civil war. Europe's collective leadership went missing just when it was most needed. The implications of the UK referendum result for the EU's global development agenda are unclear, but British government officials hardly engaged in discussions on the EU's global strategy in the first half of 2016.

The apparent disconnect between the ambition of the EU's policy statements and the reality of daily business is a reminder of the EU's 'capability–expectations gap' where high-mindedness far exceeds available resources, especially of political will (Hill, 1993). Indeed, many observers of the EU's international development engagement have noted that the reality of what Europe has been able to achieve has often been very different from the objectives outlined in policy documents (Carbone, 2013). In the past five to ten years, the EU's development policy has increasingly faced a major tension: while demand for European contributions to efforts to address complex global challenges has never been higher, the EU's capacity to supply an effective response has weakened. In this special issue, we conceptualize the capability–expectations gap as a series of collective action challenges that have impacted in various ways on European development policy, and on the broader external relations and foreign policy context in which development policy is embedded.

2 The EU's multilevel collective action challenge

Collective action in external policy has long been a central challenge for EU integration. Development policy's status as a 'shared competence' with subsidiary division of labour between EU-level and member state actors reflects this. Shared competence means that, while EU institutions are engaged in development aid, the 28 member governments also run their own bilateral programmes as they see fit. Indeed, the oft-repeated claim that the EU is the world's largest aid donor is a misconception. While the total official development assistance (ODA) provided by the EU and its members dwarfs the ODA of other OECD members, most EU member states have their own bilateral aid programmes, which they usually see as independent of the European Commission and other member states. The bilateral European aid actors reflect varying degrees of interest in coordination through the EU and are often driven by domestic political, economic and bureaucratic considerations, thus exacerbating collective action problems that are inherent to the EU's construction (Faust and Koch, 2014).

In addition to running their own bilateral aid programmes and their national contributions to multilateral agencies such as the United Nations (UN) and the World Bank, EU member governments have a direct say on policy at the EU level. Their most important forum is the biannual Development Council, an organ of the Council of Foreign Ministers. The Council of Foreign Ministers oversees policy proposals ('Communications') from the Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS), and has the final say on their adoption. Member states can also influence EU-level policies through the various working groups and committees of the Development Council, which is known as the 'comitology' system. This way, they can influence the formulation of major policy initiatives like the Agenda for Change or joint programming, as well as specific initiatives including budget support, country strategies, EU contributions to trust funds or conditionality clauses. EU government implementation agencies, such as Germany's GIZ and KfW, SNV from the Netherlands, Crown Agents from the UK and Expertise France, also look to influence policy at the EU level as well as in their own countries.

The EU-level institutional set-up for development policy involves many players. The European Commission is responsible for initiating legislation on Community policy competencies, which include the regulations governing the aid instruments financed by the EU budget, as well as the European Development Fund (EDF), which is separate from the EU budget but run as an EU programme. In addition to being a development actor in its own right, the Commission has the mandate to coordinate European donors and ensure the complementarity of bilateral and EU programmes. The EEAS is involved in setting the political priorities for the EU's aid and for deciding country allocations. The Commission Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development (DG DEVCO) is in charge of designing and implementing aid programmes through the EU delegations, the embassy-like offices that represent the EU abroad. Programmes for the European Neighbourhood are designed and implemented by the DG for the Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations (DG NEAR). The European Parliament has to approve EU budget matters, including the regulations governing development instruments. The Parliament also has an oversight role through its development, foreign affairs, trade and environment committees, which scrutinize the Commission and the EEAS.

Not surprisingly, the EU aid system has often been criticized for being over-complex, even by the EU member governments which are part of it. Although information sharing has improved in recent years and policies have become better coordinated, the EU is still far from a unified development actor. At the global level, the Commission has been an important driving force in shaping the aid effectiveness agenda. In recent years, as the agenda has become more political, the Commission has continued to represent joint EU positions at global development events, such as the 2011 Busan aid effectiveness summit and the UN SDGs negotiations. Despite its role as the EU's collective voice in these forums, the Commission has been sidelined by member states pushing national positions or seeking national visibility (Carbone, 2013). At the policy level, harmonization has been affected by the political fall-out of member state elections as well as technical factors such as differing budget cycles which stubbornly resist reforms. In-country aid coordination has been faced by many challenges, not the least of which has been the highly contingent commitment, especially on the part of the large member states, to accept coordination by the EU in countries where they have strong bilateral influence (Delputte and Orbie, 2014). The resulting system features an array of shared and overlapping responsibilities, both among EU-level actors, between the EU level and member states, among member states, and within member states.

The European institutions and the member states have tried several strategies to overcome collective action problems (Aspinwall and Greenwood, 1998). Global challenges have prompted the EU and its members to think and act strategically to modernize policy frameworks, to set priorities for aid and other development instruments, and to refine institutional mechanisms for coordinating actors. These include harmonization strategies such as the policy coherence for development (PCD) agenda, and coordination strategies such as joint programming, budget support and earmarking. Indeed, reforms to the EU's foreign relations policy-making system after the 2009 Lisbon Treaty were supposed to make the EU more effective in response to an increasingly complex world. The magnitude and complexity of these tasks has not escaped observers, for whom it has become clear that the EU's strategy, defined by its goals, can only be successful if collective action challenges are overcome (or at least better managed) by the EU institutions and the member states (ETTG, 2014). This encourages us to think about how collective action challenges play out in two distinct but mutually reinforcing ways: through incentives, which influence the decision of actors to act collectively or not, and through policy coherence, where heterogeneous preferences influence outcomes.

3 Conceptualizing collective action problems in the EU's multilevel development policy-making system

The most important feature of the changing global development policy environment is the growing importance of problems that can only be solved by collective action. As Sachs and Schmitt-Traub (2014) noted, two broad types of collective goods can be identified. One type consists of rules, governance mechanisms and regulations that drive international cooperation and economic exchange. As international regime theory suggests, these rules are critical both for guiding policy and implementation, and for the fact that it takes cooperation among a number of actors to ensure that they are upheld (Keohane, 1984). Examples include the international trade regime, international rules on tax evasion and the Paris agenda on aid effectiveness. The second type is global public goods, which require direct investment, mostly from public resources. Things like climatic stability, international peace and security, humanitarian responses to wars and natural disasters, and public health provision require not only investments from individual governments but also cooperation and coordination among a number of state, multilateral and non-state actors (Sachs and Schmitt-Traub, 2014: 34).

Public goods provision invariably requires collective action by a group of actors. But the central aspect of the collective action problem is, as Olson (1965) argued, that individual actors do not usually act in the common interest even when they would benefit from doing so. Consequently, public goods provision is often subject to collective action failures resulting in suboptimal outcomes, especially the underprovision of public goods. From a development perspective, this impacts on how actors go about pursuing goals. With regard to process, the well-known problem of free riding, where individuals face strong incentives to abstain from contributing to the public good while enjoying its benefits, is the heart of the collective action problem. Overcoming the free-rider challenge requires the provision of incentives (including sanctions) to increase compliance. With regard to substance, there are often conflicts between different outcomes, and actors interpret potential trade-offs between these goals in accordance with their preferences. In development policy this kind of challenge emerges principally in questions of policy coherence between the objectives of development and other policy areas. These two overarching aspects affect collective action in EU development policy in the ways set out below.

3.1 Creating incentives to act collectively

Public goods and collective action are closely linked through the 'aggregation technology' used to produce the public good (Sandler, 2010). In simple terms, the size of the public good produced equals the sum of the individual contributions. For instance, the amount by which global carbon emissions are to be reduced is an aggregation of the reductions implemented by everyone. However, if an agent behaves rationally, not contributing to the production of the public good and enjoying its benefits is always the best strategy. If all members of the group do the same the public good will not be produced, even if everyone agrees they want the good. Even though unilateral compliance with carbon reduction rules is still better than the status quo, joining forces to combat global warming remains a collective action dilemma because the incentive to benefit from the efforts of others is stronger than the incentive to comply with the rules.

For Olson (1965) the key question was under what conditions groups are able to act collectively to produce a public good. He concluded that actors either need individual incentives separate from the benefits that would accrue to them as members of the group, or there needs to be some form of coercion that compels them individually to accept the costs of achieving the group's objectives. Examples for positive and negative incentives include the increased access to information that can result from participation in a trust fund, or the lower costs that may result from coordinating at the country level. If incentives from the policy change itself are not clearly forthcoming on their own, they may need to be created by changes to the institutional rules of the game. EU member state contributions to the EDF are calculated by a differentiated key, and while member states that contribute less arguably benefit disproportionately from the ACP-EU partnership, the concession makes it more likely that everyone will contribute. While coercive measures may work for positive selective incentives, they run into a 'second order' collective actions problem as far as negative incentives are concerned. As several scholars have pointed out, enforcing punishment is also a collective action problem (Elster, 1989;

Ostrom, 1998). Many EU foreign and development policy scholars are familiar with the difficulties the EU has faced in imposing sanctions on neighbouring countries for non-compliance with agreements, largely due to differing member state positions on conditionality (Molenaers et al., 2015).

Another way to overcome collective action problems is through social conventions and norms. Social conventions may overcome the incentive problem in collective action (Ostrom, 1998). Convention is a situation where most individuals conform to a specific behaviour and expect newcomers to conform as well. Collective action dilemmas are more easily solved if group solidarity is the prevailing convention. Collective action is more likely with a shared conviction that the cause is worth the sacrifice, or, more precisely, that an individual contribution is expected even though it is not a dominant strategy. This can act as a 'normative incentive' additional to the positivist costs and benefits considered by rationalists. This was captured by Deutsch in his work on political community and the 'we-feeling' or notion that communities need an ideational framework to provide them with glue (Drulák and Druláková, 2014). Shared norms and rhetorical commitment towards a common Europe not only allowed the pre-accession EU to embark on the eastward enlargement despite the reluctance or even resistance of the old member states, but are now are seen as a driving mechanism in many EU policy areas (Schimmelfennig and Thomas, 2009). Nevertheless, since the onset of the global financial crisis in 2008, fiscal 'belt-tightening' in several EU member states has led to the disappearance of some bilateral aid programmes and a weakening in the solidarity behind the EU's global engagement.

3.2 Goal conflicts, trade-offs and policy coherence

Conceptually, the link between collective action and policy coherence is related to the public goods challenge of how the costs and benefits of policies are dispersed and concentrated. When the benefits of a policy change are large and concentrated among a group of actors, the group has a strong incentive for acting collectively. On the other hand, when diffuse interests pull in different directions, incentives to act collectively are lower. It becomes increasingly difficult to resolve conflicts among overlapping issues with an ever-growing number of actors with a stake in the outcome. The EU's engagement with the 2030 Agenda reflects this multifaceted collective action problem. The already ambitious global development agenda has been even further broadened with the SDGs, creating more goal conflicts that will have to be resolved in European development policy. The SDGs set targets for all nations, rather than only developing ones, requiring both coherent management of the EU's external affairs and consideration of how to achieve the SDGs within Europe.

Coherence problems arise in development policy in several ways. As the PCD agenda illustrates, goal conflicts can emerge between development cooperation and other policy fields, such as trade, agriculture or security. An example can be seen in the Africa, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries' partnership with the EU. This is ostensibly a development partnership, but one which includes trade policy in ways designed to benefit the EU more than the ACP partners (Young and Peterson, 2013). The coherence between trade and development policies in the ACP-EU partnership is not just a matter of unintended consequences, but also the outcome of a negotiated process among EU member state and partner country actors with varying preferences for different outcomes (Bartels, 2007).

Coherence problems can also emerge within the different facets of development policy itself, such as between poverty eradication and democratic governance, or ownership and conditionality. An example of conflicting goals is the trade-off between addressing humanitarian objectives and longer-term conflict resolution. This has remained a special area in which the tension between international neutrality principles and strategic policy processes for dealing with crises has long been noted. While humanitarian aid can be harmfully politicized, it can also help prolong conflicts by providing conflict parties with a buffer between their actions and their impacts (Macrae and Leader, 2001).

Furthermore, joint decision-making is characteristic of the EU's multilevel external policies. In 'joint-decision trap' situations, when actors of various hierarchical levels have to act together in order to achieve an outcome, conflicting goals may lead to stalemate (Scharpf, 1988). When actors prefer different policy outcomes they are less likely to act collectively than when they prefer similar outcomes, and vice-versa. The joint-decision trap can be escaped when new policy ideas push the frontier of Pareto-optimal solutions outwards, thus unlocking the policy stalemate (Rodrik, 2014). When the policy change in question is one that is expected to lead to more coherence between two or more policy areas, actors need to know that they will benefit from the change or they will have less reason to support it. For instance, innovative solutions include mechanisms to preserve incumbents' benefits by allowing for earmarking, especially when preferences are heterogeneous.

4 Exploring collective action: contributions to the special issue

The articles in this collection address several questions that arise from the conceptualization of collective action outlined above. Under what conditions do EU actors manage to act collectively, and under what conditions has this been more difficult? What strategies have been adopted to overcome collective action challenges in the articulation, design and implementation of development policy in the broader external relations context? What problems can be solved using coordination mechanisms, and what problems require deeper integration? What problems cannot be solved at all? Are there issues that appear to challenge collective action that turn out to not present problems after all? What are the impacts of collective action as opposed to bilateral action on recipients' perceptions?

Koch, Faust, Leiderer and Molenaers look at coordination and collective action challenges with regards to a specific aid modality, Development Budget Support (DBS). DBS has not only been promoted as one of the most promising modalities to improve aid effectiveness, it was also expected to contribute to increased donor harmonization. However, after a strong increase in DBS and coordination among European donors and the EC, DBS has ceased to be an important policy tool. Most European donor countries have reduced their DBS or abolished it altogether. This derives from large collective action problems in the EU and a 'coordination mess' in the implementation of budget support programmes. European donors have been unable to incentivize public good provision through successful policy coordination in DBS, while suffering from private fiduciary and reputational costs of failing projects.

Furness and Gänzle analyse the link between collective action and policy coherence at the EU level. Their contribution shows that bureaucratic reforms aimed at improving coordination have not been able to fix coherence problems in the key area of the security-development nexus. This is because EU-level decision-making is still affected by bureaucratic actors catering to specific constituencies. The EU institutions lack the strategic direction that would be provided by clear prioritization of global policy objectives, but this is not possible in a system that lacks clear hierarchy. Without combining strategic direction with effective changes in the foreign relations apparatus, reforms aimed at improving collective action can only make a marginal impact on policy coherence.

Orbie, Delputte, Bossuyt, Debusscher, Del Biondo, Reynaert and Verschaeve show how the EU has developed its own distinctive development norm identity in contrast to the World Bank. They use three thematic case studies – governance, aid effectiveness and social development – to show that the norms and procedural ideas of the EU have started to differentiate themselves from the World Bank's approach during the past decade. The normative and procedural approach of the EU is characterized by a higher degree of politicization and more cooperative procedural forms as opposed to the World Bank's more economic and unilateral approach. Orbie and colleagues argue that the political will of establishing a consensus in this area helped create normative incentives for the EU to overcome a collective action dilemma.

Carbone shows how collective action problems impact on aid effectiveness at the implementation level, and the EU's efforts to resolve coordination and coherence problems through joint programming (JP). EU and member state officials felt that more collective EU action could increase the impact of aid, specifically by increasing predictability, reducing fragmentation, and promoting stronger alignment with recipient development plans. At the same time, there was the idea that JP processes could help increase the EU's political and development impact through more coordinated EU action. The transformative effect of Europe on national development policies, however, has been less pronounced on the ground than at the headquarter level. While most EU member states either adopted specific guidelines on JP or committed to it on a case-by-case basis, different incentives at the implementation level resulted in resistance.

Singling out China's presence in Africa, Grimm and Hackenesch explore the extent to which solutions to collective action problems on the regional level may increase collective action on the global level. Their results are mixed: there is no indication that the EU has improved its collective action capacity at country level in response to the growing presence of China, despite the clear incentive that the Chinese 'alternative' should provide for the EU. Even in cases where they expected

China's presence to exert positive reform pressure on the EU, it did not carry enough weight to trigger reforms to strengthen EU collective action at country level or to propel reform initiatives in Brussels. From a coherence perspective, they argue that the fundamental question regarding the extent to which the EU aspires to become a more political development actor remains unresolved. Whereas the EU has been unable to unravel the different logics of political engagement and development cooperation, China openly regards development aid as a political instrument.

Bodenstein and Kemmerling provide empirical insights into the potential causes of coordination failures based on survey evidence from the Afrobarometer. Collective action problems may prove costly for the EU, as they would diminish the EU's visibility in recipient countries. In comparing the EU's public image in recipient countries with bilateral European donors who are former colonial powers, the US and China, they show that the EU's ODA is consistently linked with positive approval rates, whereas ODA from the US and China correlates with negative approval rates in recipient countries. One reason for this is that material gains from EU development policies are more tangible to citizens because they are more oriented towards meeting immediate social needs, whereas China's assistance focuses more on long-term improvement of the economic infrastructure. They conclude that the EU has positive visibility as a development actor, for which it must have overcome its collective action dilemma to some significant extent. EU-level aid is an important tool to improve the collective action capacity of the EU.

Michaelowa, Reinsberg and Schneider ask why the EU has become an important contributor to trust funds run by International Development Organizations (IDOs), such as the World Bank and the Global Fund. This so-called multi-bi aid constitutes a puzzle because, being an IDO itself, the EU's participation in multi-bi aid constitutes a case of double-delegation. Based on statistical data and expert interviews, the authors argue that participation in IDO-run trust funds helps overcome the collective action problem at the EU level, where member states have been reluctant to extend the EU's mandate. Only the recent removal of regulatory constraints has allowed the EU to set up its own trust funds.

Maxwell and Gavas examine European development cooperation through the lens of collective action, from the perspective of policy motivation. They argue that successful collective action requires a combination of both culture and calculus, and suggest that the European debate often suffers from an excess of one and a shortfall in the other – and vice-versa. They note that different perspectives can be explained by different geopolitical realities: different EU member countries have different approaches to collective action. The UK has a tradition of 'calculus' with regard to cooperation with EU partners, whereas Germany's position has been traditionally shaped by the 'culture' of the European project.

5 Conclusions

EU development cooperation faces 'traditional' collective action problems arising from the shared competence construction of the policy field. As the contributions to this special issue show, many of these long-standing problems have been recognized and dealt with, with varying degrees of success. The rapidly changing global context has thrown up at least four additional issues that have challenged the EU's capacity for collective action: global economic crisis and its European manifestation in the Euro crisis and the travails of Greece; the long-running debate about Britain's EU membership, which has weakened Britain's commitment to the EU's global agenda and its influence on EU decision-making; the Mediterranean migration and refugee crisis and its massive escalation in the summer of 2015 caused by the Syrian civil war; and the global recognition of the need for more collective action on global public goods enshrined in the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs. These issues are unlikely to be the last collective challenges for Europe and the strategies and mechanisms through which the EU and its members organize collective action will keep evolving.

The contributions to this special issue help illustrate that research on collective action in development policy must unpack two interlinked sets of issues. With regard to the processes through which decisions are taken and rules and norms created and enforced, the incentive structure that actors are faced with is of crucial importance. With regard to the content of the policy objectives themselves, questions of coherence and the complex of winners and losers that lie behind them need to be better understood. Approaching collective action in this way helps advance knowledge and scholarship relating to how and why actors take decisions on complex questions, how and why they allocate resources and some of the myriad factors that may upset the best-laid plans.

As a global development actor and policy-making system, the EU is not necessarily in a worse position than its member states or other international development actors with regard to its ability to organize collective action. As a multilevel polity the EU has more options and potentially far greater potential for positive influence than member states, acting bilaterally, minilaterally in cooperation with specific partners or through multilateral development actors like the UN system or the World Bank. Indeed, the 2030 Agenda has provided a ready-made global framework for organizing collective action on global issues. Future judgements on the EU's contributions to the SDGs will probably continue to focus on how the EU translates the many visions it articulates for stewardship of the world and its resources into action.

first submitted November 2015
final revision accepted July 2016

References

Aspinwall, M. and Greenwood, J. (eds) (1998) 'Conceptualising collective action in the European Union: An introduction', *Collective Action in the European Union: Interests and the New Politics of Associability*. London: Routledge: 1–30.

Bartels, L. (2007) 'The Trade and Development Policy of the European Union', *The European Journal of International Law* 18(4): 715–56.

Carbone, M. (2013) 'International Development and the European Union's External Policies: Changing contexts, problematic nexuses, contested partnerships', *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 26(3): 483–96.

Custer, S.; Rice, Z.; Masaki, T.; Latourell, R. and Parks, B. (2015) *Listening to Leaders: Which Development Partners Do They Prefer and Why?* Williamsburg, VA: Aid Data, http://aiddata.org/listening-to-leaders (accessed 23 August 2016).

Delputte, S. and Orbie, J. (2014) 'The EU and Donor Coordination on the Ground: Perspectives from Tanzania and Zambia', *European Journal of Development Research* 26(5): 676–91.

Diamond, L. (2008) 'The Democratic Rollback: The resurgence of the predatory state', *Foreign Affairs* 87(2): 36–48.

Drulák, P. and Druláková, R. (2014) 'The Richness of the Liberal Tradition in International Relations: Karl Deutsch on political community and the European integration', *International Relations* 28 (3): 333–49.

Elster, J. (1989) *The Cement of Society: A study in social order*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

European Commission (EC) (2014) *A Decent Life for All: From vision to collective action*. Brussels: European Commission.

European Commission (EC) (2011) *Increasing the Impact of EU Development Policy: An agenda for change*. Brussels: European Commission.

European Council (2006) Joint statement by the Council and the representatives of the governments of the Member States meeting within the Council, the European Parliament and the Commission on European Union Development Policy: 'The European Consensus', *Official Journal of the European Union* 2006/C 46/01.

European Think Tanks Group (ETTG) (2014) *Our Collective Interest: Why Europe's problems need global solutions and global problems need European action*. European Think Tanks Group www.ettg.eu, (accessed 11 June 2015).

Faust, J. and Koch, S. (2014) *Foreign Aid and the Domestic Politics of European Budget Support*. Discussion Paper 21/2014. Bonn: German Development Institute.

Gänzle, S., Grimm, S. and Makhan, D. (eds) (2012) *The European Union and Global Development: An 'enlightened' superpower in the making?* Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Hill, C. (1993) 'The Capability-Expectations Gap, or Conceptualizing Europe's International Role', *Journal of Common Market Studies* 31(3): 305–28.

Holland, M. and Doidge, M. (2012) *Development Policy of the European Union*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Keohane, R. (1984) *After Hegemony: Cooperation and discord in the world political economy*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Macrae, J. and Leader, N. (2001) 'Apples, Pears and Porridge: The origins and impact of the search for "coherence" between humanitarian and political responses to chronic political emergencies', *Disasters* 25(4): 290–307.

Molenaers, N., Dellepiane, S. and Faust, J. (2015) 'Political Conditionality and Foreign Aid', *World Development* 75: 2–12.

Olson, M. (1965) *The Logic of Collective Action: Public goods and the theory of groups*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Ostrom, E. (1998) 'A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collective Action', *American Political Science Review* 92(1): 1–22.

Overseas Development Institute (ODI), European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM) and German Development Institute/Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) (2013) *European Report on Development. Post-2015: Global action for an inclusive and sustainable future*. Brussels: European Union.

Ramalingam, B. (2013) *Aid on the Edge of Chaos: Rethinking international cooperation in a complex world*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Rodrik, D. (2014) 'When Ideas Trump Interests: Preferences, worldviews, and policy innovations', *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 28(1): 189–208.

Sachs, J. and Schmitt-Traub, G. (2014) 'Financing Sustainable Development: Implementing the SDGs through effective investment strategies and partnerships'. Draft document prepared as input to preparations for the Third Conference on Financing for Development, Addis Ababa 13–16 July 2015, 30 November 2014.

Sandler, T. (2010) 'Overcoming Global and Regional Collective Action Impediments', *Global Policy* 1(1): 40–50.

Scharpf, F. (1988) 'The Joint-Decision Trap: Lessons from German federalism and european integration', *Public Administration* 66(3): 239–78.

Schimmelfennig, F. and Thomas, D. (2009) 'Normative Institutionalism and EU Foreign Policy in Comparative Perspective', *International Politics* 46(4): 491–504.

Tsebelis, G. (2002) *Veto Players: How political institutions work*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

United Nations (UN) 2014: *Open Working Group Proposal for Sustainable Development Goals*. Sustainable Development Knowledge Platform https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/1579SDGs%20Proposal.pdf (accessed 16 June 2015).

Young, A. and Peterson, J. (2013) 'We Care About You, But..': The politics of EU trade policy and development', *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 26(3): 497–518.