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Caging and Uncaging Pride: Di(s)visibility and the Borders of Budapest Pride

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ABSTRACT

In 2008, following right-wing attacks in 2007, Budapest's Pride march was 'caged' by a cordon of police barricades which remained until repudiated by march organisers in 2017. Both caging and uncaging resulted in fundamental transformations of the march, its spectacle of identity, politics, and belonging, and the meanings of Hungarian sexual politics. Grounded in ethnographic research from 1999 to the present, this paper explores the implications of these transformations for Budapest Pride's layered visibilities and invisibilities, and their borders of desire, being, politics, and belonging. Weaving together queer concepts of 'disidentification', anthropological thinking on 'friction', and postsocialist analysis of queer 'in/visibility', I argue that that Budapest Pride's shifting caged and uncaged state renders it a critical site of 'di(s)visibility': contingent frictions, simultaneously productive and destructive, between queer and other visibilities and invisibilities, whose ambiguous, ambivalent relations both crystallise and dissolve multiple borders of identity, politics, and belonging.

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At the entry gate to the barricaded gathering area for Budapest's *Meleg Méltóság Menet* [Gay Dignity Parade] in 2009, next to the Millennium Monument at *Hösök tere* [Heroes' Square], I stand with a handful of other volunteers, scrutinizing everyone who wants to come in and join the march, deciding whom to allow in, and whom to keep out. Trying to gauge visible signs indicating pro- or anti-gay attitudes, as well as those revealing "proper gayness," we constantly check with one another, whispering, "Is that one okay?" nodding, "He's fine," or shaking our heads: no, not one of us; not on our side. Masses of nationalists, skinheads, and neo-Nazis mill about just beyond the barricades, periodically trying to sneak or push through. Backing each other up, often physically (at one point, a whole group of burly *"Hungaristas"*[1] tries to force their way inside *en masse;* we desperately link arms and eventually, bodily, repel them), anxiously consulting in cases of uncertainty or when someone complains, we repeat over and over, as politely as we can, "*Elnézést: nem engedjük* [Sorry: you can't come in]." Some of those squeezing through the gates, and our scrutiny, are relieved: "*Istenem, köszi!* [My God, thanks!]" they mutter as they make it into the relative calm and safety of the fenced-in assembly area. Others are less so, shaking their heads in dismay and frustration at what the once joyful and open event has become.

"*Mi Vagyunk a Kordon!*" [We are the Cordon!]

– Banner held by black-clad, right-wing nationalists blockading the Lánchíd [Chain Bridge], Budapest Pride 2017.

Over the last twenty years, LGBTQ 'Pride' marches have emerged as highly salient and contentious events in postsocialist Eastern Europe.[2] Controversies over efforts to hold, and attack, ban, or protect, them have located LGBTQ marches at the heart of current struggles over a range of

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postsocialist borders, and between the complex relationships of invisibility and visibility with which such marches mediate these. The first of these marches in the region, Budapest's LGBTQ march – commonly known simply as 'Budapest Pride' – has, in its twenty-six-year history, experienced dramatic changes in its relationship to such struggles and the borders they reflect and (re)produce, particularly since 2007 when, after ten years of peaceful marching, it was violently attacked by nationalists, skinheads, and neo-Nazis. These attacks were repeated with greater violence in 2008 and remained an active threat for years afterwards (indeed, to the present day). The attacks resulted in a crucial transformation of the Budapest march, beginning in 2008: the surrounding of its entire route from beginning to end with a cordon of fences and police lines – a protective yet powerfully limiting 'caging' of Pride. It was only in 2017, after years of contentious debate, that march organisers finally publicly demanded that the barrier of fences be removed, and Pride was once again – at least in certain senses – uncaged.

These dramatic and consequential changes took place against a backdrop of not only a much-publicised regional surge in homophobia, but a broader context of increasing contestation over the borders of 'European' identity, characterised by a revival of Western European neocolonialism and orientalism towards, and intensifying nationalist politics throughout, the Eastern European region (Böröcz 2006, Bukowski 2006). Central to both dynamics has been Western nations' instrumentalisation of sexual tolerance as a key indicator of people's desires for modern, democratically inclusive societies and authentic 'Europeanness', and contrasting claims of heteronational authenticity in Europe's East (Fassin 2010, Fassin & Surkis 2010, Graff 2010, Moss 2016, Paternotte & Ayoub 2014, Renkin 2007, 2009, 2023, 2024).

In such a context, Pride marches in Hungary and elsewhere have mediated crucial, cross-cutting borders of sexual, trans/national, and other identities, communities, and politics. Yet there is more at stake in the caging and uncaging of Budapest Pride. It has also in profound and lasting ways transformed the march's role as a key mediating site of another, interrelated and deeply contested, set of borders foundational to both sexual and politics: those between visibility and invisibility, and the equally profound boundaries these secure, sustain, and challenge.

In this paper, drawing upon ethnographic research from 1999 to the present, including participant-observation fieldwork, in-depth interviews with members of Hungarian LGBTQ activist organisations and communities, and analysis of public discourses, I examine some of the implications the 'caging' and 'uncaging' of the Budapest Pride march has had for its layered visibilities and invisibilities, and the borders of desire, being, politics, and belonging these reflect and produce.[3] Drawing on queer theorist José Esteban Muñoz's influential notion of 'disidentification', anthropological thinking on the concepts of 'divisibility' (Strathern 1988) and 'friction' (Tsing 2005), and postsocialist studies work on the queer politics of 'in/visibility' (Stella 2012), I argue that that LGBTQ political practices such as Pride marches are critical sites of what I will call 'di(s)visibility': shifting, contingent and multiple frictions, at once productive and destructive, between queer and other visibilities and invisibilities, whose partial, ambiguous and ambivalent relations are negotiated by diverse actors in ways that at times crystallise, at others dissolve, multiple borders and boundaries of identity, politics, and belonging.[4] If prior to the 2007 attacks the Budapest Pride march expressed Hungarian queer people's complex desires for multiple identities, belongings, and politics, visibly challenging postsocialism's normative boundaries between queer and straight, being and doing, public and private, and national and transnational, the constraints imposed on the march following the attacks, especially the material and symbolic barrier of the police's *dupla kordon* [double cordon], dramatically altered its relations of visibility and invisibility, desire and difference, contracting the boundaries of Hungarian sexual citizenship. The uncaging of the Pride march in 2017, on the other hand, by not only removing physically but symbolically repudiating the cordons and their perilous protection, once again shifted the meanings surrounding the march, reorienting visible and other borders, and both blurring and hardening them. Moving some actors and groups (visibly and invisibly) closer to both one another and imagined 'European' and 'Hungarian' norms of sexuality and politics, and others further from both, these changes

ultimately instantiated new constellations of 'di(s)visibility', new seen and unseen cordons of sexual-political belonging, for both Hungarians and Hungary.

Marching Politics – Seen and Unseen

Early readings of queer marches focused on the significance of their publicly visible claims to sexual rights and equality. Relying on liberal understandings of the centrality of visible publicness to social and political citizenship, these analyses saw such events as expressing participants' desires for inclusion in modern democratic societies, and others' public opposition to demonstrate resistance to such inclusion (Duberman 2019 [1993], Faderman 2015, Peterson et al. 2018).

Later work, emerging from the tumultuous moral and epistemological debates of queer politics and theory, critiqued the fundamental limitations of liberal visibility politics, arguing that 'spectacles of multiculturalism' like LGBTQ marches, by framing inclusion claims through public demands for recognition of difference, performatively fix the identities they claim to liberate, containing them within the very boundaries of visible difference legitimating them (Göktürk 2005, Povinelli 2002, Robinson 2009). Queer scholars have further argued that, although less obviously, such politics produce powerful 'homonormativities' as well: disciplinary regimes in which some non-heteronormative people claim inclusion by differentiating themselves from the desires, identities, and politics of others, thus reinforcing old, and creating new, internal exclusionary borders (Duggan 1998, 2002, Manalansan 1997, Warner 1999). Techniques of identity politics like LGBTQ marches are therefore not simply unifying; they also function subtly as 'practices of discreteness' (Ferguson 2004): rather than dissolving, they reinforce borders between racial, class, gender, and sexual identities, communities, and spaces, reifying both their subjects and the relationships between them, and thus supporting a civil order in which the tolerated Other inhabits a critically contained citizenship (Brown 2006, Povinelli 2002).

These practices of visibility, and the boundaries they create both visible and invisible, are also consequential for the reinforcement of other borders, similarly seen and unseen. Sexuality and sexual politics have of late come to serve as powerful markers of distinction and hierarchy between the West and its Eastern Others, both within and beyond Europe (Butler 2008, Fassin 2010, Fassin & Surkis 2010). In recent decades Western LGBTQ movements have increasingly sought inclusion by visibly asserting their own superior sexual, religious and national respectability over a range of racial, national and religious others, thus supporting long-standing global, exclusionary moral and political hierarchies (Puar 2007). As spectacular performances of such claims, LGBTQ marches bound and normativise by rendering visible some sexual desires and subjectivities, and some desires for spatial and temporal belonging, while obscuring others (Engebretsen 2021, Da Costa 2020).

Analysis of postsocialist sexual politics has also seen Eastern European LGBTQ movements and Pride marches primarily as advancing straightforward claims to an equality of citizenship that is both sexual and modern or 'global' in nature. Such work has largely taken collective visible public presence as critical to Pride marches' moral-political force as expressions of participants' desires for inclusion in global, democratic, and multicultural societies and public opposition as proof of resistance to these. This is true for such marches in places like Poland, where Gruszczynska (2009) interprets the 2005 Poznan Equality Parade's assertion of queerness in public space as mobilising transnationally modern, civic legitimacy against nationalist repression, and Graff (2006, 2010) sees such marches as public contests between queer 'desires for Europe' and nationalist 'EU-phobia', and for Serbia, where Bilić argues that while early 2000s lesbian/gay activists yearned for 'a Pride March which would finally render visible the country's discriminated LG(BT) population' (2016b: 119), such Western events ultimately 'distance [queers] from the particularities of the local legal, political, and social environment' (2016b: 122), and Mikuŝ (2011) takes support for Pride by queer people or State as visibilising pro-Europeanisation/democratization attitudes, public opposition to it their nationalist antithesis. Indeed, LGBTQ marches and movements have

frequently been read as 'litmus tests' – broad indicators of postsocialist tolerant, democratic modernity – and their absence or obstruction as evidence of its failure (Bilić 2016b, Graff 2006, 2010, Gruszczynska 2009, O'Dwyer 2018, Wallace-Lorencová 2003).

Such readings' structural simplicity has been challenged by more nuanced interpretations of postsocialist sexual politics as complex negotiations of cross-cutting frictions between queer and anti-queer actors' national and transnational identifications, and their competing negotiations of borders of European difference (Binnie & Klesse 2011, Kulpa 2013, Kulpa & Mizielinska 2011, Rédai 2012, Renkin 2009, 2015, 2023). This work has highlighted how specificities of context shape the meanings and implications of visibility and invisibility for queer politics. Some scholars argue that Western activist techniques such as LGBTQ NGOs and Pride marches constitute systems of colonial tutelage privileging visible identity politics, and unsuited to Eastern European sexual subjectivities, communities, and politics (Bilić 2016a, Butterfield 2014, Essig 1999, Kulpa 2013, Kulpa & Mizielinska 2011). Others counter that while, in postsocialism's particular conditions, Pride marches and other sexual-political practices possess different meanings and implications than in their original settings, they are not simply foreign in meaning and spirit. Whether in the Pride march in Split, Croatia, where the calculus of sexual and national visibility and invisibility, and the dynamics of hetero- and homonormativities they undergird, are structured differently than in such concepts' original Western contexts (Moss 2016), or in Poznan's Equality March, where queer activists invoked the powerful political symbolism of Solidarity to support inclusion claims (Gruszczynska 2009), these perspectives recognise that they are entangled in their own complex histories, with critical implications for queer (and other) visibilities, invisibilities, and politics.

Similarly, Francesca Stella's brilliant 2012 analysis of post-Soviet lesbians' politics of 'in/visibility' argues that the visible sexual identity politics privileged by Western-centric imaginings – coming out, spectacular events – while meaningful in Moscow and St. Petersburg, are impossible in Russia's smaller cities and rural areas, where anti-queer repression renders visibility's cost too high, and queer people must instead adopt less visible tactics of being and doing. Although 'invisible' to Western political theory's binary calculus, these practices, Stella insists – not being 'out'; the unmarked 'hanging out' of the *tusovka* – nonetheless impact their surroundings: because 'the boundaries between visibility and invisibility, and between heterosexualised and queer space, are porous and fluid', she contends, 'the very presence of a queer *tusovka* in public space challenges the heterosexualised landscape' (2012: 1842).[5] For Stella, then, the very present-yet-unremarked, at once seen and unseen, subtleties of these practices – their 'in/visibilities' – make them a *more* effective politics amidst the frictions of their specific contexts.

Queering 'In/Visibility' (Anthropologically)

Stella's challenge to the personal, social, and political boundaries between visibility and invisibility resonates powerfully with the ways queer theoretical approaches to sexuality have seen ambiguous, complexly visible/invisible relationalities to haunt the supposedly clear borders between subjectivities and broader mappings of difference. José Esteban Muñoz's work is of particular relevance. Building on Sedgwick's (1990) claims about the psychic and social interactions foundational to queer selfhood, Muñoz sought to re-envision the concept of 'disidentification' to better grasp how (queer) subjects orient themselves amidst the intersecting grids of race, class, gender, and sexuality surrounding them. Queer identifying, Muñoz argued, was a complex process, always necessarily involving 'simultaneously and partially counter-identifying, as well as only partially identifying, with different aspects of the social and psychic world' (Muñoz 1999: 8). The result was a partial, ambiguous subject positioning, 'disidentification', foundationally characterised by 'instability, mobility, oscillation, and multiplicity' (Muñoz 1999: 27), always transversing, at times visibly, at times invisibly, the normative borders of sexual and other identifications – as he puts it elsewhere (citing Butler), 'this uneasy sense of standing under a sign to which one does

and does not belong' (1999: 12).[6] Critically, for Muñoz the ambiguous, contingent multiplicities of such disidentifications are profoundly social and political, shaping new possibilities for both individuals and socialities, functioning 'to make worlds' (Muñoz 1999: 195). Such 'worlds of transformative politics and possibilities' (Muñoz 1999: 195), however, are always necessarily at best only contingently and precariously shared worlds: worlds of deeply ambivalent subjects never clearly either securely connected to, or divided from, one another. 'Disidentification' thus challenges our usual assumptions about the visibilities and invisibilities, personal, social, and political, of both recognition and misrecognition, and their causes, (dis)connections, and consequences.

Munoz's vision of the partial and contingent, ambiguous and ambivalent, relationality of the queer self can also be read, more anthropologically, as a radical gloss on poststructuralist anthropological views of the foundationally relational 'divisibility' of personhood – long overlooked by modern, Western theories of the Self. In such analyses 'dividual', rather than 'individual', selves (whether modern or non-modern, Western or non-Western) are seen as multiple, socially constructed and embedded, constantly fragmented and contingently connected to and disconnected from a diversity of other actors, structures, and meanings – in Marilyn Strathern's influential account, always at once 'partial' and part, divided and connected, in ways sometimes visible and sometimes not, but nonetheless vastly consequential both personally and socially/politically (Strathern 1988; see also LiPuma 1998, Smith 2012, Spiro 1993). Interestingly, such perspectives are reminiscent as well, although across different borders and scales, of anthropologist Anna Tsing's (2005) inspired mappings of the complex, multi-layered, and often hidden relationships, at once connecting and dividing, that characterise *fin-de-millénaire* Indonesians' social, economic, and political articulations of the local and global meanings and forces that surround them. Tsing uses the evocative term 'friction' to highlight such articulations' simultaneously productive and destructive potentials, as well as their complexly intersectional, border-traversing entanglements.

Bringing the anthropological arguments of Strathern and Tsing together with Muñozian 'disidentification', I think, gives us a way to usefully complicate Stella's treatment of 'in/visibility', by suggesting the term 'di(s)visibility'. Although reluctant to add another awkward, pretentiously parenthesising term to sexuality scholarship's already overloaded lexicon, it honestly strikes me that 'di(s)visibility' helps highlight the complex and ambivalent negotiations of borders at once personal and political, private and public, national and transnational, queer and straight, heteronormative and homonormative, and the constantly changing patterns of connection and disconnection between and across them so often overlooked in thinking about visible and invisible politics. Here, the 'di(s)', as in Muñoz's parenthetically present/absent '(dis)', underscores crucial ambiguities in the dynamics of visibility and invisibility, and people's always fundamentally ambivalent, contingent, and shifting (dis)engagements with them, that 'in/visibility' at times neglects; the separated, equally present/absent parenthesised '(s)' attunes us to the profound individual and social, personal and political, divisions and solidarities, the multilayered, frictive severings and suturings, both productive and destructive, that these shifting relations produce, also often under-explored. We can thus best understand the significance of Budapest Pride's historical trajectory of caging and uncaging, and how its complex and concrete, yet deeply ambivalent and frictive, negotiations of the boundaries between visibility and invisibility organises other, related borders of selfhood and belonging – both personal, internal ambiguities and ambivalences and a range of social and political socialities, solidarities and sunderings, always at once local and global – I suggest, if we think of these in terms of a fluid, ever-shifting politics of 'di(s)visibility'.

Marching Multiple Desires

Before 2007, the Budapest Pride march was a complex spectacle of sexual, social, and political desires and borders. From its beginning in 1997, motivated by desires to transcend the borders many felt divided postsocialist Hungary from the West's enlightened world of visible LGBTQ identities, communities, and rights, the march invoked the iconography of 'global gayness' (Altman

2001). Inspired by Pride marches elsewhere to fill Budapest's public space each year with the vivid symbolism of rainbow flags, umbrellas, pink triangles, and posters proclaiming 'The Gay Family' and 'Silence = Death', the march also featured drag queens and go-go dancers in highly visible roles, leading the march and anchoring post-march performances. The march's scheduling aligned it with the global timescape of LGBTQ marches; opening speakers frequently cited the 1969 Stonewall riots as the key moment in a universal history shared by Hungarian queers (Renkin 2007, 2009). The march's visibility thus might have been said to enable its function as a 'practice of discreteness', marking its participants – and through them all queer people – as distinct from both straightness and Hungarianness.

Critically, however, until the 2007 attacks, through the march queer people simultaneously expressed very different desires for belonging, through their spectacular presence in public, nationally symbolic spaces dissolving the borders dividing queer Hungarians from heteronormative national imaginings. Expanding from marginal beginnings in 1997 into Budapest's key spaces such as *Deák* Square and *Andrássy* Boulevard in the 2000s, spanning the Danube's central *Erzsébet* and *Lánchíd* bridges, and tying itself to nationally significant sites such as Heroes' Square's Millennium Monument, the march visibly asserted queer national belonging (Renkin 2007, 2009).

Budapest Pride thus created a complex public visibility, blurring the borders separating queer and straight identities, national and transnational affiliations, and local and global politics – borders foundational to postsocialist politics, sexual and otherwise. Unsurprisingly, such provocative entanglings of desires and borders have involved, as in Tsing's account, painful 'frictions'. Its challenge to the borders of both hetero- and geo-normative desires and belongings has occasioned not only right-wing laments about gays 'taking over' the city but new desires for strengthened heteronationalist borders. Critically, these have emerged against the backdrop of Hungary's dramatic cultural-political reorientation since the late 1990s, characterised by both Viktor Orbán's and his *Fidesz* party's rapid rightward shift and the surrounding rise of a broader nationalism (including the emergence of groups such as the neo-fascist *Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom* [Movement for a Better Hungary] and its even more extreme successor, *Mi Hazánk Mozgalom* [Our Homeland Movement]), and surging right-wing willingness to violently police public and private boundaries and spaces. Especially significantly, a terrifying expansion of overtly heteronationalist government politics since *Fidesz* and Orbán's 2010 return to power has directly instrumentalised gender and sexuality as key sites for policing the borders of true Hungarianness (see Rédai 2019, Renkin 2023, 2024).

Caging Pride

It was against this backdrop of cultural and political contestation and change that in 2007, after 10 years of scattered, peaceful opposition, Budapest Pride was attacked. Throwing eggs (some filled with acid), bottles, rocks, and smokebombs, chanting 'Filthy faggots!' and '[Throw the] faggots [in]to the Danube!', nationalists and neo-Nazis assaulted the march for most of its route, then beat queer people, some severely, as they left afterward. The following year brought more intense and better organised attacks (Renkin 2009). Since then, although mostly prevented from reaching the march, mass violence has threatened it every year. Such security has come at considerable cost: both attacks and responses to them have fundamentally transformed the march's negotiation of visibility and invisibility, and the borders of desire and belonging these effect.

Outer Boundaries

Citing the need for a democratic society to protect LGBTQ people's public expression, Budapest's police demanded sweeping changes.[7] Arguing that Heroes' Square was too symbolically charged, and too open, to protect effectively, the police insisted the 2008 march begin at the less symbolic, smaller *Erzsébet* Square (home to only a Classical-revival fountain and a substantial homeless

population). A new route was delineated as well: to avoid coming too close to Heroes' Square at any point, the march ended instead at the nearby *Felvonulási* Square – long associated with parades, but less nationally significant. Despite the changes, the end of the march featured pitched battles between riot police and skinheads raging from *Felvonulási* Square to Heroes' Square, with Pride marchers enduring a rain of bottles and rocks. The following year the march's route was altered further: beginning again outside Heroes' Square, it then reversed course to end at *Erzsébet* Square. Moreover, while a mostly symbolic police contingent had guarded previous marches, 2008 saw the march route lined by continuous barricades, while a solid row of riot police encased the marchers. In addition, the march began and ended in a ring of fences and riot police; a buffer zone two streets wide with more barricades and police surrounded the entire route. This 'Double Cordon', as it was soon known, would remain in place until 2017.

Many participants were initially happy about the barricades. In the face of intense, direct violence, everyone recognised that something of the kind was necessary if marchers were not to be seriously hurt. Visible, material separation meant safety. Particularly after 2009, when less direct violence reached marchers than the previous year (which many had compared to 'a war zone') thanks to the double cordon, many expressed variants of what one marcher told me, resignedly, 'Well, perhaps this is necessary. If we can just have a couple of years like this, maybe things will calm down, and we can go back to having a normal march'.

Yet soon ambivalence grew. Many voiced concern about the cordons' other effects. Some felt they visibly separated the march from the city, rendering queer presence in public space invisible to other Hungarians, and so nullifying the march's main purpose. As one activist asked, 'What good is a Pride march if no one can see it?' Others noted that the cordons made them feel constrained, even trapped, their bordering producing a very different kind of visibility and thus political message. Rather than pride in visible belonging, many marchers now lamented their sense of helplessness and physical containment – especially when, at the end of the 2008 march, we were channelled into a ring of police fences near – though not on – Heroes' Square, only to find ourselves not at all safe, but surrounded on all sides by skinheads throwing rocks and bottles, with no way out. The impression was underscored the following year: turning a corner near the end of 2009's march, we faced walls of jeering neo-Nazis and nationalists, pressed tightly against the barricade with cameras and mobile phones, taking photos to later 'dox' marchers on right-wing websites. A young woman near me snarled what we all felt at that moment: 'these damn fences', she spat, 'make me feel like I'm some kind of strange animal inside a zoo'.

The containment soon intensified. The preceding two years had seen shortened, as well as cordoned routes; 2010's march was caged still more drastically. Claiming that a shortage of barricades made protecting a longer march impossible, the police further truncated the route. Organisers cooperated, hoping that, with the support of the authorities, in a year or two the cordons wouldn't be needed.[8] As a result, marchers traversed less than half of *Andrássy* Boulevard to the intersection with Budapest's smaller Ring Road at *Oktogon* Square before returning to their starting point a mere eight city blocks away – a fraction of the march's traditional route, and one avoiding Budapest's most visible, symbolically important spaces. Some queer people remained relieved to simply have a secure space in which to walk; a reaction understandable given the frightening glimpses of howling, chanting nationalists, a mere block away, we caught at every cross-street. Others reacted to march's increasing enclosure, and visible isolation from the city's heart, with desperate, ambivalent anger at their collapsing spatial and existential borders. 'It feels', a woman next to me said in shock as police and march organisers told us to turn around after only eight blocks, 'like vanishing'. A block or two later, another marcher shouted in dismay at a group of volunteers, 'At this rate, soon we'll just be marching back and forth on one block, going round and round in circles – and then nowhere at all!'

Such images of containment and surveillance convey awareness of more than a mere contraction of space, or rights, but of what these signify: not only the vanishing of the march's earlier visibilisation of multiple belonging, but the disappearance of any meaningful belonging beyond a spectacle

of caged, isolated difference, paralysed by the State's 'protection'. Indeed, they reveal people's perception of the power, classically deployed against sexual Others, that Foucault described as an 'instrument of permanent, exhaustive, omnipresent surveillance, capable of making all visible, as long as it could itself remain invisible … a faceless gaze that transformed the whole social body into a field of perception' (1978: 214). And they reveal a profoundly changed march: one resulting in a different kind of invisibility – one erasing them in and through the very process of their marching – and a different kind of visibility – one intensifying borders between queer people and both public spaces and other citizens; in its fenced-in, protected character creating a precisely delimited citizenship: a static, frozen exhibit in the 'zoo of differences' (Malik 1996).

These di(s)visible borderings were underscored by the chants rising from the fist-pumping, right-wing throng metres from us on the cordon's other side. As I have written elsewhere, counterdemonstrators had for years visibly, yet peacefully, rejected queer visibility in Hungary's national space and time, displaying along Pride's route banners with slogans like 'Take your difference elsewhere!' and 'Don't stop till you get to *Hegyeshalom*!' (Hungary's border-crossing with Austria) (Renkin 2007, 2009). Now, mirroring both the cordon's visible division of Hungarian space and the violent bordering of their own attacks, chants of 'Soap factory!' and 'Faggots to the Danube!' and 'Go back to Israel!' explicitly threatened queer presence in the Nation with the fate of Hungary's most historically potent form of visibilised – and violently invisibilised – national Otherness: Jewishness.[9]

Right-wing discourses praising the attacks further transported queerness beyond national borders. Yet Pride supporters, too, aligned visible queerness and sexual tolerance with similar geotemporal boundaries. Participants on gay internet forum *pride.hu* commenting on the 2007 attacks asserted that, 'what happened yesterday was not truly European', while Péter Gusztos, spokesperson of the liberal Alliance of Free Democrats [*Szabad Demokraták Szövetsége*] party, warned of their implications for Hungary's precarious Europeanness. 'In Western European countries', Gusztos informed online news site *Hírszerzõ.hu*,

> such a march – in which more than one hundred thousand, and sometimes even a million people can take part – takes place in a tolerant atmosphere, in which not only the community specifically involved, but families with children, too, are present in the spirit of tolerance. To our East, on the other hand, physical assaults are not uncommon.[10]

The attacks on Pride thus reoriented not only queer and anti-queer Hungarians, but Hungary itself, with respect to the boundaries of both 'Europe' and 'tolerance' – boundaries whose geotemporally disciplinary force is evident precisely in their imagined nature, itself the consequence of the relative visibilities and invisibilities of Pride globally, as Western Pride marches and their politics have in fact been deeply contested as well, internally and externally (Engebretsen 2021, Valverde & Cirak 2003). Ironically, such borderings, too, incite their own forms of resistance, producing boundaries simultaneously personal, domestic, and transnational: as Péter, one of Hungary's earliest queer activists commented bitterly to me about the discourses above, '"Tolerance": I hate that word! Tolerate me at home, but not where I have to see it!'

Inner Borders

Border policing within queer community intensified as well. Both attacks and police response pressured Pride organisers to new compromises with city authorities. They soon led further: organisers heightened emphasis on Pride's respectability. In 2008 the march name was officially changed from Gay Pride Day March [*Meleg Büszkeségnapi Felvonulás*], its name since its 1997 inception, to Gay Dignity Parade [*Meleg Méltóság Menet*]. Driving the point home, the 2008 march was led by a float with two elegantly dressed, same-sex 'married' couples, their visibly normative significance underscored by the year's official slogan, 'Spade-hoe-big bell' [*Ásó-kapa-nagy harang*], a traditional phrase invoking marriage's sanctity and permanence (Renkin 2015).

Moreover, hoping to prevent violence, organisers released advice urging march participants to avoid provocative dress and displays, and when leaving afterwards, to remove outward symbols, such as rainbow pins, flags, or umbrellas, or pink triangles and clothing, visibly identifying them as queer. The march's caging thus became profoundly intimate. Finally, to keep attackers from infiltrating the march, in 2008 organisers instituted a system of multiple barriers and inspections. The pre-march gathering area, for many years an open space of joyful meeting – and initial public visibility – was cordoned off. Those entering were first vetted by volunteers, who decided whom to allow in and whom to keep out. Those admitted were searched for dangerous objects at a second gate. Such efforts certainly barred nationalists and others from interfering with the march from within. Yet they also created a palpable atmosphere of suspicion among queers – and sometimes excluded queer people not seen as displaying visibly queer or queer-friendly identities. Inevitably, some expressions of sexual and other desires transgressing existing borders of gendered, classed, and sexual respectability were refused entry. One young person – possibly Roma, possibly trans, definitely poor – notorious for their intoxicated, intensely sexual dancing at previous marches, was not allowed past the barricades in 2010 (see Renkin 2015); other queer people argued that the traditional drag queens were 'too provocative', and encouraged right-wing hatred (Renkin 2015). Other, everyday changes exacerbated these normativising effects: in the wake of attacks and cordoning more than a few queer people admitted to me that they were trying to look less visibly 'queer' and curtail public displays of same-sex affection. The caging of Budapest Pride thus strengthened normative borders between queer and straight Hungarians, and queer people's own desires and practices.

Such new borderings have stimulated new desires for border-crossings and political solidarities; they have also erected new obstacles to such desires, and new borders between queer activists and activisms. The constraints on the march's visibility and the equally visible respectabilities they have encouraged have raised doubts about its organisers' political desires – doubts reflected in the visible discomfort with which many in the audience greeted the Hungarian national anthem, the *Himnusz*, played for the first time at the opening ceremony of 2008's Pride Week, or younger activists's derision at organisers' 2010 suggestion that marchers wear a heart-shaped ribbon, half rainbow colours, half Hungary's red, white, and green national tricolour. These newer, more radical activists saw this symbol as visible capitulation to the national respectabilities behind both attacks on the march and Hungary's everyday homophobia. Organisers meant it to express queers' national belonging. Similarly, when organisers in 2010 ordered us to turn back after only eight blocks, before reaching a barricade behind which waited several hundred right-wing counterdemonstrators, some marchers were relieved. Others were outraged: one woman near me grimaced in exasperation as we turned around, demanding sardonically of both organisers and marchers, 'And is this working for you?'

The di(s)visible borderings of desire and community have also been geotemporal. Before the 2011 march, for example, at an open meeting with *Szivárvány Misszió*, the activist group organising Budapest Pride, a cluster of German-Austrian queer, antifascist anarchists who had joined the march since 2008 spoke vehemently against what they saw as organisers' old-fashionedly compliant, insufficiently visible approach the previous year. What, they asked, were organisers going to do if police once again demanded the march be cut short to avoid counterdemonstrators? Direct, visible confrontation, they insisted, was critical to real, cutting-edge queer activism. Arguing that any such demands by authorities be rejected, they warned that, if the march were cut short again this year, they could not promise to comply. As Pride organisers fought to keep discussion calm, some Hungarian participants angrily shouted that, as outsiders, the Germans and Austrians couldn't appreciate the local situation's complexity sufficiently to make such demands. Others vehemently supported the outsiders' more radical political desires. The sense of new divisions and connections – personal and political, national and transnational, spatial and temporal – crystallizing and fracturing was palpable in the room.

The minglings of visibility and invisibility here are complex and cacophonous: distinguished, marked off and surveilled, rendered more stably and distinctly seen, yet separated and distanced, obscured yet highlighted by the State's protecting, dividing barriers, and their shadows Left and Right. Neither clearly one nor the other, evidently at odds with yet still unquestionably aligned with the typical functions of Pride marches and identity politics, these simultaneously contradictory and askew relations of visibility and invisibility constitute a profoundly ambiguous (and, as we have seen, ambivalent) politics of being and belonging; of di(s)visibility.

Uncaging Pride?

And it was this complex set of frictions – over the march, its diverse participants, its opposition, and the cordons binding and dividing all these in a matrix of desires and borders both private and public, visible and invisible – that five years later, in 2017, again 'uncaged' Budapest Pride. Rather than representing a simple 'return' to the march's previous meanings, however, the removal of the cordons instead transformed not only march, marchers, and Hungarian queer politics, but those opposing all of these and, indeed, Hungary itself, as new constellations of di(s)visibility again reoriented the march's multiple borders.

Opposition to the cordon had been growing amongst activists and the broader queer community for years. Besides the critical reactions above, after just a few more years of marching within fences, journalist Márton Bede could in 2015 write on a progressive website:

> Because of [the cordon], marchers are forced into cages year after year, making Pride even more like an Island. An island – there isn't a better word – where, by the grace of the majority society, you can be a little different, as long as no one forgets that, at the end of the event and beyond the fence, such a thing is no longer allowed."[11]

Shifting attitudes toward the cordon arose partly from the march's changing demographics. Always small by Western standards (at most 2000 participants throughout the 2000s), from 2013 Budapest Pride grew dramatically, to more than 10,000 people. As long-term attendees noted, however, it wasn't necessarily that more queer Hungarians were taking part: rather, more foreigners and straight allies were attending. These years also witnessed an exploding, and highly visible, corporate presence (almost entirely Western). Increasingly, liberal commentators lamented that, with such new participants, the march's 'caged' spectacle was too neatly aligned with Hungarian normality. Pride's cordoning mirrored geotemporal borders here, too: noting that 'Prides west of the Hungarian border are opened by ministers and mayors rather than surrounded by a fence', Bede complained that Budapest marchers 'didn't even do anything outrageous' – unlike Western events in places like San Francisco, London, or New York.[12]

Yet, as we have seen, some new participants also brought more radical perspectives, and increased impatience with the cordons' constraints. Responding to the shifting tone, for several years *Szivárvány Misszió* had requested police remove the cordons. The police repeatedly refused, on the grounds that protecting march, and marchers', safety was paramount. This new dynamic was further rooted on both sides in foundational shifts in Hungary's cultural-political terrain. The profound impact of Victor Orbán's *Fidesz* party's 2010 rise to power, and the increasingly authoritarian, heteronationalist character of its government, had by this time become clear. A new, explicitly heteronormative Constitution defining marriage as solely 'between a man and a woman', pronatalist policies rewarding multiple children, state targeting of gender and sexual equality NGOs as 'foreign' agents, and panics demonising gender-sexuality scholarship were all justified by government propaganda linking together anti-migrant sentiment, suspicion of the EU and liberalism, homophobia, and the primacy of the Nation – succinctly expressed by *Fidesz's* 2018 campaign slogan, '*Nekünk Magyarország az Elsõ!*' [With us, Hungary is (the) First!].

Finally, in 2017, three days before the march, these intertwining pressures led *Szivárvány Misszió* to unilaterally, and publicly, renounce the cordon. Passionate debate ignited. Police insisted the

cordon was absolutely necessary for the march to be held. Pride organisers fought back, decrying its 'hermetic seal' around the march. Highlighting authorities' hypocrisy about who was allowed public visibility, they proclaimed 'We find it outrageous that in Hungary today, police can cage a peaceful crowd instead of concentrating on violent protesters'. Arguing that the cordon violated marchers' constitutional rights, they called for 'open, inclusive visibility', arguing that denying queer people full public visibility fatally compromised 'the emotional experience of the demonstration' and the sense of openly shared citizenship it produced. 'This year's event', they asserted, 'is emphatically about strengthening the relationship between the LGBTQ community and the majority society, the key tool of which is the meeting of participants and interested people and passersby at Budapest Pride'.[13] Insisting they would 'take all necessary steps to ensure that the march does not take place on a completely closed route', *Szivárvány Misszió* warned online news site *24.hu*, 'As a last resort, the fences may be torn down'.[14] 'Whatever the police decide', they declared, 'there will be no closure at Pride'.[15]

Some queer people, remembering the horror of the 2007–2008 attacks, and deeply concerned by Hungary's broader right-wing political trajectory, strongly disagreed. In such a hostile atmosphere, they felt, the cordon's protection was still needed; Pride organisers' quest for queer visibility was endangering queer people's safety, in the march and beyond. Others, such as Zsazsa, a long-term activist with LGBTQ NGO *Háttér Társaság* [Background Society], argued that despite these risks, the march's main point, queer visibility, was unattainable with fences separating participants from city and citizens.

Revealingly, right-wing voices too spoke up. János Lázár, Prime Minister Orbán's Chief of Staff, intervened in the controversy, insisting that the Pride march simply could not be held without cordons. 'The law is clear', he stated, 'the police cannot lawfully comply with this request'.[16] Police agreed. Queer visibility, apparently, required invisibility. Ironically, even some of the very people whose violent attacks the cordons were implemented to block expressed their support, not for the chance to once again attack Budapest Pride and visibly reject queer visibility, but for maintaining the cordon. The anti-queer, nationalist '64 Counties Youth Movement' [*Hatvannégy Vármegye Ifjúsági Mozgalom*], for example, declared their approval of the cordon: 'caging the gays', they admitted, actually fulfilled many of their anti-queer goals – keeping queer people and politics out of the public space and eye – *for* them.[17] Here, queer invisibility depended on visibility.

Liberal voices, unsurprisingly, supported *Szivárvány Misszió*'s repudiation of the cordon. Affirming the importance of open, public visibility to the march, the Hungarian Civil Liberties Union (*TASZ*), released a press statement accusing the police of 'blocking the procession, separating it from the city and its inhabitants, and thus depriving the parade of its meaning'. 'An invisible procession isolated from the city is less likely to draw attention to the social problems that people with a gender identity and/or sexual orientation other than the majority face on a daily basis', *TASZ* noted.[18]

In the end, Pride's renunciation of the cordon triumphed. Despite the police's insistence, the march went ahead without the cordon – the activists of *Szivárvány Misszió*, just hours before the march, changed the planned route, giving police no time to set up their fences – and without direct violence. Organisers even managed to extend the march path, at the last minute persuading police, who had demanded they stick to the previous, truncated route, to let them go further, transversing major corridor *Bajcsy-Zsilinszky út*, through Budapest's centre, and even crossing the iconic Chain Bridge [*Lánchíd*]. Fittingly, the year's official march slogan was 'Are You Free?' *[Szabad-e vagy?]*; an estimated 22,000 marchers, almost certainly the largest Hungarian Pride ever, paraded across the city. Pride banners long present, such as one announcing 'Visible Lesbians' [*Látható Leszbikusok*], stood out openly once more, other signs asked, 'Is it the difference that counts, or what we have in common?' [*a különbség számít vagy ami közös?*], or proclaimed 'Love is Love'. The march's dissolution of the usual borders of identity and politics could also be observed in the Roma foundation-sponsored 'Gypsy, Queer, Happy 2017' DJ truck, and in Hungary's best-known homeless aid NGO's eponymous banner, 'The City is for Everyone' [*A Város Mindenkié*].

As had their establishment, the removal of the cordons' bordering of Budapest Pride both reflected and stimulated new, di(s)visible desires and boundaries: for and between visibilities and invisibilities, different visions of social and political possibility, and contrasting sexual geotemporalities. For Hungary's liberals, queer activists, and queer community, the uncaging occasioned joyous celebration: of a return to the march as openly visible spectacle, unobscured by the State's isolating protection; of a return to the public honouring of queer difference, and its 'open, visible inclusion' in Hungarian society; of a return to Hungarian queer people's and politic's belonging in the global rituals of (uncordoned) Pride. And, for these actors, Pride's uncaging visibly signalled potential return, at least, in the face of Orbán and *Fidesz*'s heteronationalist politics, to Hungary's place on the path of democratic, tolerant, globally 'normal' sexual politics. As Márton Bede rejoiced: the change meant that Budapest's march, long 'hermetically sealed away from the city and its inhabitants', could at last, once again, be 'a little freer', more like Pride marches 'anywhere in the freer half of the world'.[19]

Yet Pride's uncaging was unfortunately not as simply positive and liberatory as it may have seemed on the (visible?) Surface. Hungary's homophobic right-wing took the cordons' removal as an opportunity to reassert their countervision of the Nation's proper boundaries and borders. Like Budapest Pride itself, this had its visibilities and invisibilities. Despite the cordon's absence, there was no recurrence of massed right-wing attacks – indeed, compared to the previous decade, anti-queer demonstrators could hardly be seen. Invisible now, too, were the State's fences themselves – as well as the personal and political containments these had made clear, and the connections to broader homophobias and heteronationalisms they had hidden. Yet there were telling, and consequential, visibilities. As queer marchers proudly approached their procession's symbolic culmination, the *Lánchíd*, or Chain Bridge (an icon of Hungarian national modernity), in order to once again cross the Danube so visibly dividing Buda-pest before ending at the national monument of Buda Castle and thus with their queerness bridge the city's two halves – they met a chilling sight: a wall of black-clad bodies from the nationalist 64 Counties Youth Movement, blocking their path across the bridge and bearing a huge, black banner announcing, starkly, 'We Are the Cordon'. After considerable delay, police managed to clear the blockaders, and the march was able to cross the river. But the message was clear to all. The Hungarian right-wing response to Pride's rejection of the cordon's protective but paralysing di(s)visibilities was to be a reassertion of their own politics of di(s)visibility, their private yet public, personal yet political, embodiment of Hungary's heteronational borders.

Conclusion

> There is a dividing line that starts from the Baltics and runs all the way along the western borders of Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, and Slovenia. To the west of this line are those countries that have already abandoned the protection of the family; everywhere to the east of the line, on the other hand, family-friendly policies have prevailed; nowhere is same-sex marriage accepted.
> (Viktor Orbán, *Magyar Idök* [Hungarian Times], 24 December 2015)

The Budapest Pride march's recent history of caging and uncaging has profoundly altered its relations of visibility and invisibility, ultimately reshaping the complex and intersecting borders that divide and unite Hungarians: borders between queer and straight, and queer and queer; between marching and not marching, and march, city, and society; between resistance and compliance, and Hungarianness and Europeanness. Seeing such relationships through a concept like 'di(s)visibility', I suggest, helps us untangle some of their complexities, and thus grasp them and their effects more clearly, by casting into greater relief the ambivalent, partial, shifting, and contingent attachments and detachments with which people, on both individual and social scales, engage with their own and others' diverse and different sexual and political visibilities and invisibilities in actual practice (Jackson & Scott 2010, Valentine 2007).

Budapest Pride's shifting, frictive di(s)visibilities have altered the borders of queer Hungarians' desires for visible and invisible forms of identification, community, and politics – strengthening some people's sense, and performance, of national respectability and belonging; aligning others' visions of identity and activism more closely and clearly with LGBTQ socialities and politics stressing discrete, multicultural difference and compartmentalized 'tolerance'; reorienting still others to more radical queer perspectives rejecting both of these. They have also driven key transformations of Hungarian heteronational resistance to queerness, including new interweavings of visible and invisible violences, and shifting relationships to State and other forms of power. Critically, such changes have di(s)visibly altered other boundaries as well: those between modern Europe and its postsocialist Others, as Viktor Orbán and *Fidesz* increasingly target queer people and organisations as agents of the West's 'gender madness', and warn of a 'new line dividing Europe', the boundary of a 'perversity' from which 'Europe' can only be saved by the heteronational East; those of queer Hungarians who increasingly see no place for themselves there; those in the West's whose own imagined sexual-political cordons increasingly perceive homophobia as a distinctly 'postsocialist problem', rather than their own (Renkin 2009).

'Di(s)visibility', then, can focus our analytical attention more clearly and precisely on the complexities of what events like Pride marches *do*, and how their layered manifestations, both seen and unseen, function to negotiate postsocialism's diversely intersecting personal, social, and political frictions on many sides – rather than seeing them, more simply and flatly, as symbolic figures for the spectacular reproduction of stark sexual, geopolitical, and conceptual divides: straight and queer, local and global, East and West, visible and invisible, political and non-political, as much popular and political, and even some scholarly, discourse continues to do.[20] In so doing, 'di(s)visibility' also potentially extends to new terrains anthropology and sexualities studies critiques of contemporary sexual politics' post- (and neo-) colonial dynamics – including those shaping foundationally the modern West's politics of seeing/knowing, sexually and politically (Butler 2008, Durban 2023, Sabsay 2012, Stoler 1995, 2008, Trouillot 1995) – offering us a new tool to challenge persistent divides between universalist assumptions about the (transparent) benefits of identity politics' moral and political models or their (equally evident) inappropriateness for the particularities of sexual and political lives lived 'elsewhere' – East or West, North or South. Like our modern categories of sexuality themselves (Bleys 1995), our understandings of the very distinctions between supposedly 'universal' concepts like these, and their more 'particular' Others, as well as of the geopolitically-hierarchising implications of their 'difference', are in fact born in the simultaneously productive and destructive frictional process of such concrete practices of global/local articulation themselves (Tsing 2005). The (de)constructive intent at the heart of the idea of 'di(s)visibility' reveals more clearly not only the material moments and movements in and through which such distinctions are made – amid the complex and frictional relations of Budapest, or any other, Pride – but how, in the very face of their actual, agentive, and concretely practical blurrings, they are imagined as disclosing structural meanings at once simpler and broader: borders between proper and improper people and politics, citizens and societies. 'Di(s)visibility', then, can aid us not only in seeing clearly but, in Haraway's (2016) sense, in staying with the trouble of seeing clearly.

Notes

1. 'Hungarista,' a term reaching back to Hungary's World War 2-era fascist Arrow Cross Party [*Nyilaskeresztes Párt – Hungarista Mozgalom*], is often used today in Hungary (by my queer interlocutors and the right-wing) to describe Hungarian nationalists.
2. In 2008 the Budapest march's name was changed from 'Gay Pride Day March' (*Meleg Büszkeségnapi Felvonulás*) to 'Gay Dignity Parade' (*Meleg Méltóság Menet*); in 2012 it was renamed the 'Budapest Pride march' [*Budapest Pride Felvonulás*]). Most participants continued to refer to it simply as 'Pride.' I use the term 'Pride march' here, except when referring specifically to the 'Gay Dignity Parade.' The proper terminology

for Europe's formerly socialist regions is deeply contested (as is 'postsocialist' itself). Here I prefer the broader 'Eastern Europe,' rather than 'East Central Europe,' 'Central and Eastern Europe,' or 'Central Europe,' precisely because I wish to frame Hungarian sexual-national politics in relation to a wide range of postsocialist settings, including Poland and Czechoslovakia (typically located in 'Central Europe,' 'East Central Europe,' 'Central and Eastern Europe,' or 'Eastern Europe'), Croatia and Serbia (figured variously as part of "the Balkans,' the 'Western Balkans,' 'Eastern Europe,' or 'the former Yugoslavia'), and Russia (commonly assigned to 'Eastern Europe' or 'Eurasia').

3. This research was conducted under the oversight of the Ethical Research Committee of Central European University, Budapest, Hungary. No individual review number was assigned. All university and CEU ERC policies and procedures were followed. Verbal informed consent was obtained from all participants; all participants were anonymized.
4. Throughout my research most people identified as 'lesbian,' 'gay,' or 'bisexual' [or the Hungarian equivalents of *leszbikus*, *meleg*, and *bi*]. The Hungarian *buzi*, typically translated as 'faggot,' whose derogatory value roughly compares to English 'queer,' is rarely used. This article uses the term 'queer' heuristically to evoke the wide range of subjectivities and practices at play in and around the politics of Pride, recognising the problematic nature of this terminological convention.
5. 'Tusovka' in Russian refers to an informal group of people, a 'get-together,' usually public. In Stella's account, it describes groups of queer women 'hanging out' in public places. Like '*Hungarista*' (above), the term has a revealing political history: in the late Soviet period it referred to gatherings of young, anti-system 'hippies.'
6. Critically, Muñoz's concept expressly refuses the clarity of raced, classed, gendered, and sexual borders, and insists on our (dis) identifications' constant and ambivalent tra(ns)versals of them.
7. As Anita Kurimay argues in *Queer Budapest, 1873–1961*, Budapest's Municipal Police has been since its 1871 founding a key tool of Hungarian national governance, including of sexuality (2022, p24-26). Postsocialism has changed little: Budapest Pride's route has since its beginning been negotiated with the police (Renkin 2007), who have occasionally cooperated, but also consistently attempted to deny marching permits. Following the 2007–2008 attacks both balance of power and tenor of these negotiations shifted considerably.
8. http://nol.hu/belfold/20100709-rendorok_kertek__az__arviz_miatt__roviduljon_a_melegfelvonulas-731811.
9. 'Soap factory' and 'Go back to Israel' are obvious; 'Faggots to the Danube!' [*Buzik a Dunába!*] refers to the Siege of Budapest at the end of World War 2, when Hungarian fascists (the original *Hungaristas* – see f1 above) rounded the city's remaining Jews, forced them at gunpoint to the river's edge, and shot them, throwing the bodies in.
10. Hírszerzõ.hu 2007. (7/9/2007) http://www.hirszerzo.hu/cikk.nem_lesz_otparti_nyilatkozat_a_melegfesztivalrol.39679.html (accessed 7/10/2007).
11. https://444.hu/2015/07/11/a-szivarvanysziget.
12. Ibid.
13. https://budapestpride.hu/hirek/buadpest-pride-felvonulas-kiallunk-a-szabadsagunkert.
14. Ibid.
15. https://444.hu/2017/06/26/a-budapest-pride-szovivoje-kozolte-nem-hajlandok-kordonok-kozott-vonulni-a-melegfelvonulason.
16. https://hvg.hu/itthon/20170706_Lazar_kordon_lesz_a_Prideon.
17. https://mmreflexiok.blogspot.hu/2017/07/kordonkerdes.html.
18. https://ataszjelenti.444.hu/2017/07/07/jogallamban_a_pride_kordonmentes.
19. https///444.hu/2017/07/08/egy-kicsit-szabadabban-budapest-pride-2017.
20. I by no means intend this as a blanket criticism of the rich body of complex analytical scholarship on Pride and Equality marches in Eastern Europe or elsewhere. This work has cast a great deal of valuable and productive light on the personal, cultural, and political meanings and impacts of such events. Nonetheless, as I have argued here, in my view this body of work also raises some important and fundamental questions about what we see and do not see about them – what might be called the present field's own conditions of possibility. With these in mind, my goal here is to offer a new analytical tool to constructively contribute to, and so expand, ongoing scholarly conversation on this topic.

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