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Charter–manifesto congruence as a signal for issue salience: democratic innovations within political parties in Hungary

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ABSTRACT

This article proposes a proxy for issue salience via studying congruence between parties' organizational structure and the policies they promote to their voters. This charter-manifesto congruence, i.e. institutionalizing the same democratic innovations at the intra-party level and advocating for their adoption at the national level, is particularly useful to demarcate party profiles in dominant party systems and electoral autocracies. To demonstrate how such congruence can be measured, we analyse the credibility of the commitments made by opposition parties in Hungary to a variety of democratic innovations. Drawing on novel survey data, we further substantiate our argument by showing high support for these innovations among party members and voters. The analysis identifies gender quotas as the most congruent innovation. Our longitudinal research design also reveals a recent breakthrough of e-democracy in party manifestos. We then discuss how preferences for various innovations are potentially shaped by membership size, party founders' political socialization or organizational learning. At the normative level, the analysis suggests that some forms of democratic innovations are better suited for intra-party organizations than for party manifestos. These implications might be relevant for those committed to promoting deliberation, gender equality and (re-)engagement of the youth in politics.

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Democratic innovations, such as deliberative mini-publics, citizens' forums and online voting, have recently become institutionalized in a variety of national contexts. Some parties were even able to develop issue ownership over some of these innovations, after implementing them while in (national or local) government. For instance, following its victory in local elections the Workers' Party in Brazil introduced participatory budgeting first in Porto Alegre and subsequently extended the initiative once the party obtained executive power at the federal level.[1] In a similar fashion, populist parties

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in Belgium, such as Vlaams Belang and PTB-PVDA, demonstrate greater enthusiasm for advisory and binding referendums, as well as participatory budgeting.[2]

But how should party promises on adopting democratic innovations be assessed, if they were never given an opportunity to realize them? When should voters believe that institutional changes would indeed be introduced, if these parties were to get a chance to govern? To answer this question, we build upon saliency theory, which posits that political parties, instead of arguing directly with each other, emphasize certain issues.[3] In other words, electoral campaigns are not about direct policy confrontations, but rather attempts of parties to "render their own areas of concern most prominent."[4]

As Budge puts it, parties "define their policies by emphasizing certain topics more than others, particularly in public documents."[5] For this reason, we find the analysis of party charters and electoral manifestos, probably the two most important public documents of political parties, a suitable approach to scrutinize congruence. We argue that institutionalizing the same democratic innovations at the intra-party level and advocating for their nation-wide adoption suggests that a party is more sincere and committed to introduce these policies. This entails carrying out a systematic analysis of charters and manifestos, to get a clearer picture of which democratic innovations are more likely to be practiced on a day-to-day basis within parties during candidate selection or decision-making, and which ones remain sheer campaign promises.

Political Science has witnessed a recent uptake in the study of intra-party politics, including the study of democratic innovations within parties, deepening rank-and-file party members' influence in decision-making and enhancing their ability to deliberate.[6] However, whether such intra-party institutions mirror public endorsement of democratic innovations is a question that has hitherto remained on the fringes of scholarship.

Focusing on this question can be a fruitful avenue of research when it is harder to draw the profiles of parties with other established methodological approaches. In dominant party systems,[7] as well as in electoral autocracies,[8] opposition parties might have only a limited number of MPs, rendering roll call analysis and other forms of studying parliamentary behaviour futile. If these parties regularly form electoral alliances, comparative content analysis projects such as MAPOR assign joint scores for them along ideological or issue dimensions, resulting in the analyst's inability to pit these parties against each other.

To demonstrate the usefulness of scrutinizing charter-manifesto congruence, we selected opposition parties in Hungary as cases for our analysis. Ideologically fragmented and internally divided, they have posed no serious threat to incumbent populist-right Fidesz's supermajority since 2010. Only fairly recently did opposition parties manage to overcome internal divisions and achieve an electoral breakthrough at the municipal level.[9] As green, social democratic, liberal and far-right parties, they might have very distinct preferences with respect to adopting democratic innovations.

Nevertheless, voters are left in the dark in determining whether these parties are indeed committed to realizing such innovations. In the words of Wagner, "while voters can judge the performance of the governing parties in leading the country for the recent years, they have to rely more heavily on other factors as evaluation criteria for opposition parties."[10] Accordingly, opposition parties are expected to emphasize their position over issues more strongly, while issue salience also shapes voters' calculus to a larger extent (compared to parties in government, the evaluations of which are rather based on past performance). Studying whether such processes or institutions are already in place at the intra-party level could offer a more nuanced picture of how

salient various innovations are for opposition parties and what national realization potential they hold.

For most parties, manifestos serve multiple functions, including shaping the campaign's issue agenda, smoothing over internal differences, and informing other parties – especially those that are potential coalition partners.[11] Party charters, contrarily, are a legal requirement in Hungary: founders of a new party are required to submit it to the court, alongside a balance sheet.[12] Party congresses can subsequently amend it, often only with a supermajority. That is, whoever possesses voting rights in the Congress (delegates elected by local party units, or in a few parties, all members) has the potential to shape regulations, including whether democratic innovations are institutionalized.

Typology and operationalization

Following Smith, we use the term democratic innovations for "institutions designed to increase and deepen citizen participation in political decision-making process."[13] As *decision-making* can characterize both intra-party behaviour and citizens' involvement in national politics, this definition is well-suited for studying congruence between different political arenas. It is also widely used by other studies on democratic innovations.[14]

There are some more recent definitions of democratic innovations, although they tend to be less useful for our purposes. For instance, Elstub and Escobar include institutions, but focuses heavily on *governance processes*, which are of limited help when one aims to study intra-party structures.[15] Geissel conceptualizes democratic innovations as "practices," but as analysts of formal party documents, we are constrained by formal institutions, being unable to scrutinize implementation.[16]

For operationalization purposes, we modify Smith's definition[17] in one regard. We restrict our analysis to institutions that are relevant, and the creation of which is empirically possible, at both the national and the intra-party level. This is a necessary restriction allowing us to capture the saliency of such innovations.

This inevitably leaves out some of the most popular democratic innovations. Having a party led by some other sort of collective leadership is a good example:[18] it is hard to envision how co-chairs could be put in practice on the national level. Similarly, participatory budgeting might serve municipal or federal budgets well,[19] but we are unaware of any empirical example of their implementation at the intra-party level.

Based on the above, we selected five categories, the manifestations of which we subsequently record and analyse. These are: e-democracy or digital participation;[20] deliberative and direct innovations;[21] quotas based on gender, age or geography;[22] recall of elected officials;[23] and lowering the voting age.[24] These innovations can all be institutionalized both at the intra-party and the national level.[25] For instance, party congresses might be organized online, and closed forums (intranet) can facilitate deliberation for members. At the same time, political parties can fight for the introduction of online voting with respect to parliamentary, local or regional elections. In a similar fashion, "party referenda" are frequently institutionalized, allowing rank-and-file members to directly shape the ideological priorities or alliance politics of their parties; whereas at the national level, it can be a tool to constrain the executive or to bypass the legislation.

We note that some of these institutional solutions have been tried and tested in at least a few established democracies. However, we argue that in Central Eastern Europe (CEE), introduction of quotas or lowering the voting age do qualify as innovative (and

often-time controversial) initiatives, motivated by parties' commitment to integrate citizens disengaged from or un(der)represented in politics – unlike Western Europe, where party quotas were adopted already in the early 1970s by socialist and social democratic parties.[26] Following Geissel's conceptual framework,[27] such institutions can still be classified as democratic innovations, "irrespective whether the innovation in question has been tried out in another state."

Recent literature on the region has studied, *inter alia*, the influence of referendum campaigns on decision-making in Bulgaria, Poland and Slovakia and the effect of partisan cues on turnout preferences in the context of a citizen-initiated referendum in Slovakia.[28] A bevy of scholars extended the empirical scrutiny of democratic innovations to contexts beyond the previously mentioned countries. Mișcoiu shows how perceptions to democratic innovations' ability to aggrandize the executive and to increase the political establishment's control have potentially contributed to the failure of recall referendums in Moldova.[29] Moreover, case studies also document the limited success of EU-funded e-democracy projects in Serbia;[30] attrition in neighbourhood consultative councils, a form of mini-publics organized annually in Timisoara, Romania;[31] as well as a field experiment on participatory budgeting in Ukraine, increasing the level of public trust.[32]

Without going into too much detail, it is worth underlining that similar democratic innovations are not peripheral to the Hungarian political agenda: on the contrary, some of them tap into vexing questions, dividing voters and politicians alike. Again, this should not be taken against their inclusion: democratic innovations are "ideas in action,"[33] rather justifying our case selection. For instance, (sporadic) discourse on the need of introducing recall for MPs since the early 1990s does not mean recall cannot qualify as an innovation. It took Jobbik and LMP a decade to put this "idea in action," i.e. to institutionalize it for their own elected officials. Accordingly, the next section briefly reviews how aforementioned innovations' fit into the broader context of contemporary Hungarian politics.

Democratic innovations: the Hungarian context

Whether *recall* should be implemented in the context of single-member district (SMD) MPs has been a heated debate since the early 1990s. The Independent Smallholders' Party (FKGP) was the first advocate of an electoral reform that would include the possibility of recalling parliamentarians. After that, Jobbik submitted multiple bills in the Parliament, attempting to create the legal framework of recalling MPs. Such proposals were usually reactions to scandals by government politicians, whose behaviour was condemned by their own party, yet they did not resign and instead became independents. Other, less relevant actors (extra-parliamentary parties, police trade unions, etc.) have also been vocal proponents of a recall clause.

Hungary has already legislated to lower the voting age to 16 years at the national level, albeit only for those who are married,[34] as marriage is possible for minors with the consent of a public authority, which subsequently makes married children over 16 to become of legal age. These, however, affect only a handful of citizens, unlike general and more comprehensive extensions of the franchise.[35]

Ever since the regime change, referenda have been understood as a manifestation of checks-and-balances; that is, largely a tool of the opposition to constrain the executive. The very first national referendum in 1989 already exemplifies this, as liberal parties

pushed through four questions, out of which the only polarizing one concerned the timing of the election of the new President. The campaign for postponing this election after the parliamentary election went against the position of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party. Later, Fidesz used arguably populist referendums to thematize symbolic issues (2004) or to sink the ruling left-liberal coalition's policy agenda (2008). In the last decade, it has also stripped the referendum of its quintessentially opposition and anti-establishment character, initiating referenda on controversial items of its own legislative agenda, such as migration or LGBTQ rights.[36] Simultaneously, Fidesz-appointed delegates (at the National Election Office) and judges (of the Constitutional Court) systematically blocked referendum proposals initiated by opposition parties, trade unions or other civil society actors.[37]

Scrutinizing how Hungarian parties are using digital tools for their internal procedures, Oross and Tap found that closed social media groups, newsletters and mailing lists, online polls, as well as digital platforms are used for the purposes of internal communication.[38] Their analysis highlights that some (but not all) parties also use online tools for deliberation, candidate selection and policy development. Molnár and Urbanovics, however, underline the "lack of digital technology use" in LMP and Momentum; according to them, "elements of e-democracy as a tool of direct democracy" are absent in Momentum's electoral manifesto, and nor did LMP "benefit from opportunities and instruments" of e-democracy.[39]

Figure 1 offers a rough proxy of overall salience of these democratic innovations, using data from the Hungarian news agency (MTI).[40] As visible, direct democracy is by far the most salient keyword out of the democratic innovations studied in this article. Party statements and news articles mentioning quotas decreased over time, nevertheless they have not disappeared from the political agenda.[41] Recall was most salient around the time when the parliament debated proposals for the new Constitution and the Electoral Law, with opposition actors – notably newly minted Jobbik MPs – pushing for its introduction in amendments and press conferences. Contrarily,



Figure 1. Frequency of party statements and news articles mentioning various democratic innovations, based on MTI Archives, for the time period between the 2010 and 2022 general elections. The authors' own work.

online voting was featured most prevalently in Hungarian media between 2019 and 2021, years that coincide with opposition primaries.[42] These primaries offered a chance for opposition parties to demonstrate the viability of the e-democracy tools they have been advocating for in their very own manifestos. Lastly, voting age appears to be the least salient among all democratic innovations discussed in this article. Similarly to recall, mentions peak in 2011, suggesting that considerable interest is linked to amending the Electoral Law. Figure A1 in the Supplementary Materials suggest similar trends using data from Google Trends; that is, relative interest in distinct forms of democratic innovations, as captured by search frequency for the same set of keywords.

To better gauge public demand, both at the national and the intra-party level, we utilize novel survey data.[43] Fielded in Hungary, it includes respondents from two groups: one drawn from an online sample ($N = 1337$) designed to be representative of the Hungarian voting age population in terms of age, gender, and education, and another group consisting of MPs, as well as rank-and-file party members to answer the same battery of questionnaire items on democratic innovations. While survey questions cover only a subset of our operationalization, we nonetheless believe they are helpful in understanding public support for democratic innovations in general. Questionnaire items inquired about whether national and local referenda should be held more frequently; whether certain topics are less suited to be decided via referenda; whether a referendum makes political decisions more legitimate; whether respondents would like to see more deliberative meetings and fora; and lastly, if candidates nominated by parties should be selected via primaries.

Figure 2 shows levels of support for various democratic innovations, both among the voting-age Hungarian public and party members (both rank-and-file party members and MPs). Two patterns are immediately apparent. First, party members and "ordinary" citizens share very similar views, the vast majority of them expressing support for most of the aforementioned tools and innovations. The exceptions concern the scope of topics suitable for referenda, as well as potentially restricting them. Moreover, party members seem to be less enthusiastic about a primary-centered candidate selection procedure, which might have to do with Hungary having only experimented with multi-party ones; hence their institutionalization could potentially diminish party members' own chances of contesting general or municipal elections. Whereas one should be cautious to extrapolate from support for a particular type of democratic innovation to another, we do see high support for deliberative and direct democracy innovations alike. Figure A2 in the Supplementary Material visually presents the same data for the subsets of opposition party members and voters with opposition PID, respectively.

Case selection: opposition parties in Hungary

We analyse opposition parties in Hungary between 2010 and 2018, a case selection driven by both theoretical reasons and data availability constraints. Opposition in Hungary is ideologically fragmented, which allows for studying democratic innovations (or lack thereof) in a variety of ideological setting.

At the same time, the Electoral Law of 2011/CCIII, which strengthened the majoritarian character of the electoral system, incentivized the opposition to gradually cooperate. After a decade of losing all national, municipal and European parliamentary



Figure 2. Public support for democratic innovations in Hungary among party members and voting-age citizens. The authors' own work based on survey data collected by Oross et al. Responses are recorded as agreements with statements, measured on a 5-point Likert-scale, where "5" stands for "Fully agree" and "1" for "Fully disagree."

elections, the juxtaposition vis-à-vis the government has become more salient than internal cleavages. This suggests that our longitudinal analysis, focusing on parliamentary elections of 2010, 2014 and 2018, offers ample opportunity to trace trends in democratic innovations. The most recent general election took place in April 2022; but as these six opposition parties formed a coalition, contesting the election with a joint list, they drafted a joint manifesto, which we decided not to use. Table 1 and Figure 3 provide tabular and visual overviews of the opposition parties discussed. Table A2 in the Supplementary Material presents more information on their alliance structure and past electoral performance.

Table 1. Main opposition parties in Hungary.[96]

Abbreviation	Full name	Ideology	Membership
MSZP	Magyar Szocialista Párt (Hungarian Socialist Party)	social democratic	15,000 (2016)
Jobbik	Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom (Movement for a Better Hungary)	populist right	13,000 (2019)
LMP	Lehet Más a Politika (Politics Can Be Different)	green	1953 (2022)
DK	Demokratikus Koalíció (Democratic Coalition)	social liberal	15,000 (2023)
Dialogue	Párbeszéd Magyarországért (Dialogue for Hungary)	green/new left	700 (2022)
Momentum	Momentum Mozgalom (Momentum Movement)	liberal	2500 (2022)



Figure 3. Ideological position of opposition parties based on the Chapel Hill Expert Survey.[95] Except for Dialogue, which was only included in the 2017 wave, all data points are from 2019. Parties in the scatterplot contested the 2022 general election with a joint list and joint candidates in all SMDs. The authors' own work.

Recent literature has demonstrated that democratic innovations, particularly direct democratic institutions (DDIs), serve as "convenient alternative[s] to proportional representation" – and consequently opposition actors prioritize more their introduction in majoritarian settings.[44] According to Leemann, groups that enjoy a fair amount of electoral support but struggle to translate this support to parliamentary seats due to distortions in the electoral system look for second-best solutions for influencing the legislative process. Ruling elites are also more likely to allow for the introduction or extension of DDIs than make concessions about the electoral system, as the former still only offers a limited influence in the policy-making process and remains costly for opposition groups who need to mobilize considerable resources as initiators.

Whereas Leemann's case study focused on Switzerland, it is easy to see how the scope conditions above relate to the last decade in Hungary. Fidesz obtaining 67–68% of parliamentary seats with only 42–49% of the votes in the last four general elections underscores the "imbalance between electoral strength and legislative strength,"[45] which subsequently incentivizes political parties in opposition to single out policy issues and prioritize contesting them via DDIs, such as the referendum or the popular initiative.[46]

Restricting the scope of inquiry to the aforementioned opposition parties, we omit analysing two relevant parties: Fidesz and Our Homeland (*Mi Hazánk*). Under the period of study, Fidesz was in government at all times; moreover, uniquely among all Hungarian parties, it refused to produce an electoral manifesto since 2010.[47] This would make it impossible to assess the extent to which charter and manifesto are congruent with respect to democratic innovations. Furthermore, democratic innovations

used by Fidesz, such as national consultations, have recently been subject to heightened scholarly attention,[48] whereas intra-party structures and campaign promises of the opposition received far less interest. Furthermore, scrutinizing congruence for these six parties, but not for Fidesz is further justified with previous research having found that opposition parties and actors are more likely to support the introduction of democratic innovations, such as binding mini-publics,[49] referenda,[50] or deliberative events.[51] Thus, whether such tools are consistently endorsed (or implemented) is easier to probe when political parties themselves are more in favour of said innovations.

Scholars of Hungarian politics are divided over whether Our Homeland, a splinter far-right party, founded by former Jobbik politicians opposed to the party's ideological moderation strategy,[52] should be classified as a "genuine" or "sham" opposition party.[53] However, our reasons for omitting Our Homeland from the analysis are independent of ambiguities in classification: it was established after the 2018 parliamentary elections, hence it produced no manifesto within the time frame of our analysis.

Furthermore, as post-2010 Hungary has been described as an electoral autocracy or a diffusely defective democracy,[54] our analysis also adds to a discussion in the literature about whether democratic innovations can present genuine participatory opportunities when adopted in authoritarian regimes.[55] The Hungarian case we scrutinize, however, is different from previously studied national contexts, where democratic innovations are proposed by ruling parties and serve the strategy of regime maintenance.

In a strongly polarized party system, opposition parties have few opportunities at hand to empirically prove their commitment to policies, as they struggle to influence policymaking.[56] Spending more than a decade in opposition has meant for Hungarian opposition parties that, apart from MSZP and DK, whose politicians were on government between 2002 and 2010, there is no benchmark against which the "credibility" or "sincerity" of policy promises could be assessed.

If there is no (realistic) chance of shaping the legislative agenda, the intra-party institutions these parties have set up might serve as particularly strong heuristics for the electorate on what to expect from them. Existing literature suggests that ambiguity in party platform – i.e. lack of clarity about whether a party supports the introduction of a certain policy, say, a democratic innovation – makes voters rely more on (evaluations of) party leaders.[57] Opposition parties in Hungary, however, rarely produce leaders who manage to stay at the helm of their parties for multiple electoral cycles. MSZP often recruited its Prime Minister candidates from outside in the past, while electing lesser-known (and less popular) party leaders.[58] Jobbik's charismatic chairman resigned and quit politics after 2018. LMP's co-chairs, after the party's best-ever electoral result in the same year, were sanctioned and even physically assaulted by other party members, leading to their departure from LMP.[59] Momentum's founding chairman also had to step aside recently, having lost a vote of no-confidence. All this suggests that aforementioned parties themselves have a vested interest in issue saliency: if they believe democratic innovations would make Hungary a better place, charter-manifesto congruency could help them to emphasize this, whilst de-emphasizing their weaknesses on leadership.

Data and methods

We analyse manifestos prepared for general elections. Whereas parties under scrutiny usually also prepare manifestos before European Parliamentary elections, those tend to



Figure 4. Democratic innovations and opposition parties in 2010, 2014 and 2018. The authors' own work.

focus (almost) exclusively on European affairs, such as questions of sovereignty, common agricultural policy or Eurozone membership. It would be unreasonable to expect that democratic innovations would be featured in these manifestos. As some opposition parties were founded earlier than others, we have six, five and three manifestos for the parliamentary elections of 2018, 2014 and 2010, respectively. Both authors read and coded all charters and manifestos. In the Supplementary Material, we provide further details on coding, justify how we treated certain idiosyncratic proposals and give an example for each party-year-type-document combination. That is, for every cell of Figure 4, which records e.g. a particular party endorsing a specific innovation in its manifesto in a given election year, the reader can consult Tables A3–A5 and find an example for it.

To assess whether innovations promoted to the wide public are congruent with intra-party institutions, we collected the same number of party chapters. As these are frequently modified by party congresses, we decided to use the most recent version still in effect on each Election Day. We then conducted a systematic analysis of these texts. When coding democratic innovations in charters, we only recorded their presence (or lack thereof) in the main text; party charters often-times begin with an ideologically laden "preamble," where commitments to values and policy priorities are spelled out. This section, however, is rather concerned with the party's vision, not its institutional structure and organization build-up.

Intra-party democratic innovations

Both LMP and Dialogue have intra-party institutions set up for fostering direct democracy, complementing (and sometimes bypassing) the ultimate embodiment of representative democracy – their party congresses, where only delegates of local party units have voting rights. LMP allows that on matters of public policy, *party referenda* can be organized, where each and every party member has voting rights. MSZP party referenda cannot be used to decide over issues of the budget or personal affairs; otherwise, it can be initiated on any issues that would fall under the jurisdiction of the congress. Moreover, a "confirmatory party referendum" can be initiated by the Presidium on matters previously voted on by the congress. Were such referenda fail, the resolutions passed earlier would not come into effect.

Dialogue has the somewhat oddly named *decision-making of the entire membership*, a procedural solution that can be initiated by 50% of all members; once convened, it possesses the same rights as the party congress. In spite of common wisdom describing DK as a heavily centralized, personalized party, all party members are allowed to attend *and vote* at DK congresses, and even registered supporters (an alternative form of membership for those preferring less commitment) are welcome at party congresses. Furthermore, "partial congresses" are organized for party members living in the same county or region, extending the experience of direct democracy beyond yearly (national) congresses.

Jobbik, LMP and Momentum all have some provisions for *recall*. Jobbik is widely regarded as the harbinger of the return of recall to the political agenda, and a wide range of its party officials, such as national and regional board members or local party unit heads, might be recalled accordingly. LMP allows for recalling all of its elected officials, provided 2/3 of the delegating body supports the motion. The same is true for Momentum, where this can be done even without a supermajority – but only through a constructive vote of no-confidence (CVNC). Party officials of Dialogue or DK cannot be recalled at all, and such regulation is also absent from MSZP.

As for online tools used for deliberation and decision-making, Momentum expects all of its prospective members to fill out monthly activity reports electronically. Its party charter also allows for a fully virtual (i.e. online) congress. The Ethics and Disciplinary Committee of Dialogue can have its meetings online, and the same holds true for all party units of LMP. (The latter even defines spreading the "use of the electronic tools of democratic structures" as one of its primary objectives.) Interestingly enough, the "party referendum" of DK, designated to elect its chairman, is the party's single and only online voting procedure. Lasting at least 5 days, all members are eligible to cast votes, exclusively electronically. Nomination committees in DK are also expected to consult with rank-and-file members in advance electronically, using intranet forums, before suggesting candidates for chairman.

Members of MSZP are encouraged to set up *online communities*. The Presidium and the Board can also initiate an *online dialogue*, with a deliberative first round, followed by a second round where voting takes place. Such online dialogues are not public, organized on the intranet and open to all MSZP members, supporters, and volunteers.

Lower age limits for membership are common in most opposition parties. Both LMP and Dialogue admit 16-year-olds as full members; whereas both Jobbik and Momentum boasts themselves as "generation-based parties" and ones being the most popular among the youth,[60] only the erstwhile far-right party implemented the same principle, with Momentum still forbidding minors to become full-fledged party members. Even MSZP and DK, parties often described as harnessing electoral support mostly among the elderly, allow anyone over 16 to join their ranks.

More recent party charters often make references to *gender quotas*, intended to enhance intra-party advancement of female politicians. DK specifies the share of female members of the Presidium, as well as boards of electoral-district level party units. The originally mandated, less ambitious threshold of $\frac{1}{5}$ has been changed to $\frac{1}{3}$ in January 2021. Similarly, Dialogue implemented gender quotas for its Presidium, Ethics and Disciplinary Committee, and co-chairs. LMP makes sure that gender quotas are also applied when selecting candidates for public offices, not just for intra-party positions, and it even uses a *territorial* quota for boards of SMD-level

party units, guaranteeing that settlements are adequately represented in the otherwise heavily gerrymandered[61] electoral districts.[62]

In the Hungarian context, these measures might be understood as somewhat brave, given that it is unclear whether they pay off electorally. Fidesz refused to ratify the Istanbul convention; Orbán's consecutive governments had only four female cabinet members over the course of 13 years; and sexist remarks are commonplace in the Parliament and local governments alike. Even when LMP nominated a female candidate for Prime Minister, she was more unpopular among women than men.[63] Nevertheless, as the number of countries that have already amended legal regulations or party charters to introduce gender quotas is now over 130, and most voluntary party quotas have parity thresholds,[64] these commitments aiming for thresholds of 20% or 33% are relatively modest. While quota proposals help the opposition to distinguish itself from the ruling party, they appear fairly cautious amid the "global quota trend,"[65] which led to the adoption in constitutional quotas in several societies – even in some where the "idea of equality between women and men" is a more controversial one.[66]

Innovations (not) making to manifestos

Whereas almost all parties (with the exception of Momentum) allow 16-year-olds to join as full members, this does not translate to commitments to lower the age limit with respect to franchise. This reveals an interesting contradiction: parties deem 16 and 17 years-old teenagers old enough to join their preferred parties, select their candidates for public office, but not for casting a ballot for the very same parties' candidates at a general (or municipal) election. Dialogue remains the only party that supports granting voting rights to (at least) 16-year-olds.

Manifestos also suggest that, with a single exception, parties have no inclination whatsoever to reinstate a recall procedure for elected officials. Only Jobbik declares that voters should be able to recall MPs between general elections. Even LMP, which already had recall procedures in place in 2010, to be used against any elected party official, published an electoral manifesto in the same year that vehemently rejects the introduction of the same democratic innovation against MPs, describing such proposals as "populists drawing a long bow."

Conversely, not counting Momentum, all parties have pledged to foster direct democracy and strengthen participatory politics in one way or another. MSZP would hold referenda over contentious issues (e.g. the expansion of the Paks Nuclear Plant), and it would give the decision over Corporation Tax Allowance (i.e. to what purposes it should be allocated) to company employees. Jobbik would introduce "e-consultations," which would mimic the National Consultations of Fidesz, just "without propaganda," would lower validity thresholds of referenda and expand the scope of questions suitable for referenda. The latter two pledges appear in manifestos of DK and LMP in an almost identical form, but LMP would also like to see local governments to "adopt direct democracy elements," as well as an easier procedure for submitting referendum proposals. Finally, Dialogue would bring back non-binding referenda and popular initiatives,[67] both of which were previously abolished by Fidesz, and would introduce a mandatory round of citizens' review before bills are passed in the National Assembly or in city councils. The reluctance of Momentum to follow suit is likely explained by its founders' political socialization: as Angyal et al. has pointed

out, Momentum leaders have sympathized with the student protests of 2012/13, but they clearly rejected their organizational structure, "condemning" direct democracy.[68]

Opposition parties are split evenly on quotas. Momentum and Jobbik avoid any mention of them in their manifestos, consistent with their reluctance to introduce any for intra-party offices. In a similar fashion, MSZP only makes a half-hearted effort, promising to raise the share of women on boards of state companies to $\frac{1}{3}$, albeit without explicitly proposing the introduction of quotas, and omitting any mention of similar policies for the sphere of politics. LMP agrees with MSZP's assessment, highlighting that it is "rare to have female company leaders," but this leads the party to the conclusion that *politics* should start the change, hence their proposal of a $\frac{1}{3}$ female quota for party lists. Other parties have also focused their attention on the PR channel of mandate allocation: DK would enforce a 30% quota, reserved for female politicians in the Parliament, in local governments, as well as for female businesswomen sitting in companies' supervisory boards and the boards of directors. Dialogue pursues a similarly progressive policy, proposing a 40% quota not just for party list candidates in general elections, but also for the top management of all companies listed on the stock market.

Most parties would also introduce (some sort of) e-democracy at the national level. Jobbik, DK, Dialogue and Momentum would all create a framework where online voting is feasible at general elections; some of them would implement the same procedure for European Parliamentary and municipal elections, as well as for referenda. Furthermore, Momentum is also committed to "online debate of bills," "electronic bill proposals" and to conduct student union elections in universities entirely online.

Discussion

The greatest incongruence characterizes parties' position on age limits: as demonstrated by Figure 4, they were consistently featured in charters, but never endorsed in electoral manifestos. Only Dialogue's sudden support for this innovation in 2018 introduced this idea to the electorate. Conversely, parties were rather consistent in endorsing practices of direct democracy at the 2018 general election, with the single exception of Jobbik, which promotes direct democracy to the wide public, but not for its own members.

Lastly, the three "youngest" (i.e. most recently founded) parties delimit the scope where we find congruence w.r.t e-democracy: Momentum, Dialogue and DK have a variety of online tools promoted both within and outside their parties. LMP and MSZP have seemingly felt such tools, which they rely on heavily for intra-party deliberation and decision-making, are premature for replacing more traditional methods at a national scale. Interestingly, despite all the scholarly attention devoted to Jobbik's social media presence and the role of the internet in its early rise,[69] the party's organizational structure lacks any e-democracy elements – which does not stop Jobbik from promoting them for its voters. Oross and Tap also corroborate this finding on the absence of e-democracy, emphasizing that the role of Jobbik's digital platform is restricted to storing party members' phone numbers and e-mail addresses.[70] These patterns are consistent with recent literature finding that "new" parties are more likely to use digital tools for deliberation and decision-making than "old," established counterparts.[71]

It is worth pointing out that the multi-party open primaries, jointly organized by NGOs and all opposition parties under scrutiny in this article, combined elements of traditional and online voting. Used to select big-tent opposition candidates for the 2019 municipal and the 2022 general elections,[72] primaries demonstrate how even the more reluctant political parties came to terms with relying on tools of e-democracy. Whereas in 2019 voters still had to register personally before casting their votes online, one could register and choose between SMD and Prime Ministerial candidates fully electronically just two years later. Table A1 in Supplementary Material shows that Dialogue and Momentum, characterized by manifesto-charter congruence on the issue, were the most outspoken advocates of online voting amid the opposition primaries, whereas other parties remained rather indifferent on the matter. This suggests that stated preferences (i.e. endorsing and institutionalizing e-democracy in the manifesto and the charter, respectively) in most parties – with the notable exception of DK – follow revealed preferences (i.e. position taken during negotiations amid the primaries).[73] Only time will tell whether witnessing e-voting in action, without any fraud or party raiding taking place,[74] convinced hitherto hesitant parties about the scalability and feasibility of this particular democratic innovation.

There are very few examples of parties *abandoning* democratic innovations once they embraced them. In other words, no matter whether experimentation with innovations started within parties or in manifestos, the conclusion was almost never that the particular innovation failed and should be retracted. This could be welcome news for those committed to "reimagine and deepen the role of citizens" in democratic processes:[75]our Hungarian case study suggests that institutionalized innovations, the very tools designed to achieve this goal, do not end up being failed experiments. The only two exceptions concern LMP: intra-party direct democracy institutions were absent in 2014, whereas e-democracy did not make into LMP's 2018 manifesto.

From a more theoretical perspective, our analysis suggests potential links between electoral co-operation and organizational learning. Some of the opposition parties studied here were arch-enemies of each other: Jobbik and LMP have originally established itself against the ruling MSZP. DK, a splinter party project of former MSZP Prime Minister and party chairman Ferenc Gyurcsány is viewed by many as "cannibalizing" the voter base of MSZP, perceiving Gyurcsány's efforts to co-opt MSZP politicians (and voters) as revenge on his former intra-party opponents. Jobbik-allied far-right websites, such as kuruc.info, issued calls to deface billboard ads of MSZP candidates, resulting in anti-Semitic words and drawings painted on a large number of posters, while mocking LMP supporters in a weekly recurring column. Before the 2018 parliamentary elections a *cordon sanitaire* excluded the possibility of opposition parties electorally coordinating with Jobbik, which was still perceived as a far-right party. For instance, MSZP regularly expelled councilors and other party members who co-operated with Jobbik at the local level, on an *ad hoc* basis. Even Momentum – arguably the most centrist party included in our analysis – campaigned on the platform of "New Faces, New Hungary," refusing to contest the 2018 election with a joint list.

Nonetheless, as Fidesz gradually dismantled checks and balances,[76] party elites and supporters alike have become more open for co-ordination, eventually fielding joint candidates in 2019 for the municipal elections, achieving an electoral breakthrough.[77] The 2021 opposition primaries furthermore made for strange bedfellows, as candidates

jointly nominated by DK-Jobbik or Momentum-MSZP underscore how pragmatic considerations transcended cleavages between "old" and "new" parties or left vs. right.

The analysis above demonstrates how this *détente* was accompanied by a convergence of party structures and manifesto content. As activists worked together and party elites started talks with each other, particular forms of democratic innovations have emerged as "best practices," whereas others remained isolated examples organizational specificities on the fringes. For instance, back in 2014, only LMP had a clear position on gender quotas, as no other party was characterized by manifesto-charter congruence. Four years later, quotas were endorsed both internally and in manifestos by DK and Dialogue, too. We witness a similar story unfold with respect to direct democracy, only this time LMP and DK jumping on Dialogue's bandwagon.[78]

Tools of online democracy, however, hint at a different pattern: whereas in 2010, it was entirely absent from opposition parties' charters and manifestos, one can see a sudden change in 2018, commitment to e-democracy having become ubiquitous in charters, manifestos, or both. Two explanations lend themselves. The first would, rather trivially, posit that Hungary was simply not ready for the wide-scale introduction of such tools earlier – nor for their implementation in the intra-party context. This, however, seems unfounded, given data on internet penetration rate and digital literacy in Hungary.[79] Even LMP claimed in its 2014 manifesto that the "technology necessary for e-voting is already available."

Alternatively, one could conjecture that the upsurge of electoral clientelism and coercion after 2010 incentivized opposition actors to think about electronic alternatives for elections.[80] If a growing share of voters feel that ballot secrecy is violated or turnout buying is widespread, opposition party leaders, as well as rank-and-file members, could perceive e-voting as a remedy for illicit behaviour. That is, demand for democratic innovations of this type might be driven by fears of voter frauds; killing two birds with one stone, online democracy could strengthen programmatic linkages, while potentially also diminishing the chances of Fidesz-allied brokers boosting ruling parties' vote share.

We also document a clear shift in opposition parties' position on gender quotas. To be fair, this change is driven by the emergence of new opposition, rather than the volte-face of MSZP or Jobbik. LMP, however, suddenly embraced the innovation in 2014, both internally and in the electoral arena, despite omitting any mention of them four years earlier. Dialogue and DK followed suit in 2018: during the course of eight years only, quotas arrived from being literally a non-issue to an institution endorsed by half of the opposition. This corroborates findings of Newton, who claims quotas are one of the most widely used democratic innovations,[81] because they are "remarkably successful" ones: relatively easy to understand, low-cost innovations, which tend to work – once introduced, they indeed increase representation of the target group. Nevertheless, Figure 4 also suggests that quotas are divisive tools: for MSZP, Jobbik and Momentum they are just as non-existent, as they were for LMP a decade ago.[82] This suggests that even if the opposition parties' joint list had won a legislative majority in April 2022, the new government would have been hallmarked by intra-coalition conflicts with respect to democratic innovations.

Analysing LMP's charter over time also reveals an interesting, albeit well-established pattern: as parties grow in membership size, direct participation often-times gives way to institutions of representative democracy.[83] In 2010, we coded the presence of direct democracy based on the regulation that allowed all members of LMP to attend

and vote at its congress. However, the charter included a clause that once party membership reaches 500, voting rights should be reserved to delegates of local party units. The irony of this passage is that *after* OMOV was deleted from the charter, LMP membership figures have once again sunk below 500 – not independently of (sometimes violent) infightings[84] and a self-defense clause of the charter against usurpation, which places a cap on the number of applicants local party units are allowed to admit as members.[85]

Conclusion

This article has addressed the relationship between institutionalizing democratic innovations at the intra-party level and endorsing them publicly, via their inclusion in electoral manifestos. As saliency theory posits, parties "compete by selective issue emphasis rather than by direct confrontation."[86] We argued that congruence is a sign of a party emphasizing a democratic innovation more, signalling sincere commitment about their introduction to voters. Examining six opposition parties in Hungary, findings suggest that attitudes towards implementing quotas is the most congruent dimension; i.e. political actors implementing them at the intra-party level were, without exception, also promoting them in their electoral manifesto. Contrarily, all sorts of patterns have emerged with respect to e-democracy elements and tools for online deliberation, hinting at less genuine commitment of Hungarian parties regarding respective democratic innovations. Recalling elected party officials, as well as allowing 16-year-olds to join as party members were, by and large, not followed by endorsing the same measures at the national level, in the electoral arena.

These results hold some interesting lessons for future research. As intra-party politics and organizational structures are obscure topics for most voters, it is somewhat unclear to what extent aforementioned inconsistencies undermine parties' credibility. For instance, DK's resistance to the introduction of electronic voting ahead of the launch of the 2021 opposition primaries drew considerable media attention, but most, if not all, journalists failed to point out that it also contradicts the party's own manifesto, endorsing the very same democratic innovation.

Contrary to campaign promises and pledges, it is rather rare for intra-party regulations to make it to the headlines; and even if they do, it usually relates to personal conflicts and rival factions.[87] Further research should evaluate the degree to which political sophistication affect any "electoral penalty" associated with incongruence. In other words, it would be interesting to see whether those who are better informed and consume more political news indeed perceive manifesto pledges as more genuine, were parties to implement some versions of them internally beforehand.

To move beyond simply confirming the occurrence of charter-manifesto congruence, future research should probe which factors are driving (in)congruence. We suggested organizational learning could potentially be one of them: party activists and elites, who were once arch-enemies of each other, were gradually forced to cooperate by Duverger's Law and growing public discontent; this inevitably influenced how particular democratic innovations are perceived by voters and members of *other* opposition parties. Research on *inter*-organizational learning in the context of political parties is scarce,[88] and further studies can look into the question whether forming alliances, particularly electoral cooperations, make such learning more likely than merely being contemporaries of each other.

There are a handful of potential factors, which might explain why certain innovations are featured prominently in manifestos, but not in party charters (or *vice versa*). Studying whether disparities in parties' opinion structures,[89] i.e. different strategic considerations of central party and rank-and-file members, determine the arenas where democratic innovations are endorsed, could be a fruitful avenue of future research.

We purposefully selected specific democratic innovations that have already been implemented both at the intra-party and the federal/country level in other national contexts.[90] Whereas certain democratic innovations might be better (or less) suited for parties with lower membership figures, Figure 4 does not demonstrate any division along those lines. For instance, as we pointed out earlier, opposition parties are evenly split when it comes to (gender) quotas. However, the disagreement about the usefulness of quotas apparently has nothing to do with party size, as the smallest and the largest parties – Dialogue and DK, respectively – share the same enthusiasm for this tool (see Table 1 for membership data). In a similar fashion, proponents of recall include both Jobbik (with 13,000 members) and LMP (with less than 2,000).

The analysis has made further progress in charting the prevalence of institutionalized democratic innovations. Using press statements and media reports from the Hungarian news agency (MTI), search histories from Google Trends (Figure A1 in Supplementary Material) and a novel survey on public attitudes towards direct democratic and deliberative institutions, we showed how such innovations are both salient and widely supported by the electorate. Nevertheless, whether public sentiment affects parties' willingness to openly endorse innovations remains unclear. After all, manifesto contents are frequently the function of the preferences of rank-and-file members and activists, "leading political parties to adopt some policies which may be unpopular with their target voters."[91]

Scholars have argued that despite the *cordon sanitaire* between mainstream parties and Jobbik during its far-right period, Jobbik nevertheless heavily influenced the government's legislative agenda.[92] Fidesz implemented some of Jobbik's fairly popular initiatives, in order to keep the party's support at bay. However, Jobbik apparently struggled to convince other parties about the need for recalling elected officials. Even Momentum, which at least institutionalized it at the intra-party level adopted it from the party charter of extra-parliamentary, liberal EGYÜTT.[93] Future research could investigate what explains Jobbik's striking inability to influence adoption of democratic innovations, despite the Hungarian public's long-lasting support for recall. Ideological distance and polarization between the Left and the Right is certainly one possibility, albeit definitely not the only one.[94]

We focused on opposition parties, as in their context, charter-manifesto congruence might be understood as a proxy of saliency. Nevertheless, we were also constrained by data availability, as Fidesz has refused to publish electoral manifestos in the past. Future research could select other cases to study whether patterns similar to our findings are empirically observable in parties currently in government. Analyses like that would also allow for scrutinizing the relationship between ideology and presence of democratic innovations (or lack thereof).

At the normative level, the analysis furthermore suggests that some forms of institutional solutions are better suited for intra-party organizations and more easily adopted by parties than national institutions. These implications might be relevant

for those committed to promoting gender equality, participation of youth in politics or deliberative democracy.

Notes

1. Melgar, "Time of Closure".
2. van Dijk et al. "Voters of Populist Parties".
3. Budge, "Issue Emphases".
4. Budge and Farlie, *Explaining and Predicting Elections*, 23.
5. Budge, "Issue Emphases", 761.
6. Barberá and Rodríguez-Teurel, "PSOE's Deliberation"; Stoiciu and Gherghina, "Intra-Party Deliberation".
7. Arian and Barnes, "Dominant Party System".
8. Gandhi and Ong, "Committed or Conditional Democrats".
9. Kovarek and Littvay, "Greater than the Sum".
10. Wagner, "Party-Specific Vote Functions", 43.
11. Harmel, "Party Manifestos".
12. Kovarek and Soós, "Cut from the Same", 186.
13. Smith, *Democratic Innovations*.
14. Bua, "Agenda Setting"; Mattijssen et al. "How Democratic Innovations Realise"; Trettel, "Politics of Deliberative Democracy".
15. Elstub and Escobar, "Defining and Typologising".
16. Geissel, "Impacts of Democratic Innovations".
17. Smith, *Democratic Innovations*.
18. Rüdig and Sajuria, "Green Party Members".
19. Melgar, "Time of Closure".
20. Gilman and Peixoto, "Digital Participation"; Smith, *Democratic Innovations*, 142–61.
21. Elstub and Escobar, "Defining and Typologising"; Hendriks, "Democratic Innovation".
22. Newton, "Making Better Citizens".
23. Welp and Milanese, "Playing by the Rules"; Welp and Whitehead, *Politics of Recall Elections*; Geissel and Jung, "Recall in Germany".
24. Tonge et al., "Voting Age Reform".
25. As political parties usually equate membership with the right to vote on intra-party matters (e.g., in party referenda, congress, or local party unit meetings), we study whether parties who declare minors eligible to join their ranks also advocate for passive voting rights for the same age group, while recognizing these two innovations are rather adjacent than perfectly identical.
26. Krook et al., "Gender Quotas", 784.
27. Geissel, "Impacts of Democratic Innovations".
28. Gherghina and Silagadze, "And Yet it Matters"; Nemčok et al., "Role of Partisan Cues".
29. Mişcoiu, "Never Just a Local".
30. Damnjanović, "Democratic Innovations in Serbia".
31. Schiffbeck, "Attrition in Long-Term".
32. Volodin, "Deliberative Democracy and Trust".
33. Åström et al., "Crisis, Innovation and E-participation".
34. Miragliotta et al., "Values, Partisan Interest".
35. Tonge et al., "Voting Age Reform".
36. Pállinger, "Direct Democracy".
37. "Fidesz-allied skinheads" prevented a Socialist MP from submitting a referendum initiative on abolishing Sunday shop closure measures. See Kovarek and Dobos, "Masking the Strangulation", 116. Other opposition-sponsored initiatives revolved around topics such as academic freedom of teachers, regulating battery plants, holiday resort constructions around Lake Balaton, the planned Budapest campus of China's Fudan University or the eligibility period for unemployment benefits.
38. Oross and Tap, "Moving Online".
39. Molnár and Urbanovics, "Role of E-democracy", 550.

40. The accuracy and objectivity of MTI reporting have been repeatedly criticized in recent years. Consequently, Figure 1 might underreport certain forms of democratic innovations over which the opposition has issue ownership (e.g., primaries). Nevertheless, MTI is still obliged to publish all party statements; it might only refuse to publish a statement that "hurts its own business interests", "concerns its employees" or relates to persons who are not public figures. The latter reason is frequently cited when statements discuss business dealings of Orbán's son-in-law. See Freedom House, "Freedom of the Net".
41. While we study *any* form of quotas, we present results of searching for gender quotas in the MTI Archives, in order to avoid results getting conflated with records on *immigration* quotas, an extremely salient topic on the political agenda between 2015 and 2018. The exact keyword (*női kvóta*) mirrors the German term *Frauenquote*, both of which translates as "female quota". The verbatim equivalent of gender quota (*nemi kvóta*) is hardly ever used in public debate and remains of artifact of LMP's party charter.
42. Tóka and Popescu, "Hungarian Opposition Primaries"; Kovarek and Littvay, "Greater than the Sum".
43. Oross et al., "Democratic Innovations".
44. Leemann, *Direct Democracy*, 2.
45. Ibid., 15.
46. This also sets Hungary and its mixed-majoritarian system apart from other countries in CEE, as Romania, Slovakia, the Czech Republic or Slovenia all use proportional representation (PR) systems.
47. Kovarek and Dobos, "Masking the Strangulation", 116.
48. Bocskor, "Anti-Immigration Discourses in Hungary"; Oross and Tap, "Using Deliberation".
49. Rangoni et al., "More Competent".
50. Junius et al., "Interests, Ideas or Institutions".
51. Núñez et al., "Changing Democracy?".
52. Borbáth and Gessler, "Populist Radical Right Parties".
53. Tóka, "Hungary".
54. Bogaards, "De-democratization in Hungary".
55. Woo and Kübler, "Taking Stock"; de Parades and Desrues, "Unravelling the Adoption"; Chapman, "Shoring up Autocracy".
56. Vegetti, "Political Nature of Ideological".
57. Wagner, "Party-Specific Vote Functions".
58. Kovarek and Soós, "Cut from the Same".
59. Kovarek and Littvay, "Where Did All".
60. Pirro and Róna, "Far-Right Activism in Hungary".
61. Vegetti, "Political Nature of Ideological", 90.
62. LMP's efforts on diversifying its candidate pool with respect to gender might cancel out due to these territorial quotas: "seemingly gender-neutral formal party rules", such as requirements on candidates' geographic background, have (unintended) gendered consequences and hinder the inclusion of women. See Bjarnegård and Zetterberg, "Political Parties, Formal Selection", 326.
63. Kovarek and Littvay, "Where Did All", 576.
64. Clayton, "How do Electoral Gender".
65. Wängnerud, "Women in Parliaments", 53.
66. Tremblay, *Women and legislative representation*, 10.
67. The popular initiative was a petition-like institution, which mandated the Parliament to discuss any topic supported by 50,000 signatures; it was abolished in 2012 by the new constitution.
68. Angyal et al., "Új kihívók".
69. Borbáth and Gessler, "Populist Radical Right Parties".
70. Oross and Tap, "Moving Online".
71. Vittori, "Membership and Members' Participation".
72. Tóka and Popescu, "Hungarian Opposition Primaries"
73. DK, however, was an outlier: despite its expressed support both in charter and manifesto, it advocated *against* the option of voting online. Analysts have explained this position with DK's limited support among diaspora Hungarians and the young.
74. Kovarek and Littvay, "Greater than the Sum", 394.
75. Elstub and Escobar, "Defining and Typologising", 11.

76. Bogaards, "De-democratization in Hungary".
77. Kovarek and Littvay, "Greater than the Sum".
78. Further examples of organizational learning are abound with respect to intra-party democracy elements. For instance, MSZP introduced male and female co-chairs in 2020 after contesting elections and caucusing in the Parliament together with Dialogue for years. However, our descriptive evidence does not allow for establishing a direct link between organizational learning and changes in intra-party organization; such endeavour would require in-depth interviews with party leaders and congressional delegates to uncover expectations and motives of those proposing such changes.
79. NRC, "Legfrissebb internetpenetráció".
80. Mares and Young, "Core Voter's Curse".
81. Newton, "Making Better Citizens", 151–2.
82. Note that in the literature, Hungary is not coded as a country with voluntary party quotas exactly because of this split: as not even all opposition parties support their introduction, the "total number of adopting parties" does not amount to "at least 30% of the legislature". See Clayton, "How do Electoral Gender", 238.
83. Poguntke, "Changing or Getting Changed".
84. Kovarek and Littvay, "Where Did All".
85. Kovarek, "Négy dudás, négy csárda", 41.
86. Dolezal et al., "How Parties Compete".
87. For instance, the party statute of Jobbik gave the chairman the power to veto the appointment of any duly elected Vice Chairman. Whilst unique among Hungarian parties, this particular clause has only received media attention when Gábor Vona used the veto, blocking infamous far-right politicians to take their seat, eventually leading to the departure of Jobbik's extremist flank.
88. Jakopovich, "Uniting to Win".
89. May, "Opinion Structure".
90. Mişcoiu, "Never just a local"; Geissel and Jung, "Recall in Germany"; Vandamme, "Can the Recall Improve"; Oross and Tap, "Moving Online".
91. Basu, "Bridging Spatial", 444.
92. Böcskei and Molnár, "Radical Right in Government".
93. Kovarek, "Négy dudás, négy csárda", 51.
94. Vegetti, "Political Nature of Ideological". See also Figure 3.
95. Jolly et al., "Chapel Hill Expert Survey".
96. Based on Kovarek and Soós, "Cut from the Same"; Gulyás, "Fidesznek több a tagdíjbevétele".

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