

# Feeling insecure and excluding immigrants: Relationship between subjective risks and welfare chauvinism

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## Abstract

We argue that subjective insecurity plays an important role in explaining welfare chauvinism, which is defined as the restriction of immigrants' access to social benefits and public services. Additionally, macroeconomic performance and welfare regime are closely related to opinions about the social rights of migrant groups. We test these propositions, using a multilevel ordered logit model using the 8th wave of ESS. It is found that subjective unemployment and income risks are not overlapping with objective measures, and self-assessed insecurity has a strong and positive effect on welfare chauvinism. Moreover, we demonstrate that, even for the most socio-economically advantaged respondents, subjective risk increases the likelihood of chauvinistic welfare attitudes. At the macro level, higher rates of GDP per capita growth decrease welfare chauvinism, and Central and Eastern European welfare regime increases the likelihood of exclusionary attitudes in relative terms. The results are robust across different estimation techniques and inclusion of alternative contextual factors.

## KEYWORDS

European social survey, immigration, multilevel model, public opinion, subjective risk, welfare chauvinism, welfare regime

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## 1 | INTRODUCTION

Due to the rise in immigration flows to Europe over the last decades, and particularly after the refugee influx in 2015, public and scholarly debates about migration regained momentum. Both labour market consequences of migration and its relationship to welfare state policies are investigated by various strands of research (Kootstra, 2016; Kurer, 2020; Reeskens & van Oorschot, 2012; Scheve & Slaughter, 2001). In this regard, welfare chauvinism, which can be roughly defined as the belief that the welfare state should be responsible only for its own citizens, received increased attention. At the micro level, citizens might understand redistribution as a zero-sum game and oppose the access of immigrants to these benefits and public services due to perceived economic and ethnic competition (Esses et al., 1998). People might also hold more restrictive attitudes towards immigrants with the fear of higher fiscal burden on welfare states, especially when immigrants are net recipients (Gerber et al., 2017). Perceptions of economic and ethnic competition from immigrants are also likely to depend on subjective evaluations. The few studies in the literature, which focuses on personal assessment of income and risk, highlighted a strong link between subjective measures and welfare chauvinistic attitudes (Heizmann et al., 2018; Reeskens & van Oorschot, 2012). In addition to objective and subjective individual level factors, context also matters for welfare chauvinism. Whilst universal welfare systems boost solidarity and lower perceptions of group-based competition for welfare services, poor economic and labour market performance is expected to increase worries about migration and associated competition (Crepaz & Damron, 2009; Kuntz et al., 2017; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010).

The paper aims to bring these different strands of the literature together and jointly examine objective, subjective and contextual determinants of immigrants' deservingness of social rights. Even though income, education, labour market status can be theoretically significant in explaining welfare attitudes, it has been repeatedly shown in previous empirical research that material gains and losses tend to have low or no explanatory power (Gerber et al., 2017; Heizmann et al., 2018; Reeskens & van Oorschot, 2012). Due to perceived competition and cultural threats, people might have less tolerant inclinations towards out-group members such as immigrants even when there are no material perils to their socio-economic status. Thus, we propose that subjective risks and how people understand their socio-economic position are more relevant to attitudes. Moreover, when the economy is prospering and there are universal social benefits, even objectively disadvantaged individuals might feel relatively more secure and do not perceive immigrants as a source of concern for their livelihoods.

Our findings reveal that the level of subjective unemployment and income risks do not overlap with objective measures, and self-assessed insecurity has a robust and positive relationship to welfare chauvinism. The results are not altered by the inclusion of alternative contextual variables and estimation techniques. Moreover, we demonstrate that, even for the most socio-economically advantaged respondents, subjective risk increases the likelihood of chauvinistic welfare attitudes. These suggest that self-assessed employment and income status of individuals have a large bearing on opinions about policies regarding immigrants, and such aspects should also be addressed in integration programmes. When we look at the macro level explanations, a higher rate of GDP growth is found to be decreasing welfare chauvinism. Moreover, no robust association is detected between the welfare state model and attitudes towards immigrants' social rights except for Central and Eastern European regimes. Finally, in our findings, the relationship between subjective insecurity and welfare chauvinism is not mediated by the contextual factors.

The paper is organised as follows. In the next section, we summarise the main theories about determinants of migration attitudes at the individual level, how these are shaping welfare nationalism and leading to exclusionary preferences. We also present our hypothesis on the relationship between subjective measures of risk and welfare chauvinism. The third section looks at macro level factors, particularly economic growth and welfare state regime,

and their association with sentiments about immigrants. This section outlines the interaction between contextual aspects and subjective insecurity with respect to welfare chauvinism as well. In the fourth section, operationalization, data and empirical methodology are discussed. The fifth section of the paper displays our findings and compares them with earlier research. In the sixth section, we offer few concluding remarks on the implications of exclusionary views on immigrants' social rights in European countries, and briefly discuss limitations of our research and future directions.

## 2 | INDIVIDUAL LEVEL DETERMINANTS OF WELFARE CHAUVINISM

### 2.1 | Labour market and ethnic competition, cultural threat, and ideology

In the literature, economic and cultural anxieties as well as ideology are given a lot of attention as important sources of anti-immigration prejudices. People would have negative opinions on migration if they are more likely to be at competition with immigrants for the resources they themselves need, such as jobs or welfare benefits (Kurer, 2020; Scheve & Slaughter, 2001). Because economically precarious individuals would be in more need of jobs and social assistance, a positive link between unemployment, low income, welfare dependency, and restrictive attitudes towards immigration is anticipated. In line with these expectations, previous research found that strict forms of welfare chauvinism are associated with low education, income, and occupational status (Mewes & Mau, 2012). Besides labour market competition, ethnic competition and threat theories are offered as explanations why anti-immigration views might prevail in some societies. According to these models, individuals identify with one group, and distributional conflicts are perceived as zero-sum games in which members of one group wins at the expense of another (Esses et al., 1998). Once again, individuals who are economically disadvantaged feel most threatened, and hold more negative attitudes towards migrant groups.

Cultural anxieties that are related to migration can include a fear of the unknown and an aversion to becoming exposed to new beliefs and customs. If members of a particular ethnic or cultural group perceive differences in values, norms, and beliefs of immigrants, they are more likely to have prejudices and favour anti-immigration policies (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; Stephan et al., 1999). These symbolic threats would be more pronounced if the sensed social distance from the immigrant groups is higher. The existence of outsiders could raise cohesion within the group, and hence could be used as a tool by politicians and people controlling social and cultural practices. The difficulty of operationalization and lack of cross-country data make it hard to distinguish the impact of perceived collective threats on immigration attitudes. However, existing studies found that there are substantial differences between societies, and whilst in some nations, economic issues are found to be more prevalent, in other nations, cultural conflicts are key to the determination of the public views on refugees and migrants (Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2014).

Ideological positions and values at the individual level are also discussed to be critical to anti-immigrant views. Right wing ideologies and particularly authoritarian tendencies are claimed to be increasing the negative outgroup attitudes mainly because of the perceived threat by immigrants to maintenance of order, eminence of group norms, and stability (Duckitt, 2006; Yoxon et al., 2019). In a similar vein, positive links between universalistic values and opinions about migrants have been identified whilst the opposite holds for traditional values (ibid). Unsurprisingly people who are more supportive of redistribution and ascribe a greater responsibility to the government for provision of needs also tend to favour inclusionary policies towards migrants. Nonetheless, it has been also argued that these associations are conditional on the level of cultural embeddedness and the size of the immigrant group in the country (Davidov et al., 2020). The studies exploring the impact of ideology and values on welfare chauvinism repeatedly found that authoritarian and right-wing political ideology raises negative sentiments towards immigrants (Crepaz, 2020; Mewes & Mau, 2012). Also, cultural, and economic threats do not systematically mediate the effect of authoritarianism on welfare chauvinism, which implies that ideology and values work separately from their influence on individual's economic and social status.

## 2.2 | Perceptions, subjective insecurities and welfare chauvinism

Despite their intuition, labour market competition theories usually fall short of explaining the attitudes towards immigrants. For example, it has been shown that individuals who might be battling for jobs because they work in the same industry or have comparable skills to immigrants do not have more negative opinions (Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2014). Thus, more recent work focuses on the perceptions rather than objective threats in the labour market (Heizmann et al., 2018; Kros & Coenders, 2019; Reeskens & van Oorschot, 2012). As mentioned above, redistribution can be viewed as a zero-sum game, and people might believe that migrants' receipt of welfare payments and public services come at the cost of ingroup members (Kootstra, 2016; Reeskens & van Oorschot, 2012). A direct implication of perceived competition is higher welfare chauvinism amongst individuals who think they have more to lose if the immigrants are given the same access to social benefits. For example, low educated, unemployed, and people who are dependent on transfer payments are more likely to perceive the competition to be fiercer and support exclusionary policies towards immigrants. In contrast, socio-economically advantaged groups who might not fear competition and do not typically receive welfare benefits can be more open to inclusion and favour granting social rights to immigrants.

Besides perceived risks at the individual level, people might have more restrictive attitudes if they think fiscal burden on the welfare state is increased due to migration. A strong and direct relationship between the belief that immigrants are net beneficiaries of social policy and welfare chauvinism has been exposed (Gerber et al., 2017). This suggests that even individuals who are not necessarily at risk of actual competition might still opt for exclusive welfare programmes and be inclined to leave out immigrant groups. In the few recent empirical studies that consider subjective evaluations of one's economic and social position such as expected income and unemployment reveal that perceived risks are important for welfare chauvinism even after considering various objective measures (Heizmann et al., 2018; Kros & Coenders, 2019; Reeskens & van Oorschot, 2012). It has been also showed that unemployment does not lead to greater fear of immigrants whereas subjectively vulnerable economic position is linked to feeling threatened (Kuntz et al., 2017). Hence, it is not unemployment either due to competition with migrants, or automation and offshoring, but perceived risk of it that leads to favouring more exclusionary social rights for immigrants. We extend this line of research by focusing on the relationship between subjective insecurity, contextual factors, their interaction and welfare chauvinism. Subjective data reveals important complementary information to objective indicators, and to capture the complexity of socio-economic risks, our index looks at three dimensions of perceived insecurity; unemployment risk, economic well-being and income loss.

First component of our index looks at the likelihood of unemployment in the near future, which is also utilised by previous researchers (Heizmann et al., 2018; Kuntz et al., 2017). Second and third components take subjective living standards and prospect of income losses in upcoming months into account, and similar measures were employed in earlier studies too (Heizmann et al., 2018). It is well known that job loss can have dramatic material and immaterial consequences for employees, and subjective assessment of such a risk might significantly influence policy preferences (Duman & Kemmerling, 2020). Hence, we argue that the greater subjective unemployment risks would translate into negative attitudes towards immigrants even when individuals are not essentially in disadvantaged positions. People's beliefs about more uncertain labour market prospects would aggravate the supposed effects of competition and render them less tolerant to migrant groups.

Even though subjective assessment of living conditions is linked to objective indicators such as income, occupation, and education, these tend to be imperfect measures for positioning in the social ladder. Hence, personal evaluations of living standards and expectations about income might better capture the subtle aspects of social status (Operario et al., 2004). It has been found that subjective class status is explanatory for redistributive preferences even after controlling for objective indicators such as income, education, and labour market status (Duman, 2019). If more individuals in an economy consider themselves as materially deprived and suppose that their income prospects would not get better, they would become more hostile towards outgroup members. Thus, like unemployment risks, perceived inferiority of living conditions and expected income losses would elevate the alleged threats from

migration, and citizens become less supportive of inclusive social benefits. Therefore, we propose that self-reported economic hardship and unemployment risk are associated with higher degrees of welfare chauvinism irrespective of material conditions and socio-economic status of individuals.

**Hypothesis 1.** Subjective risks increase welfare chauvinism even after controlling labour market status, income, demographic characteristics, ideology, and redistributive preferences.

### 3 | CONTEXTUAL DETERMINANTS OF WELFARE CHAUVINISM

The above-mentioned individual level determinants of welfare chauvinism do not operate in isolation, and they are certainly shaped by contextual factors. Individuals might feel more threatened by immigrants economically or culturally depending on the socio-economic environment they are living under. For example, slow economic growth, recessions, and high unemployment rates are expected to increase the anxieties about migration and make people to see immigrants as competitors (Kuntz et al., 2017; Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2010). As a corollary, better economic conditions might ease labour market stress and make people less worried about potential threats from migration. However, empirical evidence on the relationship between macro-level economic indicators such as level of development measured by GDP per capita, and unemployment is mixed. On the one hand, it has been found that greater national income is negatively associated to the welfare chauvinistic attitudes, whilst unemployment rates have a positive impact (Mewes & Mau, 2013). On the other hand, numerous studies revealed that there is no systematic link between level of development, unemployment, and perceptions about immigrants' entitlement to welfare benefits (Eger & Breznau, 2017; Heizmann et al., 2018).

We argue that not only objective but also subjective risks of unemployment and income can be affected by broader economic and social circumstances. For example, in countries that have stable growth, people might be less worried about their future labour market and income prospects. It has been asserted that the volatility of growth has an influence on beliefs about social competition and a greater share of individuals attribute reasons for having economic failures to non-personal causes (Duman, 2013). Likewise, low growth rates might boost feelings about insecurity and reduce inclusive welfare attitudes by increasing the self-assessed risks about unemployment and income. For example, it is shown that the European public became less positive towards immigration during economic crisis (Isaksen, 2019). Thus, we contend that at the country level, instead of national income, the rate of economic growth would be crucial. Hence, people in countries with low growth rates will feel less secure about their socio-economic position and favour more restrictive policies towards immigrants.

**Hypothesis 2a.** High levels of economic growth are likely to lead to attitudes that are less welfare chauvinistic.

**Hypothesis 2b.** Subjective insecurity is less likely to increase welfare chauvinism in countries with high levels of economic growth.

Another channel through which attitudes towards immigrants can be affected is the type of welfare state in the country. One of the widely discussed features of universal welfare systems is the stronger sense of solidarity and greater tolerance amongst the citizens for outgroup members including immigrants (Arts & Gelissen, 2001; Korpi & Palme, 1998). Hence, social democratic states are anticipated to be more inclusionary as opposed to liberal states with regards to the policies targeting migrant populations, and conservative welfare states lie in the middle (Dallinger, 2010). Furthermore, it has been shown that universal welfare systems and particularly decommodification reduce perceptions of group-based competition for welfare services and generate solidarity amongst citizens (Crepaz & Damron, 2009). However, it should be noted that share of conditional entitlement amongst Scandinavian

citizens are quite similar to other European countries, and rather than universalism, social democratic welfare states might lower chauvinism through decreasing income inequality (van der Waal et al., 2013).

Moreover, subjective assessment of insecurities could depend on the type of welfare state and generosity of social expenditures. In the literature, it has been shown that the generosity of social benefit schemes is explanatory for the varying levels of job and employment insecurity across different countries (Blomberg et al., 2012). Given the relatively higher generosity and universalism of social benefits and public services in social democratic welfare states, we assert that this type of welfare regime will be associated with more inclusionary rights for immigrants. Hence, in line with the earlier studies, we expect social democratic welfare regimes to reduce chauvinism. Furthermore, we argue that generosity and universalism of social policy decreases subjective insecurities and make people less anxious about potential competition from immigrants.

**Hypothesis 3a.** Social democratic welfare states are likely to lead to attitudes that are less welfare chauvinistic.

**Hypothesis 3b.** Subjective insecurity is less likely to increase welfare chauvinism in social democratic welfare states.

## 4 | DATA AND EMPIRICAL STRATEGY

### 4.1 | Description of individual level variables

To examine the relationship between subjective insecurities and welfare chauvinism, a multilevel approach is adopted since both individual and country level variables are germane to our analysis. The dependent variable, welfare chauvinism is based on a survey question from the 8th wave of European Social Survey (ESS), which dates to 2016. The only other round where the same question was included is the 4th wave. This round was undertaken in 2008 was marked by severe economic downturn in Europe. We believe that using a later wave can help us to isolate some of the immediate effects of the financial crisis. The following question in ESS indicates welfare chauvinism. 'Thinking of people coming to live in [country] from other countries, when do you think they should obtain the same rights to social benefits and services as citizens already living here? Please choose the option on this card that comes closest to your view'. People can then choose one of the following answers: (1) Immediately on arrival; (2) After living in [country] for a year; (3) Only after they have worked and paid taxes for at least a year; (4) Once they have become a [country] citizen; and (5) They should never get the same rights. This is the only available survey question attempting to directly gauge welfare chauvinism and it is widely used by the researchers, which makes our results comparative (Heizmann et al., 2018; Mewes & Mau, 2013; Reeskens & van Oorschot, 2012). Evidently, this variable does not cover all potential approaches to granting immigrants welfare access. For example, neither limits to certain types of immigrants, nor restrictions to certain types of welfare resources are possible to derive from the questionnaire item.


Our main independent variable is subjective insecurity, which is operationalised by three survey questions. For unemployment risk, we consider the question that asks about the likelihood of getting unemployed and looking for work in the next 12 months, and surveyors can opt for a range of answers from not at all likely to very likely. The higher the probability a respondent attaches to be unemployed, the more likely s/he feels insecure about her/his current job. The second question used to construct the index looks at the feelings on household income, and individuals are given the following options: ((1) Living comfortably on present income, (2) Coping on ..., (3) Difficult on ..., (4) Very difficult on...). The final question for subjective insecurity asks about how likely it is that the household will not have enough money for necessities in the next 12 months, and they rank it happening from not all likely to very likely. As can be expected, the harder the individuals find to live with their household income, the more likely they feel

insecure and threatened by the supposed competition from immigrants. Because the index components have ordinal values, standard methods of performing factor analysis are not suitable. The details of how we build our main independent variable are explained in the following section.


Figure 1 displays the unemployment rates in the survey year and share of respondents who declared that it is very likely and likely that they would be unemployed and looking for work over the next 12 months. The countries are ranked by the unemployment rate and the relationship between objective and subjective risks are not perfectly aligned. Whilst in Spain and Italy both are high, in Estonia, Russia and Poland subjective assessment of job loss is well above the other countries with similar levels of unemployment. On the other hand, in Belgium and Finland, perceptions of job loss are more optimistic in comparison to the total unemployment in these economies. The deviations can be a result of other worries about labour market prospects and ability of maintaining employment, which are beyond the scope of this paper. However, regardless of its source, these divergences indicate that certain individuals feel less secure in the labour market, and potentially they are more threatened by the heightened competition from immigrants. Thus, in addition to the objective measures of unemployment risk, we claim that personal assessments would influence welfare attitudes towards migrant groups.

As can be observed from Figure 2, there is a lot of variation across countries with respect to whether individuals think they are having difficulty to live with their present income and likelihood of not having enough money for household necessities over following year. It should be noted that only respondents whose income falls in the highest three brackets are included in the figure below. In other words, these are the relatively richest households in their respective countries, and yet in Italy, Lithuania, Russia, a significant percentage of them believe they are materially deprived and will have problems with their future incomes. Unsurprisingly, the shares are much higher amongst lower income categories, suggesting that there is an overlap between objective and subjective measures but even the wealthiest individuals in some nations have considerable insecurities about their living standards. For example, in Italy and Lithuania more than 60% of the respondents stated that it is difficult or very difficult to live on present incomes amongst the poorer households whilst this ratio is nearly 12% in Norway and 24% in Germany. Once again, these figures suggest that it is not purely the income level determining the subjective income insecurities, and the more insecure respondents see themselves the higher chances of welfare chauvinism.

Parallel to the literature we have four different sets of individual level control variables; demographic (age, gender, education, being a migrant and location of residency), socio-economic status (income, labour market status, contract type and benefit dependency), political orientation (left-right scale and conservative values) and welfare



**FIGURE 1** Unemployment rates and subjective job loss risk across Countries. Source: Author's calculations based on ESS and World Bank Data. [Colour figure can be viewed at [wileyonlinelibrary.com](http://wileyonlinelibrary.com)]



**FIGURE 2** Living standards and subjective income risk across Countries. *Source:* Author's calculations based on ESS. [Colour figure can be viewed at [wileyonlinelibrary.com](http://wileyonlinelibrary.com)]

legitimacy (attribution of greater government responsibility for provision of standard of living for elderly, unemployed and childcare). These control variables are utilised by previous studies reviewed in Section 2.

## 4.2 | Description of macro level variables

To test whether contextual factors have an impact on welfare chauvinism and if they alter the effect of subjective insecurities, we consider GDP per capita growth, type of welfare state, and interaction between the macro variables and subjective risks at the individual level. In most of the previous studies, GDP per capita is used as a measure of level of development (Mewes & Mau, 2013; Kuntz et al., 2017; Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2010), however, growth rates might have a more straightforward bearing on future expectations, and people might feel less hopeful if the economy is underperforming in relative terms. To control for the very sudden changes in economic growth, we take the average of past the 5 years. As can be seen from Table 1, there is significant variation across countries with respect to economic performance. Whilst negative growth rates were recorded in Italy, Austria, Russia and Finland, economic expansion was sizable for Ireland, Hungary, and Poland over the same period. In order to account for indirect effect of GDP per capita growth through subjective insecurity, we also add an interaction variable to our model.

With regards to the welfare state, as discussed earlier, a positive association has been identified between generosity, universalism, and more inclusionary attitudes towards immigrants. To classify welfare states, we use existing typologies that distinguish between social democratic, continental, and liberal models (Arts & Gelissen, 2002; Esping-Andersen, 1990). These often group together Scandinavian countries (Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden in our sample) in the former, Continental European countries (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzerland in our sample) in the second, and Anglo-Saxon countries (Ireland and the UK in our sample) in the last category. Extensions to the original typology are made by several researchers to include Southern European countries (Italy, Portugal, and Spain in our sample) and Central and Eastern European countries (Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Russia, and Slovenia in our sample) as distinct models (Adascalitei, 2012; Cook, 2010; Rhodes, 1996). Even though Israel is not typically contained in welfare regime classifications, there are various elements that resemble to liberal welfare model (Doron, 2001).

Given the higher generosity and universalism, individuals in social democratic welfare states are expected to have more inclusionary opinions. Moreover, the welfare state regime can affect subjective insecurities and via this



**TABLE 1** Mean values for key variables across countries.

	Welfare chauvinism	Living standards	Income risk	Job loss risk	GDP growth	Foreign born (%)
AT	2.38	1.85		1.59	-0.27	17
BE	1.98	1.80	1.82	1.72	0.86	16
CH	1.94	1.55	1.68	1.72	0.69	28
CZ	2.69	2.21	2.10	1.97	2.42	7
DE	1.94	1.65	1.65	1.57	0.86	13
EE	2.30	2.17	1.95	1.99	2.25	15
ES	1.74	2.02	2.06	2.21	1.5	13
FI	2.20	1.86	1.84	1.78	-0.64	6
FR	2.03	1.91	2.12	2.01	0.43	12
GB	2.20	1.69	1.87	1.69	1.62	13
HU	2.80	2.27	1.99	1.72	3.57	5
IE	2.00	1.88	2.06	1.81	10.86	17
IL	1.98	2.17	1.73	1.69	1.43	23
IS	1.68	1.52	1.63	1.53	2.59	12
IT	2.34	2.14	2.32	2.02	-1	10
LT	2.44	2.30	2.68	2.19	3.43	13
NL	2.30	1.57	1.64	1.70	0.71	12
NO	1.97	1.42	1.48	1.56	0.53	14
PL	2.44	2.08	2.04	2.11	2.98	2
PT	1.82	2.18	2.47	1.86	1.06	10
RU	2.65	2.62	2.44	2.17	-0.56	8
SE	1.76	1.40	1.42	1.44	1.79	16
SI	2.44	1.70	2.03	1.89	1.21	12

Source: Own calculations based on ESS, World Development Indicators, and Eurostat.

**TABLE 2** Social expenditure, welfare state and subjective risks.

Country	Welfare state regime	Unemployment risk	Living standards	Income risk
LT, EE, CZ, PL, RU, HU, SI	Central and Eastern European	7.8	7.2	8.6
CH, NL, DE, AT, BE, FR	Continental	7.2	2.5	3.4
IL, IR, GB	Liberal	6.9	7.0	6.1
PT, ES, IT	Southern European	14.5	8.2	14.5
IS, NO, SE, FI	Social Democratic	5.4	1.7	3.0

Note: Unemployment risk, living standards and income risk columns show % of individuals who opted for responses 'very likely' and 'very difficult'.

Source: Author's calculations based on ESS.

channel indirectly influence welfare chauvinism. As can be seen from Table 2, systems differ in terms of self-reported unemployment and income risks. On average, individuals in Social Democratic welfare states feel securer on all three measures of subjective insecurity. At the other end of the spectrum, we have Southern European countries exhibiting greater degrees of subjective risks, particularly on job and income losses. There is also within cluster variation. For example, more than 19% of the respondents asserted that it is very likely to be unemployed in Spain, whilst

this ratio is 10% in Portugal, which belongs to the same welfare regime. To examine the indirect effect of welfare state type on exclusionary social rights through self-assessed risks, we include an interaction variable of welfare regime and index of subjective insecurity.

We also include the share of foreign-born population as a macro-level control variable. Living in the vicinity of immigrant communities and interacting with them can reduce negative perceptions through socialisation, and it is suggested individuals in direct contact with migrants would have more positive attitudes (Abrams et al., 2018). However, the size of the group might also be seen as a danger, especially on scarce welfare resources and negative personal experiences with migrants can lead disproportionately adverse opinions. Indeed, it is proposed that the existence of large immigrant populations creates fiercer competition and leads to higher levels of prejudice, which imply that people from regions with larger migrant groups exhibit more perceived group threat (Schlueter & Wagner, 2008). In the empirical literature, whilst some studies find that the presence of immigrants is associated with greater welfare chauvinism, others argue that neither real nor the perceived size of immigrants matters for attitudes (Crepaz & Damron, 2009; Schlueter & Scheepers, 2010; van der Meer & Reeskens, 2020; van der Waal et al., 2013).

Certainly, there might be other contextual variables such as social expenditure, inequality and unemployment that may affect welfare chauvinism. On the one hand, the level of social expenditure and specific labour market policies might protect individuals against economic risks. On the other hand, higher level of social expenditures might make citizens fear larger losses if migration is expected to cause welfare retrenchment or to pay more taxes in order to finance the generous programmes. This might increase the resentment against immigrants and lead to support of exclusion of them from public services and assistance (Facchini & Mayda, 2009). Lower income inequality at the country level could promote equality of opportunity, make citizens securer, and have better labour market and economic prospects (Larsen, 2006). Hence, an inverse relationship might be seen between welfare chauvinism and more equal income distribution. Finally, unemployment rate can affect the severity of labour market competition and lead to exclusionary views (Eger & Breznau, 2017). Since we have a restricted sample of countries, not all contextual factors can be added to the model simultaneously. For each model, we include a maximum of three macro-level variables and substitute the economic growth and welfare regime type with social expenditure, income inequality, and unemployment to test the strength of our results. Table A1 in the Appendix shows summary statistics for all variables.

### 4.3 | Empirical strategy

Factor analysis is a widely used technique to reduce many variables into fewer numbers of factors, by extracting maximum common variance from all variables and putting them into a common score. However, in standard methods of performing factor analysis, variables are assumed to be continuous and follow a multivariate normal distribution. As reviewed in the previous section, variables that are utilised to form our core independent variable, subjective risk, are ordinal. Thus, we generate a matrix of polychoric correlations to estimate factor scores and calculate the index for subjective insecurity based on these scores. For simplicity, let us suppose that  $Z_1$  and  $Z_2$  are two ordinal items with  $m_1$  and  $m_2$  categories. If we assume that variables,  $Z_1^*$  and  $Z_2^*$  are the underlying variables, which are normally distributed, their combined distribution can also be assumed to be normal bivariate with a correlation  $\rho$ . Then, polychoric correlation becomes the correlation  $\rho$  in the bivariate normal distribution  $N(0,0,1,1, \rho)$  (Equation 1) of the latent variables  $Y_1^*$  and  $Y_2^*$ . The equation is as follows and can be estimated by maximising the function of maximum likelihood of the multinomial distribution:

$$P[X = i, Y = j] = p_{ij} \int_{a_{i-1}}^{a_i} \int_{b_{j-1}}^{b_j} \frac{1}{2\pi\sqrt{1-\rho^2}} \exp \frac{1}{2(1-\rho^2)}(x^2 - 2\rho xy + y^2) dx dy \quad (1)$$

$$\ln L = \sum_{i=1}^{m_1} \sum_{j=1}^{m_2} n_{ij} \log p_{ij} \quad (2)$$

Given that our dependent variable has an ordered character, we use a multilevel ordered logit regression model. A linear estimation technique is not suitable because the distances between the response categories are not necessarily equal, and the values attached to these categories are ordinally ranked. An ordered logit model does not assume that the distances are meaningful as such, and therefore offers a better option to investigate categorical data. Furthermore, our analysis includes both the country and individual-level variables, hence we use a multilevel approach. We estimate models with random intercept for national clusters as well as random slope for the effect of contextual factors on subjective employment and income risks. Thus, with multilevel modelling we can study the impact of national variables on individual opinions whilst at the same time recognising that all respondents within a country receive the same level-2 treatment and perfectly correlate on level-2 measures. Additionally, this type of methodology informs us on the proportion of variation that is caused by level-1 or level-2 variables. The following mixed-effects ordered logistic regression is used:

$$p_{ij} = \Pr(y_{ij} = 1 | x_{ij}, X_j) \quad (3)$$

$$\text{Logit}(p_{ij}) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 x_{ij} + \beta_2 X_j + \beta_3 x_{ij} X_j + u_{0j} \quad (4)$$

$$\text{Var}(u_{0j} | x_{ij}, X_j) = \sigma_{u_0}^2 x, X \quad (5)$$

where  $x_{ij}$  is the set of level-1 variables including subjective insecurity, demographic characteristics, ideological stance, and welfare legitimacy, and  $X_j$  is the set of level-2 variables including GDP per capita growth, welfare state type, and share of foreign-born population.  $x_{ij} X_j$  is the interaction term between our core independent variable, subjective insecurity and the main macro level determinants, namely GDP growth and welfare state regime. The variance term  $u_{0j}$  includes the level-1 and level-2 variances and covariance between intercept and slopes. The model enables to examine the country level factors on welfare chauvinism directly as well as indirectly through their effects on subjective insecurity. We use State 15 meologit and post-estimation commands for all regressions that are presented in the following section. Likelihood ratio (LR) test, Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) are used to compare the strength of random intercept versus random intercept-random slope models.

## 5 | FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

Table 3 displays the results of the multilevel multivariate ordered logit analyses under four specifications, starting with our core independent variables insecurity, GDP growth and welfare state type, interaction variables between subjective insecurity and macro determinants- and adding demographic, socio-economic, political and welfare legitimacy controls sequentially. All models of interest are compared to a simple null-model where no independent variables are included. The full sets of results are presented in Table A2 in the Appendix. AIC and BIC are reduced noticeably between the 1st and 4th model, suggesting that the full model is correctly specified. Moreover, likelihood ratio tests support the utilisation of the random intercept-random slope model, which means that subjective insecurity does not only vary across countries but there is also diversity within countries. Figure A1 and A2 exhibit random slope and intercepts by country, and both are different from zero in most cases.

As can be observed, subjective insecurity has a positive and significant effect on welfare chauvinism, and the coefficient is robust across most specifications. Subjective insecurity is not statistically significant in the first model

with only demographic controls; however, the index becomes explanatory after the insertion of individual level variables on socio-economic status, political orientation, and welfare legitimacy. This suggests that demographics as controls are insufficient to capture the variation in welfare chauvinism, and omitted variable bias is corrected when the full set of controls are added to the model. It can be observed from the 4th column of Table 3, for a one unit increase in subjective risks, the odds of welfare chauvinism versus more inclusionary is 1.12 times greater, given the other variables are held constant in the model. Hence, in line with our argument, the less secure people feel, the more exclusionary they become towards immigrants. The findings are comparable to previous examinations where subjective economic risk is disclosed to have a direct and positive effect on welfare chauvinism in the UK and Netherlands after economic egalitarianism and ethnic threat perceptions are accounted for (Kros & Coenders, 2019). Thus, it can be said that our first hypothesis 1 is supported by the empirical evidence as subjective risks increase welfare chauvinism even after controlling for labour market status, income, demographic characteristics, ideology, and redistributive preferences.

In Figure 3, we illustrate the marginal effects of subjective insecurity on welfare chauvinism, and for clarity, we only include the least inclusive outcome. It shows the probabilities of someone having chauvinistic attitudes in comparison to other alternatives (inclusion and conditional inclusion) according to the level of subjective assessment of risks. Our results demonstrate that the likelihood of being welfare chauvinistic is higher when perceived insecurities are larger. If subjective insecurity is zero, the predicted probability of respondents having most exclusionary attitudes is slightly less than 5% whereas the ratio increases to a little over 11% if insecurity is at its highest level. To elucidate the effects of self-assessed risk on welfare attitudes towards immigrants, we also look at the predictive margins for the most objectively secure individuals. This group is defined by university education, permanent employment, no social benefit dependency and belonging to the highest income category. Even for these respondents, subjective insecurity has a positive and significant, around 1%, impact on the most chauvinistic welfare attitudes.

When we look at the macro level explanations, higher degree of GDP growth is found to reduce welfare chauvinism. The coefficient of economic performance gets smaller as we add more control variables, however, it is still significant as can be observed from Table 3. This is confirming the first part of H2a and H2b, which states that better economic performance can improve objective and subjective well-being of individuals and make them less anxious about migration. Figure 4 shows the relationship between GDP growth and most exclusionary views on immigrants' social rights. It is evident that higher economic growth is decreasing welfare chauvinism. For example, when GDP per capita is contracting at 1% (Italian case), the likelihood of reporting most exclusionary attitudes towards immigrants is around 8%, and the likelihood decreases to less than 4% if GDP per capita growth approaches to 10% (Irish case). Once again, the findings are similar to the previous research that identifies a varied but important effect of economic crisis on viewpoint of European public towards migrant groups (Isaksen, 2019). Since growth rates might better capture fluctuations in economic performance and expectations than national income levels, and our results might be better at divulging the association between crisis and welfare chauvinism. Nonetheless, we do not find an interaction between subjective insecurity and GDP per capita growth, which indicates that there is no indirect link between economic growth and welfare chauvinism. In other words, we cannot validate that better macroeconomic performance in a country is making individuals to have less exclusionary views towards immigrants through reducing self-assessed risks.

Our final set of hypotheses (H3a and H3b) consider the direct and indirect relationship between welfare regime and welfare chauvinism. Given the relatively more generous and universal systems of rights in social democratic regimes, we expect opinions about immigrants' rights in such regimes to be less negative. From Table 3 it can be seen that welfare chauvinism in Continental European and Southern European regimes are not statistically different from the Social Democratic one. However, there is a strong and negative impact of Central and Eastern European model as well as a smaller and adverse effect of Liberal system on welfare chauvinism. Thus, our findings are partially in line with the previous research affirming that social democratic and comprehensive welfare regimes are more conducive to inclusionary views (van der Waal et al., 2013; Crepez & Damron, 2009). Earlier cross-country studies on welfare chauvinism usually compare only social democratic, continental, and liberal welfare states, and in this regard, we


**TABLE 3** Subjective insecurity and welfare chauvinism.

	1	2	3	4
Subjective insecurity	0.07 (−0.04)	0.10* (−0.05)	0.11* (−0.04)	0.12** (−0.04)
SI*GDP growth	0.05 (−0.08)	0.04 (−0.06)	0.04 (−0.08)	0.05 (−0.09)
SI*welfare state	−0.06 (−0.04)	−0.05 (−0.03)	−0.03 (−0.05)	−0.06 (−0.05)
GDP growth	−0.08** (−0.03)	−0.08* (−0.03)	−0.06* (−0.03)	−0.06* (−0.03)
Liberal	0.63** (−0.2)	0.55* (−0.21)	0.44* (−0.21)	0.37 (−0.21)
Continental	0.26 (−0.22)	0.23 (−0.25)	0.29 (−0.24)	0.21 (−0.25)
South European	−0.14 (−0.26)	−0.19 (−0.26)	−0.12 (−0.24)	−0.12 (−0.24)
Central and Eastern Europe	0.97** (−0.19)	0.91** (−0.2)	0.67** (−0.22)	0.62** (−0.22)
Foreign born	−2.64* (−1.26)	−2.86* (−1.25)	−2.93* (−1.22)	−2.87* (−1.15)
Demographic	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Socio-Economic	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Political orientation	No	No	Yes	Yes
Welfare legitimacy	No	No	No	Yes
# of Obs.	32,046	23,078	20,970	20,805
# of Countries	23	23	23	23
Country level variance (null model = 0.328)	0.09	0.08	0.08	0.08
AIC	92767.5	64061.9	54892.3	54468.1
BIC	92934.9	64246.9	55067.2	54642.8


Note: Models reflect the results of multilevel ordered logit analyses and standard errors are reported in parentheses. Demographic variables include age, gender, education, being a migrant and residency. Socio-economic variables include contract type, employment status, welfare dependency and income. Political orientation includes left–right scale and conservative values. Welfare legitimacy includes an index based on opinions about government responsibility for providing living standards for elderly, unemployed and childcare. \* an \*\* denote 0.05 and 0.01 significance levels.

extend the literature by considering a larger set of countries with distinct welfare regimes. We also test the interaction between welfare state type and subjective insecurity, and similar to the case of economic growth, we are unable to verify an indirect relationship. Hence, we cannot assert that impact of perceived risks is mediated by the welfare regimes.


We also look at the predicted probability of having the most exclusionary attitudes towards immigrants' social rights across different welfare state categories in Figure 5. In comparison to Social Democratic systems, it is visible that Continental and South European models do not have different effects. The contrasts of predictive margins are close to zero. On the other hand, for Liberal welfare states the likelihood of asserting welfare chauvinism is



**FIGURE 3** Welfare Chauvinism and subjective insecurity. *Source:* Marginal effects are estimated at covariate means and based on the 4th specifications of Table 3. The outcome is the most exclusive response category on welfare attitudes towards immigrants. [Colour figure can be viewed at [wileyonlinelibrary.com](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com)]



**FIGURE 4** Welfare Chauvinism and GDP per capita growth. *Source:* Marginal effects are estimated at covariate means and based on the 4th specifications of Table 3. The outcome is the most exclusive response category on welfare attitudes towards immigrants. [Colour figure can be viewed at [wileyonlinelibrary.com](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com)]



**FIGURE 5** Comparison of Welfare Chauvinism to Social Democratic Regime. *Source:* Marginal effects are estimated at covariate means and based on the 4th specifications of Table 3. The outcome is the most exclusive response category on welfare attitudes towards immigrants. SD = Social Democratic, SE = Southern European and CEE = Central and Eastern European. [Colour figure can be viewed at [wileyonlinelibrary.com](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/jpol.12919)]

approximately 2% higher than Social Democratic ones and this ratio goes up to 4.5% for Central and Eastern European counterparts. To isolate the effects of social spending and GDP per capita from the welfare model, we explore the predictive margins when these indicators are set to the highest and lowest values of the sample, yet welfare state type continues to be differentially related to chauvinism. This implies that there are system specific effects, which might be related to solidarity rather than generosity in Social Democratic states.

For robustness checks, we replicated our main model employing micro variables, macro variables, and three subjective insecurity measures separately using an ordered logit model with country dummies. The results can be found in Table A3 of the Appendix. In all specifications subjective insecurity continue to have statistically significant and positive coefficients, which implies that the less confident people are about their labour market and income prospects the less inclusionary they become towards immigrants. It can be also seen that expected unemployment loss, insufficient household income and expected income loss are positively and significantly related to welfare chauvinism. Hence, our results are not driven by the construction of subjective risk index. Lastly, we leave out Israel and Russia from the estimation in the last specification as they are not classified in typical welfare models. Our findings are still confirmed as can be seen from Table A3, and subjective insecurity as well as core macro level variables have similar magnitudes and same signs as before. All in all, the results show that a more comprehensive measure of subjective insecurity is explanatory for welfare chauvinism even when we control for a long list of individual and contextual factors across several European countries. In fact, objective measures of risk, except education lose their explanatory power once self-assessment of job and income losses are added to the models.

To ensure that our findings are not driven by the choice of particular contextual variables, we also run the regressions using alternative macro level covariates, namely unemployment rate, social expenditures and income inequality. Table 4 presents the estimation results based on full specification of the 4th column in Table 3. As can be seen, self-assessment of risks maintains their explanatory power across all models, and the magnitude of the coefficient is 0.12 for differing contextual factors. Figure A3 in the Appendix presents marginal effects of subjective

**TABLE 4** Subjective insecurity and welfare chauvinism (alternative macro covariates).

	Unemployment rate	Social expenditure	Inequality
Subjective Insecurity	0.12** (0.04)	0.12** (0.04)	0.12** (0.04)
Unemployment Rate	−0.43* (0.21)		
Social Expenditure		−0.13 (0.24)	
Inequality			0.6** (0.21)
Liberal	0.21 (0.18)	0.15 (0.21)	0.26 (0.25)
Continental	0.23 (0.25)	0.22 (0.24)	0.38 (0.23)
South European	0.3 (0.40)	−0.08 (0.28)	0.38 (0.31)
Central and Eastern Europe	0.62** (0.22)	0.51* (0.16)	0.85** (0.22)
Foreign Born	−3.11** (1.20)	−3.51 (1.82)	−2.02 (1.13)
Demographic	Yes	Yes	Yes
Socio-Economic	Yes	Yes	Yes
Political Orientation	Yes	Yes	Yes
Welfare Legitimacy	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country Level Variance	0.07	0.07	0.08
# of Obs.	20,805	20,805	20,805
# of Countries	23	23	23

*Note:* Models reflect the results of multilevel ordered logit analyses and standard errors are reported in parentheses. Demographic variables include age, gender, education, being a migrant and residency. Socio-economic variables include contract type, employment status, welfare dependency and income. Political orientation includes left–right scale and conservative values. Welfare legitimacy includes an index based on opinions about government responsibility for providing living standards for elderly, unemployed and childcare. \* an \*\* denote 0.05 and 0.01 significance levels.

insecurity across these three models, and in sum, there is a significant and positive impact in all three specifications. The impact gets larger for higher levels of self-reported risk, especially when inequality is considered. This supports our hypotheses that subjective insecurities are highly relevant for welfare chauvinism, and its impact is not contingent on the objective socio-economic position of the individuals or the choice of macro level indicators.

We also reveal that unemployment rate is significantly and negatively associated with exclusionary preferences. This appears to be counterintuitive but higher unemployment might shift the blame from immigrants to mismanagement of the economy and more systemic causes. In the literature, there is no agreement on the effect of unemployment rate and various studies found no link between unemployment and perceptions about immigrants' entitlement to welfare benefits (Eger & Breznau, 2017; Kuntz et al., 2017). When we consider social expenditures, no link between the extent of government spending and welfare chauvinism is detected. This could be due to the opposing effects of comprehensive programmes. On the one hand, they will provide safety nets to citizens and on



the other hand, they increase the opportunity cost of perceived immigrant competition (Facchini & Mayda, 2009; Larsen, 2006). In the last column of Table 4, we added inequality measured by Gini coefficient, which turns out to be positively and significantly related to welfare chauvinism. Hence, more unequal countries tend to be also less tolerant towards immigrants.

Finally, if we look at the impact of welfare system on attitudes, Liberal cluster is no longer different than Social Democratic one. In this sense, our results are quite comparable to the researchers who highlighted that regime differences in welfare chauvinism can be fully attributed to their differences in income inequality (van der Waal et al., 2013). Nevertheless, the coefficient on Central and Eastern European welfare state maintains its significance even when inequality is included, which signal that there are system specific elements beyond income distribution, unemployment rate and social expenditures shaping opinions about immigrants' welfare access.

## 6 | CONCLUDING REMARKS

Welfare chauvinism and its role in raising prejudices against migrants is becoming the centre of many studies and policy analyses in recent years. The paper explored the association between individual characteristics, contextual factors, and welfare chauvinism across several European countries. Our results demonstrate a clear support for the notion that subjective risk is explanatory for welfare chauvinism even after controlling a long list of variables on demographics, socio-economic position, political orientation, and welfare legitimacy. In contrast, objective features such as labour market status, income and social benefit dependency are not illuminating once self-assessed risks are taken into account.

Our contribution to the literature is several. First, we rigorously investigate the relationship between subjective risks and attitudes towards immigrants by constructing a multidimensional index. Second, we consider macro-level variables and revealed that economic growth and welfare system are significantly and robustly linked to chauvinism. Higher growth decreases the probability of exclusionary attitudes, which is also confirmed in several studies that identify a negative impact of crisis on tolerance to migrant groups. Finally, we show that in comparison to Social Democratic model, especially Central and Eastern European cluster is raising welfare chauvinism. This effect is unchanged when social expenditures and income inequality are added, pointing out that there are system specific features shaping the welfare attitudes. Earlier research usually focuses on Western Europe and overlook Central and Eastern European countries; thus, we contribute to the literature by expanding the geographical coverage and highlighting the differences between welfare models.

Despite the empirical extensions and our contributions, there are few limitations. First, we only looked at the influence of different individual positions in the welfare state system in a general way by depicting only the mean consequences of these for welfare chauvinism. Nonetheless, macroeconomic performance and welfare system might moderate the association between subjective insecurity and attitudes towards immigrants. Due to the limited sample, we are unable to control for interactions, but future research can explore the interrelation between welfare system arrangements and individuals' objective and subjective risks. Second, lack of individual-level longitudinal data makes it impossible to establish causality between welfare chauvinism and self-assessment of employment and income losses. Even though there is no match between higher flows of immigrants and subjective insecurity, this might lead to a change in immigration policy, which in turn might make people more anxious about migration. However, our results are robust to model specifications and variable selection and establish a strong association between subjective insecurity and welfare chauvinism given the available cross-country data.

The vast cross-country differences in terms of citizens' lack of willingness to share social benefits with immigrants might have substantial implications for policy making in the upcoming years. In countries and regions, where significantly higher chauvinistic attitudes are displayed, extending social policy to immigrants can be extremely difficult. Besides, more restrictive views on migration in specific countries can have a negative impact on migration policies across Europe through policy spillovers and mimicking. This might imply that sustainability of welfare systems

that are based on solidarity and inclusion can be shaken even in societies where there is no substantial change in immigration patterns. Given that perceptions about economic risks are sufficient to fuel welfare chauvinism, future integration measures should tackle these issues and attempt to improve expectations of citizens. Additionally, universal, and generous social policies, exemplified by the Social Democratic welfare model, can be used to decrease exclusionary preferences.

## DATA AVAILABILITY STATEMENT

The data that support the findings of this study are publicly available from ESS, World Bank, and Eurostat.

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## APPENDIX A

TABLE A1 Summary statistics.

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. dev.	Min	Max
Welfare Chauvinism	42,403	2.191	1.05	0	4
Age	44,232	49.143	18.613	15	100
Gender	44,378	0.526	0.499	0	1
Education	44,387	1.907	0.868	0	3
Born in Country	44,370	0.106	0.308	0	1
Residence	44,337	1.099	0.928	0	3
Left-Right Scale	38,583	5.157	2.239	0	10
Conservatism	43,184	2.142	1.215	1	5
Work Contract	35,622	0.331	0.634	0	2
Labour Market Status	44,387	1.229	1.385	0	3
Source of Income	43,694	2.225	1.702	1	8
Household Income	36,445	5.189	2.734	1	10
Responsibility for Elderly	44,125	8.17	1.825	0	10
Responsibility for Unemployed	43,838	6.735	2.272	0	10
Responsibility for Childcare	43,744	7.84	2.116	0	10
Living Standards	43,863	1.948	0.833	1	4
Income Risk	40,612	1.973	0.901	1	4
Job Loss Risk	43,080	12.906	21.618	1	55
GDP Growth	44,387	1.757	2.649	-1	10.86
Foreign Born	44,387	0.129	0.054	0.02	0.28
Social Democratic	44,387	0.133	0.34	0	1
Continental	44,387	0.268	0.443	0	1
South European	44,387	0.132	0.338	0	1
Central and Eastern European	44,387	0.303	0.46	0	1
Liberal	44,387	0.164	0.37	0	1
Immigrant Flow	44,387	0.013	0.008	0.003	0.03
Inequality	44,387	0.319	0.037	0.25	0.4
Unemployment Rate	44,387	0.08	0.038	0.04	0.22
Social Expenditure	44,387	0.224	0.048	0.15	0.32

**TABLE A2** Subjective insecurity and welfare chauvinism – full models.


	1	2	3	4
Subjective Insecurity	0.07 (0.04)	0.10* (0.05)	0.11* (0.04)	0.12** (0.04)
SI*GDP Growth	0.05 (0.08)	0.04 (0.06)	0.04 (0.08)	0.05 (0.09)
SI*Welfare State	-0.06 (0.04)	-0.05 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.05)	-0.06 (0.05)
GDP Growth	-0.08** (0.03)	-0.08* (0.03)	-0.06* (0.03)	-0.06* (0.03)
Liberal	0.63** (0.20)	0.55* (0.21)	0.44* (0.21)	0.37 (0.21)
Continental	0.26 (0.22)	0.23 (0.25)	0.29 (0.24)	0.21 (0.25)
South European	-0.14 (0.26)	-0.19 (0.26)	-0.12 (0.24)	-0.12 (0.24)
Central and Eastern Europe	0.97** (0.19)	0.91** (0.20)	0.67** (0.22)	0.62** (0.22)
Foreign Born	-2.64* (1.26)	-2.86* (1.25)	-2.93* (1.22)	-2.87* (1.15)
Age	0.01** (0.00)	0.01* (0.00)	0 (0.00)	0 (0.00)
Gender	-0.05 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.04)
Educ	-0.13** (0.03)	-0.17** (0.03)	-0.16** (0.03)	-0.16** (0.03)
Immigrant	-0.68** (0.15)	-0.67** (0.12)	-0.74** (0.11)	-0.73** (0.11)
Residency	0.04 (0.05)	0.03 (0.05)	0.03 (0.04)	0.03 (0.04)
Contract		0.01 (0.04)	0.04 (0.04)	0.04 (0.04)
In education		-0.36** (0.09)	-0.29** (0.11)	-0.33** (0.10)
Unemployed		-0.19 (0.18)	-0.16 (0.17)	-0.18 (0.18)
Non-employed		0.01 (0.05)	0.04 (0.07)	0.04 (0.08)
Pensions		-0.08 (0.14)	-0.12 (0.17)	-0.12 (0.16)
Social Benefit		-0.15 (0.18)	-0.12 (0.24)	-0.09 (0.24)

(Continues)


TABLE A2 (Continued)

	1	2	3	4
Income		-0.01 (0.01)	0 (0.01)	0 (0.01)
Left-Right			0.13** (0.02)	0.12** (0.02)
Conservatism			0.20** (0.02)	0.20** (0.02)
Welfare Legitimacy				-0.09** (0.02)
Cut 1	-2.34** (0.24)	-2.58** (0.28)	-1.85** (0.34)	-2.59** (0.36)
Cut 2	-1.52** (0.25)	-1.73** (0.28)	-0.97** (0.34)	-1.70** (0.36)
Cut 3	0.67* (0.27)	0.49 (0.31)	1.33** (0.38)	0.6 (0.35)
Cut 4	2.64** (0.31)	2.48** (0.35)	3.43** (0.41)	2.71** (0.39)
# of Obs.	32,046	23,078	20,970	20,805
# of Countries	23	23	23	23
Country Level Variance (null model = 0.328)	0.09	0.08	0.08	0.08
AIC	92767.5	64061.9	54892.3	54468.1
BIC	92934.9	64246.9	55067.2	54642.8

Note: Models reflect the results of multilevel ordered logit analyses and standard errors are reported in parentheses. \* and \*\* denote 0.05 and 0.01 significance levels.



**FIGURE A1** Random intercepts by Country. Intercept residuals are calculated with 95% confidence intervals and represent the empirical Bayes predictions of the random effects based on 4th specification of Table 3. [Colour figure can be viewed at [wileyonlinelibrary.com](http://wileyonlinelibrary.com)]



**FIGURE A2** Random slopes by Country. Slope residuals are calculated with 95% confidence intervals and represent the empirical Bayes predictions of the random effects based on 4th specification of Table 3. [Colour figure can be viewed at [wileyonlinelibrary.com](http://wileyonlinelibrary.com)]

TABLE A3 Robustness checks.


	Micro	Macro	Without index	Without Israel and Russia
Subjective Insecurity	0.14** (0.05)	0.08* (0.03)		0.10* (0.04)
Subjective Unemployment Risk			0.02* (0.04)	
Subjective Income Condition			0.12** (0.05)	
Subjective Income Loss			0.07** (0.04)	
GDP Growth		-0.13** (0.04)	-0.08* (0.06)	-0.09* (0.04)
Liberal		0.67** (0.13)	0.22 (0.19)	0.52 (0.30)
Continental		0.73** (0.13)	0.44** (0.12)	0.19 (0.25)
South European		-0.03 (0.15)	0.25 (0.20)	-0.11 (0.23)
Central and Eastern Europe		1.18** (0.13)	1.27** (0.18)	0.78** (0.22)
Foreign Born		-1.3 (1.07)	2.14 (1.66)	-2.61 (1.35)
Age	0 (0.00)		0 (0.00)	0 (0.00)
Gender	-0.02 (0.05)		-0.02 (0.05)	0.02 (0.03)
Educ	-0.16** (0.02)		-0.16** (0.02)	-0.18** (0.02)
Immigrant	-0.73** (0.07)		-0.73** (0.07)	-0.69** (0.12)
Residency	0.03 (0.03)		0.03 (0.03)	0.07* (0.03)
Contract	0.04 (0.06)		0.06 (0.06)	0.01 (0.04)
In education	-0.33* (0.13)		-0.31* (0.13)	-0.39** (0.10)
Unemployed	-0.18 (0.14)		-0.14 (0.15)	-0.14 (0.21)
Non-employed	0.04 (0.09)		0.05 (0.09)	0.01 (0.08)
Pensions	-0.12 (0.13)		-0.14 (0.13)	0.04 (0.10)
Social Benefit	-0.1		-0.11	0.1



TABLE A3 (Continued)

	Micro	Macro	Without index	Without Israel and Russia
	(0.13)		(0.13)	(0.18)
Income	0		0.01	0
	(0.01)		(0.01)	(0.01)
Left-Right	0.12**		0.12**	0.14**
	(0.01)		(0.01)	(0.01)
Conservatism	0.20**		0.20**	0.18**
	(0.03)		(0.03)	(0.03)
Welfare Legitimacy	-0.09**		-0.09**	-0.10**
	(0.02)		(0.02)	(0.02)
Country Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Models reflect the results of ordered logit analyses and standard errors are reported in parentheses. \* and \*\* denote 0.05 and 0.01 significance levels.



**FIGURE A3** Welfare chauvinism and subjective insecurity (alternative macro variables). *Source:* Marginal effects are estimated at covariate means and based on each specification of Table 4. The outcome is the most exclusive response category on welfare attitudes towards immigrants. [Colour figure can be viewed at [wileyonlinelibrary.com](http://wileyonlinelibrary.com)]