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The Significance of The Many Property Problem
Title / Series / Name
Publication Volume
Publication Issue
Pages
Authors
Editors
Keywords
Adverbialism
Content, Physicalism
Intentionalism
Intentionality
Naive realism
Perception
Propositional attitudes
Philosophy
Psychology (miscellaneous)
Cognitive Neuroscience
Content, Physicalism
Intentionalism
Intentionality
Naive realism
Perception
Propositional attitudes
Philosophy
Psychology (miscellaneous)
Cognitive Neuroscience
URI
https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14018/27371
Abstract
One ofthe most influential traditional objections to Adverbialism about perceptual experience is that posed by FrankJackson's 'many property problem'. Perhaps largely because ofthis objection, few philosophers now defend Adverbialism. We argue, however, that the essence ofthe many property problem arises for all ofthe leading metaphysical theories ofexperience: all leading theories must simply take for granted certain facts about experience, and no theory looks well positioned to explain the facts in a straightforward way. Because ofthis, the many property problem isn't on its own a good reason for rejecting Adverbialism; and nor is it a puzzle that will decide amongst the other leading theories.
Topic
Publisher
Place of Publication
Type
Journal article
Date
2022
Language
ISBN
Identifiers
10.17454/pam-2214