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What Drives International Cooperation? Evidence from WTO Negotiations
Title / Series / Name
World Trade Review
Publication Volume
Publication Issue
Pages
Authors
Editors
Keywords
authoritarian regimes
democracy
lobby
negotiations
WTO
Economics and Econometrics
Political Science and International Relations
Law
democracy
lobby
negotiations
WTO
Economics and Econometrics
Political Science and International Relations
Law
URI
https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14018/28706
Abstract
Why do some countries cooperate in international negotiations while others do not? This paper examines how regime type and trade relationships jointly shape cooperation among states. While prior research claims that democracies are inherently more cooperative and that trade fosters collaboration, we argue that neither factor alone sufficiently explains patterns of cooperation. Drawing on 1,567 documents submitted by World Trade Organization (WTO) members during the Doha Round negotiations (2000–2012), we analyse cooperation between country pairs (dyads) using hurdle models to assess both the likelihood and extent of cooperation. We find that democracies are not uniformly more cooperative but become so only when high levels of trade interdependence exist. Similarly, democracies also cooperate with authoritarian regimes when intensive trade relationships are present. These results challenge the assumption that democratic governance naturally generates cooperation, showing instead that economic incentives play a decisive role. The study advances understanding of international cooperation in complex multilateral negotiation settings.
Topic
Publisher
Place of Publication
Type
Journal article
Date
2025-11
Language
ISBN
Identifiers
10.1017/S147474562510133X