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Defending Truthmaker Non-Maximalism
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Keywords
Philosophy
URI
https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14018/27608
Abstract
Jago (2012) argues that truthmaker non-maximalism, the view that some but not all truths require truthmakers, is vulnerable to a challenge from truths which ascribe knowledge of propositions about things which don't exist. Such truths, Jago argues, can only be dealt with using maximalist resources. I argue that Jago's point relies on the claim that the relevant truths require truthmakers, a point that non-maximalists can coherently and plausibly deny. Moreover, I argue that by making use of a safety account of knowledge, non-maximalists can fully answer Jago's challenge.
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Publisher
Place of Publication
Type
Journal article
Date
2014-12
Language
ISBN
Identifiers
10.1002/tht3.144