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Alternative possibilities and causal overdetermination

Title / Series / Name
Publication Volume
Publication Issue
Pages
Editors
Keywords
Abilities
Freedom
Overdetermination
Possibilities
Preemption
Philosophy
URI
https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14018/27509
Abstract
This paper argues against dismissing the Principle of Alternative Possibilities merely on the ground of so-called Frankfurt-style cases. Its main claims are that the interpretation of such cases depends on which substantive theory of responsibility one endorses and that Frankfurt-style cases all involve some form of causal overdetermination which can be interpreted either as being compatible with the potentially manipulated agent’s ability to act otherwise or as a responsibility undermining constraint. The paper also argues that the possibility of such scenarios can support the truth of classical compatibilism as much as the truth of semicompatibilism.
Topic
Publisher
Place of Publication
Type
Journal article
Date
2017
Language
ISBN
Identifiers
10.1515/disp-2017-0004
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