On the Explanation of Intentionality
Crane, Tim
Crane, Tim
Title / Series / Name
Publication Volume
8
Publication Issue
1
Pages
Author
Editors
Keywords
URI
https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14018/29054
Abstract
It is a widespread assumption in contemporary philosophy of mind that a naturalistic explanation of intentionality must answer to what I will call the ‘question of aboutness’: what makes it the case that any intentional mental state is about something? Furthermore, it is assumed that an adequate answer to this question must not employ any intentional notions, and that it should apply in broadly the same way to all the various kinds of intentional phenomena (perception, desire, intention etc). The aim of this paper is to dispute this popular conception of what a naturalistic explanation of intentionality must involve. Not only does the question of aboutness lack a general motivation, but the accompanying assumptions are not compulsory for a naturalistic explanation. The outlines of an alternative naturalistic picture are sketched.
Topic
Publisher
Place of Publication
Type
Journal article
Date
2024
Language
ISBN
Identifiers
10.1080/24740500.2024.2485164