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Deflationism and truthmaking
Title / Series / Name
Publication Volume
Publication Issue
Pages
Authors
Editors
Keywords
Deflationism
Metaphysics
Truth
Truthmakers
Truthmaking
Philosophy
General Social Sciences
Metaphysics
Truth
Truthmakers
Truthmaking
Philosophy
General Social Sciences
URI
https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14018/27605
Abstract
This paper is about the relationship between truthmaking—one of the pillars of contemporary metaphysics—and deflationism about truth—one of the main contenders in the debate about truth, and a key component of the broad anti-metaphysical philosophical approach known as (contemporary) pragmatism. Many philosophers have argued that deflationism and truthmaking are incompatible or in conflict in some interesting way. Some take this to count against deflationism, others to count against truthmaking. In this paper I argue that deflationism and truthmaking are compatible in most of the ways in which they are commonly thought to be incompatible. Deflationism does not render truthmaking unintelligible, avoidable, unmotivated, or trivial. While deflationism is incompatible with certain ideas within mainstream truthmaking, I argue that these ideas result from merely optional assumptions and principles commonly accepted by mainstream truthmaker theorists.
Topic
Publisher
Place of Publication
Type
Journal article
Date
2021-04
Language
ISBN
Identifiers
10.1007/s11229-019-02273-y