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Infants' representations of michottean triggering events
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Keywords
Causal cognition
Causal perception
Cognitive development
Event perception
Intuitive physics
Experimental and Cognitive Psychology
Language and Linguistics
Developmental and Educational Psychology
Linguistics and Language
Cognitive Neuroscience
Causal perception
Cognitive development
Event perception
Intuitive physics
Experimental and Cognitive Psychology
Language and Linguistics
Developmental and Educational Psychology
Linguistics and Language
Cognitive Neuroscience
URI
https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14018/27323
Abstract
The classic Michottean ‘launching’ event is consistent with a real-world Newtonian elastic collision. Previous research has shown that adult humans distinguish launching events that obey some of the physical constraints on Newtonian elastic collisions from events that do not do so early in visual processing, and that infants do so early in development (< 9 months of age). These include that in a launching event, the speed of the agent can be 3 times faster (or more) than that of the patient but the speed of the patient cannot be detectably greater than the speed of the agent. Experiment 1 shows that 7–8-month-old infants also distinguish canonical launching events from events in which the motion of the patient is rotated 90° from the trajectory of the motion of the agent (another outcome ruled out by the physics of elastic collisions). Violations of both the relative speed and the angle constraints create Michottean ‘triggering’ events, in which adults describe the motion of the patient as autonomous but not spontaneous, i.e., still initiated by contact with the causal agent. Experiments 2 and 3 begin to explore whether infants of this age construe Michottean triggering events as causal. We find that infants of this age are not sensitive to a reversal of the agent and patient in triggering events, thus failing to exhibit one of the signatures of representing an event as causal. We argue that there are likely several independent events schemas with causal content represented by young infants, and the literature on the origins of causal cognition in infancy would benefit from systematic investigations of event schemas other than launching events.
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Journal article
Date
2024-09-01
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ISBN
Identifiers
10.1016/j.cognition.2024.105844