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dc.contributor.authorFarkas, Katalin
dc.date.available2022-03-24T21:14:04Z
dc.date.issued2008
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s11229-006-9116-y
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14018/1733
dc.description.abstractA theory of time is a theory of the nature of temporal reality, and temporal reality determines the truth-value of temporal sentences. Therefore it is reasonable to ask how a theory of time can account for the way the truth of temporal sentences is determined. This poses certain challenges for both the A theory and the B theory of time. In this paper, I outline an account of temporal sentences. The key feature of the account is that the primary bearers of truth-values are not utterances, but sentences evaluated with respect to a time. I argue that unlike other views, the present proposal can meet the challenges faced both by the A and the B theory.
dc.description.urihttp://springer.om.hu/content/f454015713310856/fulltext.pdf
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherSpringer
dc.titleTime, tense, truth
dc.typeJournal article
dc.source.journaltitleSynthese
dc.source.volume160
dc.source.issue2
dc.source.spage296
dc.source.epage284
refterms.dateFOA2022-03-24T21:14:04Z
dc.publisher.placeDordrecht
dc.contributor.unitDepartment of Philosophy
dc.identifier.urlhttps://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11229-006-9116-y


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