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Authors
Farkas, KatalinPublisher
SpringerPlace of Publication
DordrechtType
Journal articleTitle / Series / Name
SynthesePublication Volume
160Publication Issue
2Date
2008
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Show full item recordAbstract
A theory of time is a theory of the nature of temporal reality, and temporal reality determines the truth-value of temporal sentences. Therefore it is reasonable to ask how a theory of time can account for the way the truth of temporal sentences is determined. This poses certain challenges for both the A theory and the B theory of time. In this paper, I outline an account of temporal sentences. The key feature of the account is that the primary bearers of truth-values are not utterances, but sentences evaluated with respect to a time. I argue that unlike other views, the present proposal can meet the challenges faced both by the A and the B theory.Publisher link
http://springer.om.hu/content/f454015713310856/fulltext.pdfidentifiers
10.1007/s11229-006-9116-yae974a485f413a2113503eed53cd6c53
10.1007/s11229-006-9116-y
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