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dc.contributor.authorMason, Cathy
dc.date.accessioned2023-06-16T14:43:23Z
dc.date.available2023-06-16T14:43:23Z
dc.date.issued2023
dc.identifier.issn1747-9991, 1747-9991
dc.identifier.doi10.1111/phc3.12896
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14018/13931
dc.description.abstractMost of us are partial to our friends and loved ones: we treat them with special care, and we feel justified in doing so. In recent years, the idea that good friends are also epistemically partial to one another has been popular. Being a good friend, so-called epistemic partialists suggest, involves being positively biased towards one's friends – that is, involves thinking more highly of them than is warranted by the evidence. In this paper, I outline the concept of epistemic partiality and its relation to non-epistemic partiality and explore some considerations that speak in favour of and against such partialism in friendships. I finish by suggesting some directions in which this debate could go next.
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherWiley
dc.rightsCC BY-NC-ND 4.0
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
dc.titleEpistemic Partialism
dc.typeJournal article
dc.source.journaltitlePhilosophy Compass
dc.source.volume18
dc.source.issue2
dc.source.spage1
dc.source.epage10
dc.description.versionPublished version
refterms.dateFOA2023-06-16T14:43:23Z
dc.contributor.unitDepartment of Philosophy
dc.source.journalabbrevPhilosophy Compass
dc.identifier.urlhttps://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/phc3.12896


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Except where otherwise noted, this item's license is described as CC BY-NC-ND 4.0