The misuse of the legislative process as part of the illiberal toolkit. The case of Hungary
Average rating
Cast your vote
You can rate an item by clicking the amount of stars they wish to award to this item.
When enough users have cast their vote on this item, the average rating will also be shown.
Star rating
Your vote was cast
Thank you for your feedback
Thank you for your feedback
Authors
Kazai, Viktor ZoltánPublisher
Taylor & FrancisType
Journal articleTitle / Series / Name
The Theory and Practice of LegislationPublication Volume
9Publication Issue
3Date
2021
Metadata
Show full item recordAbstract
The Fidesz-KDNP coalition parties were voted into office in 2010 with a two-thirds majority in the unicameral National Assembly, which gave them significant leeway to implement their political agenda smoothly. Nevertheless, the governing coalition, driven by revolutionary zeal, was determined to put in place major legislative reforms as quickly as possible in the face of every opposition. This attitude led to the instrumentalization of parliamentary legislation which manifested itself in an increasing number of serious irregularities of the legislative process. This article argues that the procedural flaws of parliamentary law-making constitute an infringement of the rule of law principle as it is interpreted in the Council of Europe and the European Union. In order to show that the situation is much more serious in Hungary than the criticisms voiced by the European rule of law mechanisms suggest, we analyze all the constitutional review cases in which legislative acts were challenged on procedural grounds after 2010. Finally, we discuss the outcome of the cases adjudicated by the Hungarian Constitutional Court to see which irregularities were found unconstitutional.identifiers
10.1080/20508840.2021.1942366ae974a485f413a2113503eed53cd6c53
10.1080/20508840.2021.1942366
Scopus Count
Collections