Average rating
Cast your vote
You can rate an item by clicking the amount of stars they wish to award to this item.
When enough users have cast their vote on this item, the average rating will also be shown.
Star rating
Your vote was cast
Thank you for your feedback
Thank you for your feedback
Authors
Farkas, KatalinPublisher
Oxford University PressType
Journal articleTitle / Series / Name
Aristotelian Society Supplementary VolumePublication Volume
97Publication Issue
1Date
2023
Metadata
Show full item recordAbstract
On a Cartesian conception of the mind, I could be a solitary being and still have the same mental states as I currently have. This paper asks how the lives of other people fit into this conception. I investigate the second-person perspective—thinking of others as ‘you’ while engaging in reciprocal communicative interactions with them—and argue that it is neither epistemically nor metaphysically distinctive. I also argue that the Cartesian picture explains why other people are special: because they matter not just for the effect that they have on us.identifiers
10.1093/arisup/akad009ae974a485f413a2113503eed53cd6c53
10.1093/arisup/akad009
Scopus Count
Collections