Now showing items 1-20 of 62

    • Murdoch's ontological argument

      Mason, Cathy; Dougherty, Matt (Wiley, 2022)
      Anselm's ontological argument is an argument for the existence of God. This paper presents Iris Murdoch's ontological argument for the existence of the Good. It discusses her interpretation of Anselm's argument, her own distinctive appropriation of it, as well as some of the merits of her version of the argument. In doing so, it also shows how the argument integrates some key Murdochian ideas: morality's wide scope, the basicness of vision to morality, moral realism, and Platonism.
    • Medically Unnecessary Genital Cutting and the Rights of the Child: Moving Toward Consensus

      The Brussels Collaboration on Bodily Integrity; Ben-Yami, Hanoch (Informa UK Limited, 2019)
    • Fictional Characters and Their Names

      Ben-Yami, Hanoch (Polskie Towarzystwo Semiotyczne, 2022)
      Fictional characters do not really exist. Names of fictional characters refer to fictional characters. We should divorce the idea of reference from that of existence (the picture of the name as a tag has limited applications; the Predicate Calculus, with its existential quantifier, does not adequately reflect the relevant concepts in natural lan-guage; and model theory, with its domains, might also have been misleading). Many puzzle-cases are resolved this way (among other things, there is no problem assigning negative existential statements the appropriate truth values). And fictional characters, although not existing, have real powers through their representations, which are real.
    • The Quantified Argument Calculus and Natural Logic

      Ben-Yami, Hanoch (Verein, 2022)
      The formalisation of natural language arguments in a formal language close to it in syntax has been a central aim of Moss's Natural Logic. I examine how the Quantified Argument Calculus (Quarc) can handle the inferences Moss has considered. I show that they can be incorporated in existing versions of Quarc or in straightforward extensions of it, all within sound and complete systems. Moreover, Quarc is closer in some respects to natural language than are Moss's systems - for instance, it does not use negative nouns. The process also sheds light on formal properties and presuppositions of some inferences it formalises. Directions for future work are outlined.
    • Aristotle returns

      Crane, Tim; Department of Philosophy (Institute on Religion and Public Life, 2018)
      Review of the book: Neo-Aristotelian Perspectives on Contemporary Science, ed. by William M. R. Simpson, Robert C. Koons, and Nicholas J. Teh, Routledge, 352 pages, $140
    • The problem of perception

      Crane, Tim; French, Craig; Zalta, Edward N.; Department of Philosophy (Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2021)
      The Problem of Perception is a pervasive and traditional problem aboutour ordinary conception of perceptual experience. The problem iscreated by the phenomena of perceptual illusion and hallucination: ifthese kinds of error are possible, how can perceptual experience bewhat we ordinarily understand it to be: something that enables directperception of the world? These possibilities of error challenge theintelligibility of our ordinary conception of perceptual experience;the major theories of experience are responses to this challenge.
    • Religion in the Open Society

      Crane, Tim; Ignatieff, Michael; Roch, Stefan; Department of Philosophy (CEU PressNew York; Budapest, 2018)
    • The knowledge argument is an argument about knowledge

      Crane, Tim; Coleman, Sam; Department of Philosophy (Cambridge University PressCambridge, 2019)
      The knowledge argument is something that is both an ideal for philosophy and yet surprisingly rare: a simple, valid argument for an interesting and important conclusion, with plausible premises. From a compelling thought experiment and a few apparently innocuous assumptions, the argument seems to give us the conclusion, a priori, that physicalism is false. Given the apparent power of this apparently simple argument, it is not surprising that philosophers have worried over the argument and its proper diagnosis: physicalists have disputed its validity, or soundness or both; in response, non-physicalists have attempted to reformulate the argument to show its real anti-physicalist lesson.
    • "Taking Simulation Seriously": Tim Crane reviews Reality+ by David Chalmers

      Crane, Tim; Department of Philosophy (Philosophical Society of England, 2022)
      Review of the book "Reality+: Virtual Worlds and the Problems of Philosophy" by David Chalmers published by Allen Lane
    • The significance of the many property problem

      Crane, Tim; Grzankowski, Alex; Department of Philosophy (Rosenberg and Sellier, 2022)
      One of the most influential traditional objections to Adverbialism about perceptual experience is that posed by Frank Jackson’s ‘many property problem’. Perhaps largely because of this objection, few philosophers now defend Adverbialism. We argue, however, that the essence of the many property problem arises for all of the leading metaphysical theories of experience: all leading theories must simply take for granted certain facts about experience, and no theory looks well positioned to explain the facts in a straightforward way. Because of this, the many property problem isn’t on its own a good reason for rejecting Adverbialism; and nor is it a puzzle that will decide amongst the other leading theories.
    • Thinking about Things

      Crane, Tim; Department of Philosophy (University of Notre Dame, 2019)
      Review of the book: Mark Sainsbury, Thinking about Things, Oxford University Press, 2018, 199pp., $45.00 (hbk), ISBN 9780198803348
    • Secularism as a liberal ideal

      Crane, Tim; Department of Philosophy (La Société Tocqueville, 2018)
      Review of the book "Sex and Secularism" by Joan Wallach Scott
    • The Quantified Argument Calculus with Two- and Three-valued Truth-valuational Semantics

      Yin, Hongkai; Ben-Yami, Hanoch; Department of Philosophy (Springer, 2023)
      We introduce a two-valued and a three-valued truth-valuational substitutional semantics for the Quantified Argument Calculus (Quarc). We then prove that the 2-valid arguments are identical to the 3-valid ones with strict-to-tolerant validity. Next, we introduce a Lemmon-style Natural Deduction system and prove the completeness of Quarc on both two- and three-valued versions, adapting Lindenbaum’s Lemma to truth-valuational semantics. We proceed to investigate the relations of three-valued Quarc and the Predicate Calculus (PC). Adding a logical predicate T to Quarc, true of all singular arguments, allows us to represent PC quantification in Quarc and translate PC into Quarc, preserving validity. Introducing a weak existential quantifier into PC allows us to translate Quarc into PC, also preserving validity. However, unlike the translated systems, neither extended system can have a sound and complete proof system with Cut, supporting the claim that these are basically different calculi.
    • Let the ruler be the ruler: aiming at truth in Xunzi’s doctrine of the rectification of names

      Ryan, Liam D.; Department of Philosophy (Springer, 2022)
      How should we understand the Confucian doctrine of the rectification of names (zhengming): what does it mean that an object’s name must be in accordance with its reality, and why does it matter? The aim of this paper is to answer this question by advocating a novel interpretation of the later Confucian, Xunzi’s account of the doctrine. Xunzi claims that sage-kings ascribe names and values to objects by convention, and since they are sages, they know the truth. When we misuse names, we are departing from a sagely convention of naming. As sagely convention determines moral truth, departure from the linguistic convention of the sages is a departure from moral truth. On my interpretation of Xunzi, the rectification of names is not a doctrine about what is true, but a doctrine about how we aim at truth. We are aiming at descriptive truth when our language conforms to the correct name of an object according to what I call ‘Confucian conventionalism’. When we correctly aim at descriptive truth we can aim at moral truth. Therefore, I claim that the doctrine of the rectification of names is concerned with discerning the literal accordance of language with an object (what is descriptively, linguistically true), to determine what is normatively, or morally, true. According to Xunzi, moral truth is grounded in linguistic truth.
    • The metaphysical burden of Millianism

      Mahant, Nikhil; Department of Philosophy (Springer, 2022)
      The Millian semantic view of names relies on a metaphysical view of names—often given the label ‘common currency conception’ (‘CCC’)—on which the names of distinct individuals count as distinct names. While even defenders of the Millian view admit that the CCC ‘does not agree with the most common usage’ (Kripke in Naming & Necessity, Harvard University Press, 1980), I will argue further that the CCC makes names exceptional amongst the class of linguistic expressions: if the CCC is correct, then names must have a sui-generis metaphysical nature, distinct from the metaphysics of every other kind of linguistic expression. Such metaphysical exceptionalism would be justified if the Millian view had a clear, uncontested theoretical advantage over its rivals. However, in the context of a semantic debate about names in which the closest competitors of the Millian view—the Predicate view and Indexicalism—do not result in such exceptionalism, it counts as a strike against the Millian view.
    • Epistemic Partialism

      Mason, Cathy; Department of Philosophy (Wiley, 2023)
      Most of us are partial to our friends and loved ones: we treat them with special care, and we feel justified in doing so. In recent years, the idea that good friends are also epistemically partial to one another has been popular. Being a good friend, so-called epistemic partialists suggest, involves being positively biased towards one's friends – that is, involves thinking more highly of them than is warranted by the evidence. In this paper, I outline the concept of epistemic partiality and its relation to non-epistemic partiality and explore some considerations that speak in favour of and against such partialism in friendships. I finish by suggesting some directions in which this debate could go next.
    • Revolution Against Non-violent Oppression

      Kapelner, Zsolt; Department of Philosophy (Springer, 2019)
      Oppressive governments that use violence against citizens, e.g. murder and torture, are usually thought of as liable to armed revolutionary attack by the oppressed population. But oppression may be non-violent. A government may greatly restrict political rights and personal autonomy by using surveillance, propaganda, manipulation, strategic detention and similar techniques without ever resorting to overt violence. Can such regimes be liable to revolutionary attack? A widespread view is that the answer is ‘no’. On this view, unless a government is or is likely to turn violent, revolution against it is disproportional. After all, revolution would involve launching potentially lethal attacks against oppressors who do not threaten the lives and bodily integrity of their subjects but pose only lesser threats. I argue that this claim of disproportionality is false. Armed revolution against Stably Non-violent Oppressive Regimes (which are neither violent, nor are likely to become violent) can be proportional under some circumstances, thus they may be liable to revolutionary attack. My argument relies on the Responsibility-Sensitive Account of Proportionality. This account holds that responsibility for posing threats renders agents liable to greater defensive harms than the harms with which they threaten. Even if non-violent oppressive regimes do not threaten citizens with murder, serious physical injury, or enslavement, their responsibility for creating an environment in which citizens’ political rights and personal autonomy are extremely restricted may loosen the proportionality requirement of inflicting defensive harm and render them liable to revolutionary attack.
    • Physical Determinism, Zygote-Manipulation and Responsible Agency

      Huoranszki, Ferenc; Department of Philosophy (Springer, 2021)
      Agents have no control over the formation of their own zygote. Others may do. According to a well-known argument, the so-called Zygote Argument for incompatibilism, these facts, together with a prima facie plausible further assumption, are sufficient to prove that human agents cannot be responsible for their actions if they live in a deterministic universe. This paper argues that the lack of agents’ control over the constitution of their own zygote can undermine their responsibility only in exceptional conditions and that the occurrence or non-occurrence of those conditions has nothing to do with the truth or falsity of determinism. What undermines agents’ responsibility in the situations described by the Zygote Argument is the occurrence of some specific initial conditions which may render the manipulation of agents’ behaviour possible, and not the truth of determinism.
    • The Lives of Others

      Farkas, Katalin; Department of Philosophy (Oxford University Press, 2023)
      On a Cartesian conception of the mind, I could be a solitary being and still have the same mental states as I currently have. This paper asks how the lives of other people fit into this conception. I investigate the second-person perspective—thinking of others as ‘you’ while engaging in reciprocal communicative interactions with them—and argue that it is neither epistemically nor metaphysically distinctive. I also argue that the Cartesian picture explains why other people are special: because they matter not just for the effect that they have on us.