Interdisciplinarity in philosophy of science
Type
Journal articleTitle / Series / Name
Journal for General Philosophy of SciencePublication Volume
45Date
2014Metadata
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This paper examines various ways in which philosophy of science can be interdisciplinary. It aims to provide a map of relations between philosophy and sciences, some of which are interdisciplinary. Such a map should also inform discussions concerning the question “How much Philosophy in the Philosophy of Science?” In Part 1, we distinguish between synoptic and collaborative interdisciplinarity. With respect to the latter, we furthermore distinguish two kinds of reflective forms of collaborative interdisciplinarity. We briefly explicate how complexity triggers interdisciplinarity. In Part 2, we apply these distinctions to philosophy of science and analyze in which sense different styles of philosophy of science are interdisciplinary. The styles that we discuss are a synoptic-general, a reflective-general, a reflective-particular, a particular-embedded, and a descriptive or normative style.Publisher link
http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10838-014-9269-1identifiers
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10838-014-9269-1Scopus Count
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