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Authors
Farkas, KatalinType
Journal articleTitle / Series / Name
NoûsPublication Volume
51Publication Issue
4Date
2017
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Show full item recordAbstract
The central and paradigmatic cases of knowledge discussed in philosophy involve the possession of truth. Is there in addition a distinct type of practical knowledge, which does not aim at the truth? This question is often approached through asking whether states attributed by “know-how” locutions are distinct from states attributed by “know-that”. This paper argues that the question of practical knowledge can be raised not only about some cases of “know-how” attributions, but also about some cases of so-called “know-wh” attributions; and that certain features of this practical knowledge-wh put pressure on the standard analysis of know-wh.identifiers
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/nous.12152ae974a485f413a2113503eed53cd6c53
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/nous.12152
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