The Court of Justice’s dilemma: Between ‘more Europe’ and ‘constitutional mediation'

Abstract

The Court of Justice of the EU is commonly presented as a powerful supranational engine and the unfailing hero of a liberal and federal Europe. The Court is thus an unlikely supporter of ‘new intergovernmentalism’. This chapter, through a selective analysis of the Court’s case law, judicial opinions, academic commentaries, and official statements in the post-Maastricht period, makes three key points. First, the Court does not systematically pursue a particular idea of Europe, but displays a marked preference for ‘more Europe’, whatever it takes. Second, the Court, although it has expanded its judicial control over intergovernmental processes, is at the same time deferential towards the specificities of these mechanisms, except where serious interferences with fundamental rights are involved. Third, the Court is overall supportive of the creation and empowerment of de novo bodies, even where these display intergovernmental features, except where its own judicial authority is threatened.