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dc.contributor.authorFarkas, Katalin
dc.date.available2022-03-29T08:59:47Z
dc.date.issued2015
dc.identifier.issn0165-0106
dc.identifier.doihttp://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10670-014-9620-2
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14018/10539
dc.description.abstractMost discussions in epistemology assume that believing that p is a necessary condition for knowing that p. In this paper, I will present some considerations that put this view into doubt. The candidate cases for knowledge without belief are the kind of cases that are usually used to argue for the so-called 'extended mind' thesis.
dc.language.isoeng
dc.subjectExtended mind
dc.subjectAnalysis of knowledge
dc.subjectExtended cognition
dc.subjectKnowledge first
dc.titleBelief may not be a necessary condition for knowledge
dc.typeJournal article
dc.source.journaltitleErkenntnis
dc.source.volume80
dc.source.spage185
dc.source.epage200
refterms.dateFOA2022-03-29T08:59:47Z
dc.contributor.unitDepartment of Philosophy


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