Average rating
Cast your vote
You can rate an item by clicking the amount of stars they wish to award to this item.
When enough users have cast their vote on this item, the average rating will also be shown.
Star rating
Your vote was cast
Thank you for your feedback
Thank you for your feedback
Authors
Farkas, KatalinType
Journal articleTitle / Series / Name
ErkenntnisPublication Volume
80Date
2015
Metadata
Show full item recordAbstract
Most discussions in epistemology assume that believing that p is a necessary condition for knowing that p. In this paper, I will present some considerations that put this view into doubt. The candidate cases for knowledge without belief are the kind of cases that are usually used to argue for the so-called 'extended mind' thesis.identifiers
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10670-014-9620-2ae974a485f413a2113503eed53cd6c53
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10670-014-9620-2
Scopus Count
Collections