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Practical know-wh
Editors
Title / Series / Name
Noûs
Publication Volume
51
Publication Issue
4
Pages
Authors
Editors
Keywords
URI
http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14018/12986
Abstract
The central and paradigmatic cases of knowledge discussed in philosophy involve the possession of truth. Is there in addition a distinct type of practical knowledge, which does not aim at the truth? This question is often approached through asking whether states attributed by “know-how” locutions are distinct from states attributed by “know-that”. This paper argues that the question of practical knowledge can be raised not only about some cases of “know-how” attributions, but also about some cases of so-called “know-wh” attributions; and that certain features of this practical knowledge-wh put pressure on the standard analysis of know-wh.
Topic
Publisher
Place of Publication
Type
Journal article
Date
2017
Language
ISBN
Identifiers
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/nous.12152