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Publication

Belief may not be a necessary condition for knowledge

Editors
Title / Series / Name
Erkenntnis
Publication Volume
80
Publication Issue
Pages
Editors
Keywords
Extended mind
Analysis of knowledge
Extended cognition
Knowledge first
URI
http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14018/10539
Abstract
Most discussions in epistemology assume that believing that p is a necessary condition for knowing that p. In this paper, I will present some considerations that put this view into doubt. The candidate cases for knowledge without belief are the kind of cases that are usually used to argue for the so-called 'extended mind' thesis.
Topic
Publisher
Place of Publication
Type
Journal article
Date
2015
Language
ISBN
Identifiers
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10670-014-9620-2
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