KAMILA STULLEROVA

# Understanding Xenophobia in Eastern Europe

*Workshop organized by the Center for Policy Studies, CEU*
*and the Humanities Center, CEU*
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# FIRST DAY OF THE WORKSHOP (FRIDAY, JUNE 21)

## Welcome address

**Yehuda Elkana** (President and Rector of the CEU)

In his welcome address **Yehuda Elkana** greeted the workshop's participants to the CEU and offered several reasons why he believes the issue of xenophobia demands both theoretical attention and policy recommendations from academic fora such as one. Rector Elkana rejected the commonly held view that ancient stories lie behind xenophobia, offering his support to the workshop's intention to study xenophobia in the context of diverse contemporary social issues, disentangling politics from history. In Elkana's words, xenophobia is not a historical question, it is a normative issue. Since any social interaction is a kind of manipulation, we should agree on morally acceptable manipulations/ interactions, within which the only things that really matter are the lives of people.

Violetta Zentai, one of the CEU's organizers and the chair of both Friday and Saturday panels, joined Elkana in emphasizing the organizers' aim of discussing xenophobia as a current issue within a larger social setting, after which she opened up the workshop.

## Panel One: Xenophobia, Concepts and Laws

### Paper: Wilhelm Heitmeyer (Institute for Interdisciplinary Research for Conflict and Violence, University of Bielefeld), "Group Focused Enmity and Processes of Social Disintegration"

**Wilhelm Heitmeyer**'s paper was based on sociological research carried out in Germany. Heitmeyer's team intends to apply the methodology to other European countries, their premise being that xenophobia is a societal issue and therefore, research should not focus exclusively on xenophobia as enmity towards ethnic minorities. The recent upsurge in right-wing populism is targeted not only at ethnic groups and minorities but also at several other socially marginal groups—the unemployed, welfare recipients, immigrants, homosexuals, homeless people, handicapped people, etc. Heitmeyer accounted for this trend by in terms of larger social phenomena, most importantly, what he termed the 'ideology of inequality'. As the most fundamental value of Western society, the principle of the equality of all people is losing ground; those found to be 'other' are misrecognized and rejected by mainstream society. Heitmeyer identified a syndrome of 'group focused enmity,' something which is not restricted to a minor social segment of right-wing extremists, but is part of a much larger phenomenon. The syndrome consists of several components, including racism, anti-Semitism, xenophobia, homophobia and worries about losing established (social and cultural) privileges. Certain social groups are only susceptible to particular aspects of the enmity syndrome, which again supports the thesis that this trend is not confined to groups of right-wing extremists.

To explain the dynamics of this phenomenon, Heitmeyer began by pointing out the level of integration in society –both in technical and institutional terms as well as in terms of social position and status. Heitmeyer stressed the importance of including not only the objective level, but also the subjective one. The latter deals with how an individual views her own position in and recognition by society. Disintegration, which the speaker identified as the environment in which the ideology of

inequality grows, is characterized by a lack of partial or durable exclusion, the destabilization of life contexts, emotional rejection and a lack of recognition. In this way, Heitmeyer showed how enmity towards various groups at the margins of society is a complex issue related to the quality of integration and personal recognition in a given society. The realm where interventions can be made to affect this trend is therefore much larger and more complex, including both the societal and the individual level. Moreover, in his concluding remarks Heitmeyer expressed several concerns about the future. The era of global capitalism does not enhance social integration and recognition, on the contrary, it brings with it disintegration.

*Paper: Boris Tsilevich (MINELRES, Riga), "Many Faces of the Monster"*

Being a politician and an NGO activist, **Boris Tsilevich** approached the issue of xenophobia from a practitioner's point of view. He rejected the narrow explanation of xenophobia as a response to growing competition for scarce economic and social resources. To analyze xenophobia, here understood as the non-acceptance of 'otherness', he offered two models for analysis—the 'bottom-up', emphasizing spontaneous xenophobic tendencies in society, and the 'top-down', stressing the role of elites in shaping popular attitudes. Tsilevich examined the advantages and limits of both models, concluding that in order to understand the fragmentation of what he called the anti-xenophobic paradigm, we need to employ both models. The restoration of the anti-xenophobic paradigm should be a central focus of attention, particularly because, this fragmentation was especially devastating in the eastern part of Europe and in the countries of former Soviet Union. One crucial cause of fragmentation lies in the set of values adopted after the fall of the Communist ideology. While in the West the triangle of fundamental social values consists of stability, democracy and diversity, in the former Communist bloc it is diversity which tends to be seen as an inevitable evil or a 'bypass product" of democracy at best. It is not seen as a fundamental value itself. However, as Tsilevich emphasized, xenophobia is not only an issue for the 'East'; EU member countries are witnessing a growth of xenophobic slogans in their electoral campaigns. In recognition, Tsilevich called the development 'a global virus' of xenophobia.

With respect to policies designed to reduce xenophobia, based on his own experience in Latvian minority politics Tsilevich's recommended , innovative approaches. This was because usual anti-xenophobic legal and political instruments, known under the name political correctness (PC), have produced some negative outcomes. Not only do extremist parties deny the validity of PC, politically correct rules of conduct constitute complex social issues simply as matters of form. As their sole aim is the non-discrimination of certain groups, they do not restore the whole anti-xenophobic paradigm, within which diversity is seen as an irreplaceable value. In this regard, Tsilevich identified several serious shortcomings of the international legal system. These stretch back as far as the minority treaties regime of the inter-war period, during which time the victorious powers were not placed under the same regime as the newly established countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Subsequently, minority rights have not gained effective international legal support in terms of language and cultural rights, as well as in access to citizenship—an issue that has severely affected the life of Russian minorities in the post-Soviet Baltic states. In the Latvian case according to Tsilevich, the international legal order has in fact assisted Latvia in its pursuit of xenophobic treatment of the Russian minority. The country's legislative framework meets the formal criteria of democracy, but the liberal democratic discourse coexists with xenophobic ethnocentrism and ethnic protectionism.

In response to Heitmeyer's paper, Tsilevich challenged the former speaker's claim that xenophobia is tied to right-wing populism and asserted that, at least in the former Soviet Union,

xenophobia and ethnocentrism is an issue of the far left as well. In this sense the dichotomy right/left has proven to be obsolete.

*Paper: Judit Tóth (Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest), "Discrimination in public administration—Is it the source or the evidence of xenophobia in Hungary?"*

**Judit Tóth** began her presentation by claiming that in the post-Communist world, international legal commitments are irrelevant for politicians and political culture. She demonstrated this claim on the basis of a study of Hungarian law and legal practice, highlighting the tension between Hungary's subscription to democratic commitments and the actual discriminatory treatment of clients by legal and public officials. She maintained that clients are not sufficiently protected from discrimination. In this regard, Tóth extended the focus from xenophobia to discrimination, a much larger category. The reason for such an extension is because there is a codified definition of discrimination in law, which can be used as a measure in studies like this. Relying on Hungary's signature to various international commitments to eliminate discrimination in dealing with its citizens, Tóth identified several areas where commitments are un met, insufficiently kept and/or demand radical change and improvement.

First, Tóth presented areas in which Hungary lacks sufficient legal instruments to protect its citizens against discrimination. Here, she particularly emphasized the fact that when clients in public administration and law face discrimination, there is no legal consequence if the legal authority omitted to observe the constitutionally enshrined non-discrimination policy. Moreover, the burden of proof for establishing discrimination by a proceeding authority is on the shoulders of the client. Secondly, Tóth directed her attention to legal practice. She began by emphasizing the difficulties facing those who wish to analyze the whole area. At present, there is no publicly accessible register of judgments to follow the issue over a longer time period. In terms of everyday contacts of clients with the authorities, especially in smaller settlements, clients face a practical, but very serious problem: if they are discriminated by one official there is usually no other to turn to. One other area Tóth directed attention to was the question of the Roma minority. In this respect she presented several very disturbing facts and figures, such as the enormously high number of Hungarian Roma who have been granted refugee status by the Canadian immigration authorities. This supports Toth's main claim that Hungary has a long road to travel before it can say it has fulfill its international commitments. An additional feature of Toth's presentation, although perhaps not as explicit as within Tsilevich's, was a critical tone towards the utility of international legal instruments in combating xenophobia and discrimination.

*Discussion Papers*

**Vera Messing** (free-lance sociologist) and **Andrea Krizsán** (Center for Policy Studies, CEU), two young Hungarian social scientists, complemented the three papers with two specific studies. Messing presented her research on monitoring the Hungarian media, while Krizsán's research focused on the institution of the Minority Ombudsman in Hungary. Krizsán made a larger methodological argument concerning the study of antidiscrimination, producing a normative argument which defended the legitimacy and importance of specialized anti-discriminatory bodies.

Messing's presentation complemented several of Tóth's arguments, especially those related to the Roma minority in Hungary. In the media, the broad conclusion of Messing's research was that the Roma are by far the most discriminated group. She identified three thematic areas in news programs, in which the Roma are presented in the media. The first one is politics; here the stereotype of a minority waiting for external help is maintained. In preference to Roma politicians, non-Roma

politicians are frequently presented as having policy plans towards the Roma. A second theme is poverty—the Roma are stereotyped as poor, and the third one is conflict—the Roma are represented as actors in conflicts and crime. In the latter area, Messing observed a substantial decrease in these representations within the last few years. Discrimination, nevertheless, continues and this is not only in the news. In popular entertainment programs, ethnic minorities are usually only featured in imported Western films, not in local Hungarian productions. Moreover, Messing foundthree openly racist programs or channels: the Pannon Rádio, the program Vasárnap Újság in the Hungarian public radio, and the news in Magyar Forum. Finally, the researcher suggested several policy steps how the media can become more minority-friendly, such as the integration of Roma journalists into the mainstream media as well as the introduction of a multicultural perspective into journalistic education.

**Andrea Krizsán** differentiated between several theories usually employed to explain discrimination. Though acknowledging the advantages and aspirations of each, she found the process-based approach and the result-based approach (further dividing into stigma theories and group-disadvantages theories) to be insufficient. Krizsán claimed that in order to address the full harm behind discrimination, an acceptable approach should incorporate elements of all three approaches embracing the level of social meaning (everyday racist beliefs), the level of racially significant practices (both among individuals and in institutions), and the level of racial identity distribution. Based on her research of specialized anti-discriminatory bodies in the West (in Western Europe, the USA, Australia and New Zealand), Krizsán claimed that such specialized bodies can fulfill the demands of harm reduction she had earlier identified. Such institutions can have (1) policymaking and legislative function, (2) enforcement function, as well as (3) promotional powers and educative function. Her written paper *(Minority Ombudsman and the Regulation of Racial Discrimination: The Hungarian Case)* offered also a study of the Hungarian office of the Minority Ombudsman, but in her oral contribution Krizsán confined herself to presenting the more general argument.

**Margit Feischmidt** from the University of Pécs summed up the points of convergence and tension within the first panel, identifying five areas for the workshop to discuss. (1) The difference in recommendations in the first two papers presented: Wilhelm Heitmeyer argued for enhanced social integration in order to prevent or diminish xenophobia, while Boris Tsilevich called for the politics of multiculturalism with special group rights, as elaborated for instance by the Canadian political theorist Will Kymlicka. (2) Feischmidt found Tsilevich's assertions that the anti-racist movement and the political correctness campaigns can reproduce xenophobia and that minority organizations are susceptible to cultural fundamentalism enormously challenging. She posed the question even more sharply, asking whether nationalism is a positive phenomenon when serving the aims of ethnic minorities. In this respect, she referred to Heitmeyer's paper recalling his claim that ethnic minority groups are hostile to other minorities and immigrants and added a finding from her own research: Transylvanian Hungarians living in Hungary are enormously racist towards the Chinese immigrants to Hungary. (3) Feischmidt further highlighted some of the differences between Eastern and Central Europe and the West, which seem to be in the extent of legal protection and the degree of codification of anti-discrimination laws. (4) She posed the question how social causes of xenophobia can be understood in relation to ideas and ideologies, recalling Tsilevich's claim that the dichotomy between right and left be abandoned. The last area (5) Feischmidt directed attention to was the level and the limits of anti-discriminatory legislation and the character of other public strategies (media, education). Here she isolated differences and tensions between single presentations. It can be added that, in this respect, Feischmidt succeeded in foreseeing the main point of discussion of Saturday's workshop.

The succeeding discussion introduced still more issues and arguments, among others a debate between Heitmeyer and Tsilevich regarding the issue of culturalism. While **Tsilevich** maintained the emphasis on multiculturalism, which is inevitably culturally essentialist, **Heitmeyer** stressed the dangers of cultural essentialism emphasizing that in order to offer opportunities and mechanisms of incorporation, society has to be neutral without overemphasizing cultural differences. **Tsilevich** replied that a neutral society risks the danger of assimilating weak and small minorities; the latter need to be protected by special multicultural laws. In his view only substantial equality is morally acceptable and neutral treatment does not necessarily secure this type of equality. Obviously, both contributors addressed the larger issue of multicultural politics and even though they did aspire to resolve this perhaps irresolvable debate, they demonstrated how the discussion of xenophobia, if taken in normative terms, is connected to some very serious moral and political issues. **Heitmeyer** recalled the case of Pim Fortuin in the Netherlands and the very special situation this controversial politician was addressing—a robust anti-discrimination law prevented Dutch society from discussing race and minority related issues, thereby producing a consensus of ignoring current problems. In this respect, **Heitmeyer** stressed the role of conflict in modern society—it is not common values that hold the society together, but the way the society can process conflicts. Further questions from the audience were directed at the three Hungarian discussants; these questions expressed mainly particular differences or, by contrast, similarities between various countries the workshop's participants were coming from.

The workshop participants visited the Open Society Archive's Exhibition at Galeria Centralis, *"Forced Bathing in Hungary (1940-1985). Shaving, Stripping, Public Humiliation: Disinfecting Gipsy Settlements during Socialism"*. Antropologist Júlia Károlyi responded to questions.

## Roundtable: Marketing Tolerance / Hogyan adjuk el a toleranciát? (in English and Hungarian language, simultaneous translation)

Posters from the campaigns discussed during the Roundtable, as well as from other anti-racist campaigns, were on show in the Aula of CEU.

**Imre Furmann** (Legal Defense Bureau for National and Ethnic Minorities, Budapest) chaired the afternoon roundtable to which Hungarian PR and advertisement agencies, police representatives and other professionals were invited in order to learn from realized campaigns of elimination or combating xenophobia. The roundtable offered the workshop participants as well as several other guests a unique opportunity to learn how a visual campaign against xenophobia in Germany was produced from inception to follow-up, and secondly, how London's Metropolitan Police Service established its Racial & Violent Crime Task Force. The third set of presentations covered two visual campaigns in Hungary—both directly or indirectly inspired and financed by the Soros Foundation in Budapest. In his opening remark, Furmann defended the roundtable's title—'Marketing Tolerance' - by claiming that we should sell tolerance and compete with other views on the marketplace of ideas. In this sense, Furman argued that tolerance can be learned.

**Uli Geiger** and **Oliver Handlos** from the German advertising agency Scholz & Friends, Berlin, presented their campaign against racism. The campaign was designed in cooperation with the initiative Germans Opposed to Right-Wing Violence, initiated by Cem Oezdemir, a member of German parliament, himself of Turkish ethnic origin. The campaign sought to disrupt the mental tie between Germany as belonging solely to ethnic Germans, by both challenging racist right-wing extremists as well as by addressing the larger society. Provocative pictures and messages were used with the explicit aim of raising awareness of the problem of xenophobia in Germany and to create the

acceptance of multicultural society. Geiger and Handlos, themselves professional copywriters working on commercial advertising campaigns, presented the whole anti-racist campaign in a form of bullet points, which could be taken and implemented in other environments as well. They emphasised the provocative content of the campaign—it should grasp people's attention by disturbing them. To reach this effect in their campaign they decided to use pictures of dark-skinned Germans wearing T-shirts typically worn by the neo-Nazis. The T-shirts bore the caption "I am proud to be a German." The creative execution utilized the signs and typography of the Third Reich, using Leni Riefensthal's photographic style and featuring 'real-life' volunteers rather than professional models. In this sense the campaign aimed to finger an aching point in German society. The photographs were then publicized as blow-up posters, billboards, postcards, ads in newspapers and magazines, etc.

An important part of the whole campaign was getting support from various potential donors and collaborators. Scholz & Friends did the whole campaign for free and they were looking for collaborators who could contribute by free labor or supplies. In this respect, the presentation taught the strategy of gaining non-financial support from potential collaborators and companies. The main message in this respect was that in campaigns like this one should forget the idea of collecting real money and look for sponsors who will donate free labor, material or advertising space. Geiger and Handlos also spoke about the effects of the campaign; about both positive and negative reactions they received. On the positive side they mentioned an explicit demand from the public to continue such activities—something which they have indeed done—and an enormous interest from the media to feature the photographs for free. On the negative side several incidents were recorded, such as a burnt-down billboard and telephone threats to one of the copywriters. Several negative letters from affected individual neo-Nazis and groups were received. Yet, the authors understood these as positive signals, signs that their campaign had indeed reached its recipients.

**Pál Nyíri** from the Hungarian Association for Migrants and the Central European University presented a similar, though smaller-scale campaign. He designed a sticker featuring two icons of Hungarian politics, Rákóczi and Kossuth, pictures of whom he complemented by photos of a young black man and an older, non-white man holding a small boy. This composition was intended to convey the message that all figures featured, whether famous or anonymous, ethnic Hungarians or not, were refugees and that there is no difference between them. As the author emphasized, five thousand of these stickers seemed to have had a very disturbing effect on Hungarian society, which is, according to Nyíri, a xenophobic society. Although no consequent follow-up research was done, from what has been reported by Nyíri's collaborators, most of the stickers posted on publicly accessible places did not survive until the next morning. In this respect, Nyíri expressed some very serious concerns about mainstream Hungarian public discourse towards immigrants, in which the latter are presented as undesired and potentially criminal.

**Anthony M. Bennett**, a detective inspector from the London Metropolitan Police Service's Racial & Violent Crime Force, made a presentation describing the impetus for the creation of the unit he is serving in. Using an illustrative video he showed the case of Stephen Lawrence, a black boy stabbed to death in the mid 1990s, which served as an impetus for the police to reorganize its operation and enhance the public trust in their institution. Bennett spoke openly that by the 1990s the police force in London was institutionally racist and that the Stephen Lawrence case was not only the tip of an iceberg, it was also a turning point. The police failed to deal with this murder properly and was accused of racism by Stephen's parents as well as other minority groups. The police took these accusations seriously forming the Racial & Violent Crime Task Force (RVCTF) in 1998. The task of this force is to tackle the issues and causes of hate crime. In order to eliminate institutional racism, the London Metropolitan Police adopted seventy recommendations, out of which thirty-nine were aimed directly at the police themselves. The rest were aimed at their clients, the citizens. Here the chief task

was to increase the trust of the black community in the police as an institution that shall protect them rather than harm them. The police designed ways to support the victims of hate crime, which can be divided into three groups, (1) race crime victims, (2) domestic violence victims, and (3) homophobic crime victims. The police launched campaigns to encourage these victims to report hate crimes to police and trained officers to listen to the communities. In addition they launched an advertising campaign in order to inform the larger public about their activities. The campaign's aim was to get the police into the media and to inform the larger public about the police's target areas. An operational evaluation showed that crime reporting in these areas rose dramatically (especially in the category of race crime). An advertising-tracking research showed a high level of awareness about the police's activities. Since its founding, the 'tear-drop' picture has become a well-known symbol of the Racial & Violent Crime Task Force.

**Péter Geszti**, a creative manager from ARC, a Hungarian advertising company, presented two projects his agency created, both of which fall under the category of anti-racist campaign. They were designed in broad terms with the aim of showing people as human beings who have a face. Therefore the most used medium was a photograph on a billboard. The first project, which has been in operation for some years already, is a low-cost campaign to which private people can send their photographs. A selection of these is processed and used in the campaign. The pictures feature people from villages, poor suburbs, the homeless, and very often the Roma—all with witty captions that should evoke a link between the people on the billboard and passers-by. The second, more recent campaign was a Soros Foundation Project, for which Geszti's agency won the contest. The aim was to mobilize people to go to the election polls in the recent Hungarian parliament elections. The campaign had an additional aim—to highlight the diversity of Hungarian society and make the minorities visible. Thus the series of billboards featured members of minorities, such as a group of physically challenged people, a Roma family, or a lesbian couple. On each billboard there was a caption which read: "We will go to the elections. And you?" As Geszti stressed, pictures are stronger than words and the campaign was very successful. Like other similar projects presented at the workshop, Geszti's agency did not have the resources to conduct follow-up research. Yet the response in media is a good indicator of general public response. In the Hungarian media, the greatest attention was given to the billboard featuring two naked hugging lesbians. Geszti admitted the agency also received two very negative responses from lesbian advocacy groups, claiming the billboard reinforces stereotypes among the larger society.

*Discussion*

The audience chiefly focused on the lack of follow-up research in the campaigns presented, questioning the actual results of such activities. **Geiger** and **Handlos** responded that in projects like this there is no money for result-tracking research, as this would cost more than the campaign itself. Moreover, they expressed doubt about the focus groups technique, usually used in such type of research and claimed the spontaneous responses they have received are a sufficient indicator of success. **Nyíri** and **Geszti** agreed, repeating that in campaigns like these, in which most of the work is done for free, one simply does not have resources to pay an agency to conduct result-tracking research. However, they did admit that such research would be desirable. Additional questions from the audience questioned the quality and impact of such campaigns, addressing Geiger, Handlos and Geszti. These campaigns are inevitably political and ideological, the objections went on, but the authors seemed to have been unaware of this. Geszti's answer did not satisfy one participant, as he was unable to answer why the campaign transmitted several stereotypes (of beautiful and sexy women, the lesbians) and why the authors did not consult with the minority representatives before shooting the

pictures. The German speakers responded that racism is a social issue not a political one, which makes it an agenda for everyone progressively thinking. To the question whether they think they managed to change the minds of the young neo-Nazis, they replied that a change of someone's mind was not their aim. They wanted simply to disturb some automatic mental representations and point out at the problem. **Bennett** confirmed that the Metropolitan Police has both a result-tracking research as well as language line, on which people get help and information in several of the languages minority groups in London speak.

## SECOND DAY OF THE WORKSHOP (SATURDAY, JUNE 22)

### Panel Two: Xenophobia in Practice: Measuring and Comparing

*Paper: Andrej Skolkay (University of St. Cyril and Methodius, Trnava), Xenophobia: A Catalyst of Hate Speech in Slovakia and Slovenia*

**Andrej Skolkay** presented a paper on comparative research of hate speech and xenophobia in two countries, Slovakia and Slovenia. He found several crucial historical, societal and political similarities between these two countries enabling him to discover both the particularities of each country and their commonalties. His principal claim was that neither Slovak nor Slovenian society pays enough attention to hate speech. In his empirical section, he focused on the attitudes of the public. Results were very ambiguous. Both the Slovak and the Slovenian public expressed a self-declared tolerance to ethnic minorities while admitting that they would not like their child getting married to a minority member, such as the Roma. Though levels of self-declared tolerance has increased dramatically since 1989, sixty one percent of the Slovak population and two thirds of the Slovenian population are completely or slightly racist, as they cannot imagine having a minority member in their family. The tension between these two attitudes shows susceptibility to racism among the respective populations as well as a lack of potential for anti-racist mobilization.

The next area of Skolkay's research was the media and journalism as such. In the Slovak case, he registered one daily, which is openly racist; in Slovenia there are several media that can be called racist. Yet, in both countries the majority of media simply do not care. This indifference is best observed when a racially motivated crime occurs. In neither country is this crime considered top news, nor is it followed up carefully. Private TV channels usually treat racially motivated acts sensationally, like scandals. The elites and political representatives in both countries usually do not care either—unless they are pushed by international organizations. To fulfill the accession criteria and other requirements, local political elites attempt anti-xenophobic measures, such as governmental commissions for minorities, etc. Yet, hate speech among top politicians is not unexceptional, especially among the members of nationalist parties. In respect of civil society, Skolkay tried to disrupt the myth of an extraordinarily well-functioning civil society in Slovakia. He claimed that spontaneous civil society is weak, in fact, it is nonexistent. The network calling itself civil society is a clientelist system with its own political agenda. In Slovenia the author identified two waves of civil society mobilization, the first in the 1980s when Slovenian intellectuals criticized the Communist Yugoslav regime and the second in 2001 when Slovenian civil society got a new lease of life.

In his policy recommendations section, Skolkay focused on hate speech, which in both countries is neither sufficiently tackled in legal terms, nor in terms of cultural taboos. In this respect Skolkay

pointed out the allegedly innocent realm of jokes and insisted they be censored, at least in public media. Especially in small countries with short history of national sovereignty, such as Slovakia and Slovenia, jokes about their neighbors and ethnic minorities are often very entrenched. Skolkay called attention to their negative potential when expressed on TV or from the mouths of politicians and public figures. A potentially vulnerable area, especially in Slovakia, might be with an increase of refugees. Nowadays, Slovakia is still a transit country, but in several years this might change. Non-white foreigners, people of color, and Slovaks born in racially mixed marriages are not sufficiently protected from verbal and physical attacks from extremists with the majority society. In discussion, Skolkay was criticized for advocating an unrealistic and potentially dangerous view on hate speech, calling to ban jokes, etc. As one participant said, there is a need for carefulness. The cost for forbidding jokes and other public expressions is a limitation of free speech.

*Paper: Galina Vitkovskaya (International Organization for Migration, Moscow), Forced Migration and Migrantophobia in Russia*

**Galina Vitkovskaya**'s research mapped the attitudes of Russian society towards immigrants. Her findings show two types of phobias regarding immigrants to Russia. The first type is what she called 'Caucaso-phobia' (here referring to the geographical area of Caucasus), the second type refers to images of immigrants as soaking scare resources, and Vitkovskaya called this 'poverty-phobia.' Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia has witnessed two types of migration. The first encompasses people from newly independent countries who have some ties in major Russian cities and have moved there to reunite with their family members or seek better job opportunities. Very often these immigrants are from the Caucasus region and are thus physically different from ethnic Russians. The second group are ethnic Russians who move to Russia from the newly independent states or from the Baltic states. Even though ethnically they are similar to the major society, they are often victims of rejection and mythmaking.

Caucaso-phobia is, according to Vitkovskaya's findings, the most robust kind of xenophobia in contemporary Russia, greater than anti-Semitism. The reasons respondents give for this type of phobia can be grouped in three categories. (1) Fear of the armed conflicts in Azerbaijan, and Chechnya and transmission of violence. (2) The view that immigrants do not respect the norms of behavior of the receiving society. (3) A belief that they are very well-off (what Vitkovskaya explained by the prestige-orientation of the Caucasus cultures—the immigrants often present themselves more well-off than they really are). Moreover, Vitkovskaya singled out one more reason stemming from cultural differences between the immigrants and the receiving Russian society. This is (4) disrespect of the immigrants' jobs—immigrants often work in trade, what is a profession traditionally disrespected by Russians. If they are involved in crime, the Caucasians establish ethnically based criminal groups, which are more visible, becoming another cause (5) of Caucaso-phobia. Thus ethno-cultural difference is the main source of Caucaso-phobia and Russians tend not to differentiate between different peoples from the Caucasus. Other groups of immigrants, such as the Ukrainians or the Chinese, are not similarly stigmatized. On the contrary, for instance in eastern part of Russia Chinese men are very popular among Russian women, who seek to marry them, as Chinese are considered more polite and without the drinking problem.

Ethnic Russians moving to Russia from the newly independent countries, the so-called repatriants, face yet another type of stigmatization. Signs of this are also institutional, not only in the realm of popular attitudes. Although most of these people were highly educated professionals living in urban areas, they are sent to remote villages, where they can neither accommodate and settle down, nor find adequate jobs. They are perceived negatively by their environment, chiefly as (1) competitors

for scarce jobs and resources and as (2) carrying some negative traits. The repatriants are popularly accused of having been really well off but hiding it in order to get state support. In fact, Vitkovskaya's research shows, these people are really poor, as they have moved in rush and spend lots of money on moving and transportation. Almost unexceptionally, these people did not manage to reach the living standard they have had before moving to Russia.

Vitkovskaya gave policy prescriptions only on the institutional level and she called for releasing the movement barriers for repatriants. Even though her presentation went deep into the structure of xenophobic attitudes in Russia, the written paper offered several crucial sections of quantitative data, which were brought to the fore by other participants immediately after the end of Vitkovskaya's presentation. In comparison to Eastern and Central European countries the level of xenophobia in Russia is very low.

*Discussion Papers*

**Bori Simonovits**, a sociologist from the Budapest agency TÁRKI, presented comparative results of attitudinal researches conducted in Hungary from 1990 till 2002. The research included standard closed questions on xenophobia and xenophobic attitudes and showed a peak first in 1995, which Simonovits interpreted as caused by the toughest year of economic reform, and then rising again in 2001. The discussion after this contribution dealt with the applicability and reliability of such data. As one participant claimed after the presentation, such attitudinal polls are incorrect, especially if they are interpreted in term of percentage of xenophobes and non-xenophobes. Since Hungary, like many other countries, has certain international obligations as to which it has to accept immigrants, even if the respondent does not like the immigrants, he or she might answer in favor of immigration knowing the international obligations have to be kept. Moreover, others added, some questions in the questionnaire were simply too restrictive and did not allow for free expressions of one's view. This for instance the question whether one thinks that there might be criminals among immigrants. As one participant pointed out, it is a fact that among any group there are real or potential criminals. To be aware of this and answer respectively does not make one into a xenophobe. The young sociologist was not able to address these criticisms.

**Antal Örkény**, a sociologist from Eötvös Loránd University in Budapest, presented the results of his comparative research on xenophobia in twenty-three countries. His principalfinding was in the difference between Western and Eastern and Central Europe. As Örkény put it, going East xenophobia increases. To the two categories from Simonovits's research, that of xenophobes and non-xenophobes, he added a third one, that of those who are ambivalent, who change their views from question to question or are indifferent. In the former communist countries, either the category of xenophobes or that of the ambivalent is very large. He offered several types of explanations why people are xenophobes. Interestingly, sex and age are not significant variables. What matters, however, is education; but unlike in the West, in Eastern and Central Europe higher education does notsuffice for decreased tendency towards xenophobia. In this respect, Örkény disrupted the popular belief that there is a difference between benign patriotism and malign nationalism and showed that, in terms of attitudes, there is only potentially dangerous nationalism, which is a step towards xenophobia. In the discussion, the 'Eastern exception' that higher education does not preclude from xenophobia was addressed. As this problem is especially present in Hungary, a participant asked a logical question, whether it is not the educational system and curriculum itself that makes people first into nationalists and then into xenophobes.

**Borbála Kriza** presented the findings of her qualitative research. Together with two colleagues she analyzed speeches and public addresses of the Hungarian nationalist party(MIÉP) leader, István

Csurka, using the technique of discourse and content analysis. She singled out three general features of Csurka's discourse: (1) it is based on in-group/outgroup dichotomy, the audience gets more about the out-group than about the actual program and aims of the party; (2) each narrative contributes to a whole discourse with a special logic; and (3) social and ethnic aspects are mixed. Targeted out-groups fall into several categories: political (liberals, communist), ethnic (Jews, Roma, immigrants, nationals of neighboring countries), and social (both up and down—upper class, migrants, refugees). The second part of Kriza's research focused on reasons why young people become members of this far right party. This part of research was based on in-depth interviews with young party-members. Reasons include a lack of sense of community, lack of competitive ideologies, and a lack of strong leaders. Kriza recommended improvement especially in the education system and pointed out at its structural backwardness. She also called for regular monitoring of media on hate speech.

**Pál Nyíri** responded with a set of questions, the principal among which the workshop addressed being the question regarding measurements of racist violence and of the interrelationship between official discourse and media on this issue. Wilhelm Heitmeyer emphasized the danger to take tolerance as a catchall word and stressed that tolerance can also mean indifference. He pointed to the asymmetry in relationship between the majority and the minority noting that it is only the majority, which can chose from the position of power to be tolerant. Tolerance is thus a uni-directional issue. Boris Tsilevich welcomed this remark and added that, in the area of terms and concepts, there is a huge demand for clarification and unification. He also expressed a criticism of international legal guarantees on behalf of the minorities and the minority affairs agenda in the EU. He claimed the EU regulations and pressure on the accession countries are nothing more than prudential acts, which aim ,for instance, to prevent a high influx of Roma to the EU. The final round of comments and questions brought to the fore yet other ideas. One participant said that race crimes are low in Hungary because the level of reporting is very low, a reflection of the fact that the police themselves are racist. Another participant pointed at the multiplicity of anti-racist discourse in the EU, out of which the accession countries can choose. Yet another returned to the hate speech ban proposal and offered a differentiation between institutional measures, which should not restrict free speech, and what could be called informal civilizational maturity. Hate speech should be kept down exactly by this maturity, which could be achieved by other means than law, such as education. The discussion went on and **Violetta Zentai** closed the workshop long after the scheduled end. She stressed the importance of such exchanges and expressed hope that the workshop was only a beginning of a discussion which will continue